Jessica L. Kuredjian

Appeal from a summary judgment order finding the appellants liable for civil fraud in connection with a fraudulent warranty repair scheme.

The appellants, through Eaton Equipment Ltd., submitted falsified invoices and receipts to Canadian Tire Corporation for repairs that were never performed, resulting in losses exceeding $3.2 million.

The Court of Appeal upheld the summary judgment against all appellants except Carleigh Milburn, finding that the motion judge's reasoning regarding her knowledge of the fraud was insufficiently explained and contained an inferential gap.

The appeal was allowed in part as it relates to Carleigh Milburn, but dismissed as it relates to the other appellants.

The defendant repair shop brought a motion to strike the plaintiff's negligence claim under Rules 21.01(1)(b) and 25.11 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing the statement of claim disclosed no reasonable cause of action and was scandalous, frivolous, or an abuse of process.

The plaintiff alleged the repair shop negligently failed to properly inspect and diagnose vehicle damage following a motor vehicle accident, improperly diagnosed necessary repairs, and failed to disclose known defects.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the plaintiff had sufficiently pleaded all elements of negligence and that the claim was viable and should proceed to trial.

The court also rejected the defendant's argument that the Insurance Act barred the claim.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed a motion by the appellants for a Norwich-type order seeking production of insurance-related documents from non-parties in the context of an appeal.

The court held that Norwich orders are a pre-trial remedy and are not available at the appellate stage.

The court also found that, even if such an order were available, it would not be appropriate in this case given the findings of fraud against the appellants and the lack of relevance of insurance proceeds to the damages award.

Costs were awarded to the respondent.

This is an appeal from a motion judge's decision dismissing a Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation (SLAPP) motion.

The appellants (defendants in the original action) sought to dismiss Canadian Tire's fraud action, arguing it arose from their expressions related to public interest (complaints about privacy violations and defective products).

The motion judge found the action did not arise from an expression and that the plaintiff's motive was irrelevant at the threshold stage of a SLAPP analysis under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The Court of Appeal affirmed this, holding that a plaintiff's motive is not a relevant factor at the first stage of the SLAPP