Jessica L. Kuredjian

The applicant sought a declaration regarding the interpretation of a unanimous shareholders agreement for a family-owned steel distribution business.

The applicant argued the agreement required the board of directors to consist of the registered holders of voting shares, while the respondent argued the board was to be elected by a resolution of those shareholders.

Applying the principles of contractual interpretation, the court found the ordinary and grammatical meaning of the provision, read in context with the surrounding circumstances, supported the respondent's interpretation.

The application was dismissed.

Appeal from a summary judgment order finding the appellants liable for civil fraud in connection with a fraudulent warranty repair scheme.

The appellants, through Eaton Equipment Ltd., submitted falsified invoices and receipts to Canadian Tire Corporation for repairs that were never performed, resulting in losses exceeding $3.2 million.

The Court of Appeal upheld the summary judgment against all appellants except Carleigh Milburn.

It held that the motion judge's reasoning as to her knowledge of the fraud was insufficiently explained and left an inferential gap between her dealings with her father's funds and the conclusion that she knowingly participated, so the summary judgment against her was set aside.

The appeal was allowed as it relates to Carleigh Milburn and dismissed as it relates to the other individual and corporate appellants.

Given her success on appeal, she was exempted from the costs ordered on appeal and released from liability for the costs ordered in the court below.

The defendant repair shop brought a motion to strike the plaintiff's negligence claim under Rules 21.01(1)(b) and 25.11 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing the statement of claim disclosed no reasonable cause of action and was scandalous, frivolous, or an abuse of process.

The plaintiff alleged the repair shop negligently failed to properly inspect and diagnose vehicle damage following a motor vehicle accident, improperly diagnosed necessary repairs, and failed to disclose known defects.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the plaintiff had sufficiently pleaded all elements of negligence and that the claim was viable and should proceed to trial.

The court also rejected the defendant's argument that the Insurance Act barred the claim.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed a motion by the appellants for a Norwich-type order seeking production of insurance-related documents from non-parties in the context of an appeal.

The court held that Norwich orders are a pre-trial remedy and are not available at the appellate stage.

The court also found that, even if such an order were available, it would not be appropriate in this case given the findings of fraud against the appellants and the lack of relevance of insurance proceeds to the damages award.

Costs were awarded to the respondent.

This is an appeal from a motion judge's decision dismissing a Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation (SLAPP) motion.

The appellants (defendants in the original action) sought to dismiss Canadian Tire's fraud action, arguing it arose from their expressions related to public interest (complaints about privacy violations and defective products).

The motion judge found the action did not arise from an expression and that the plaintiff's motive was irrelevant at the threshold stage of a SLAPP analysis under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The Court of Appeal affirmed this, holding that a plaintiff's motive is not a relevant factor at the first stage of the SLAPP analysis, which is restricted to determining if the action arises from an expression related to a matter of public interest.

The appeal on costs was also dismissed, as the motion judge properly exercised discretion.

The defendants brought a motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss the plaintiff's action, arguing it was a SLAPP intended to silence their complaints about the plaintiff selling defective products and violating privacy laws.

The plaintiff's action alleged the defendants perpetrated a fraudulent scheme involving false repair receipts.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the defendants failed to meet the threshold burden under s. 137.1(3) because the plaintiff's claim was grounded in fraud, not in any expressions made by the defendants.

Costs were awarded to the plaintiff.

The defendants brought a cross-motion under Rule 21.01(3)(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking to dismiss the plaintiffs' action on the grounds that the plaintiffs lacked legal capacity to commence or continue the action.

The defendants argued that the loan funds were not advanced by Scott Dorey, that the Dorey Capital Family Trust (DCFT) had conveyed its rights to the funds to other entities, and that Ora Trustees Limited had not proven its trusteeship.

The plaintiffs disputed these claims, asserting that Scott Dorey was a proper party, that no valid transfer of receivables occurred, or that they were transferred back to DCFT, and provided evidence of Ora's trusteeship.

The court applied the "plain and obvious" test for Rule 21 motions, noting that such motions are not for resolving serious factual disputes or credibility issues.

Given the numerous disputed facts and credibility determinations required regarding the alleged transfers of the loan receivable and the chain of trusteeship, the court dismissed the defendants' motion.

The plaintiff brought an unsuccessful motion for an injunction to prevent a property sale.

The successful defendants sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis, arguing the motion had no reasonable prospect of success.

The court agreed, finding the plaintiff's claim was purely monetary and the injunction was a misguided attempt at pre-judgment enforcement.

The court awarded substantial indemnity costs but declined to award per diem delay costs, noting such losses must be pursued as a counterclaim rather than as costs.

The plaintiff was ordered to pay $24,000 in all-inclusive costs.

The plaintiff, an unsecured creditor, brought an urgent motion for summary judgment to enforce a draft settlement agreement, or alternatively, an interlocutory injunction to prevent the sale of a property by the defendants, or an order that the sale proceeds be paid into court.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the summary judgment relief was not included in the notice of motion.

Furthermore, the proceeds of the sale were entirely consumed by a first mortgage, leaving no funds for the plaintiff.

The court also held that the plaintiff failed to meet the RJR-MacDonald test for an injunction, as he did not establish a strong prima facie case or irreparable harm, given his claim was merely for repayment of a loan.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court decision awarding $10,000 in punitive damages to the respondent consumer.

The consumer had signed what she believed was a purchase agreement for HVAC equipment at 0% interest, but the pre-printed form was a 10-year rental agreement.

The trial judge found the consumer was the victim of a fraud in her home.

On appeal, the Divisional Court upheld the punitive damages award, finding that the appellant's agent made unconscionable representations and the appellant unreasonably insisted on enforcing the fraudulently obtained rental agreement despite obvious inconsistencies on the face of the contract.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court decision awarding $10,000 in punitive damages to the respondent consumer.

The consumer had signed a pre-printed HVAC rental agreement after being told she was purchasing the equipment at zero percent interest, and she handwrote these terms onto the contract.

The trial judge found the transaction was a fraud and awarded punitive damages.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that while the trial judge made some factual errors regarding an 'elaborate scheme', the appellant's conduct—including relying on a fraudulently obtained contract, attempting to intimidate the consumer, and breaching multiple provisions of the Consumer Protection Act—justified the punitive damages award.

The moving parties sought leave to appeal an order of Koehnen J. The Divisional Court issued an amended endorsement to reflect that the moving parties were represented by counsel, as a Notice of Change of Lawyer had been filed but not uploaded to Caselines.

The motion for leave to appeal was dismissed, and costs of $5,000 were awarded to the responding party.

The plaintiffs in a price-fixing class action regarding electrolytic capacitors moved for court approval of a $5.9 million settlement with the Panasonic defendants, as well as approval of class counsel fees and disbursements.

The court found the settlement, which included significant cooperation from the settling defendants, to be fair, reasonable, and in the best interests of the class.

The court also approved the retainer agreements and the requested class counsel fees of $1,487,500 (25% of the settlement) and disbursements of $141,866.96, noting the complexity and risk of the litigation.

The plaintiff in a class action alleging a price-fixing conspiracy regarding film capacitors moved for approval of a settlement with the Panasonic defendants and for approval of class counsel fees.

The court found the $1.35 million settlement, which included valuable cooperation from the settling defendants, to be fair and reasonable despite being heavily discounted from the estimated exposure.

The court also approved the requested class counsel fees of 25% of the settlement, but ordered the payment to be split into two installments to incentivize counsel to advance the litigation more expeditiously.

The applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and sought various statutory accident benefits.

After the respondent eventually agreed to fund the disputed benefits, the sole remaining issue was whether the applicant was entitled to a special award under section 10 of O. Reg. 664 for unreasonable delay.

The Tribunal found that the respondent unreasonably delayed payment by improperly claiming that section 25 assessments were duplications of section 44 assessments and by failing to reconsider earlier denials after removing the applicant from the Minor Injury Guideline.

A nominal special award of $400 was ordered.

BSMW Financial Inc. moved to convert an application brought by Triumph Capital Limited into an action, and sought alternate relief to strike certain paragraphs of Triumph's affidavit.

The court considered factors for converting an application to an action, including material facts in dispute, complex issues, need for discovery, and impact of relief.

Finding significant material facts in dispute, issues beyond document interpretation, and credibility concerns requiring viva voce evidence, the court granted the motion to convert Triumph's application into an action.

BSMW's cross-application was also converted to an action to be heard concurrently due to intermingled and interdependent issues.

The moving parties (the Innes Parties) brought a motion for summary judgment in two related actions arising from a share purchase agreement for a quarry business.

The responding parties (the Guido Parties) defaulted on payments under a promissory note and failed to assume mortgages as agreed, but argued they were induced into the agreement by misrepresentations regarding the quarry licence, the standing of the mortgages, and the condition of equipment.

The court found no genuine issues for trial, concluding that no misrepresentations were made and that the entire agreement clause precluded the pre-contractual representations alleged.

Summary judgment was granted in favour of the Innes Parties for $1,477,200, plus a declaration for indemnity regarding the mortgages.

The plaintiff, Rosemary Sheldon, succeeded in her personal injury action against the defendant, Manuel Reyna, following a 15-day judge-alone trial.

This endorsement addresses the plaintiff's requests for correction of a damages award for gardening services, prejudgment interest, postjudgment interest, costs on a partial indemnity basis, and an order for periodic payments.

The court confirmed the total judgment amount, awarded prejudgment and postjudgment interest, and granted partial indemnity costs to the plaintiff, with a minor reduction in disbursements.

An order for periodic payments was also made.

The plaintiff was injured in a rear-end motor vehicle collision for which the defendant admitted liability.

The court found that the plaintiff sustained a permanent, serious impairment of an important physical, mental, or psychological function, specifically chronic pain and somatic symptom disorder.

The court awarded $100,000 in non-pecuniary general damages, $394,800.32 for future loss of income, $19,655.37 for out-of-pocket expenses, and various amounts for future care costs, while dismissing the claim for past loss of income.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for leave to amend their statement of claim.

The defendant opposed several proposed amendments, including the addition of an alternative claim for damages for spoliation and claims related to the loss of long-term disability benefits.

The Master granted leave to amend to plead the independent tort of spoliation, noting it remains an open question in Ontario.

However, leave was denied for the proposed amendment claiming damages against the tort defendant for a long-term disability insurer's denial of benefits.

The motion was granted in part, with parties bearing their own costs.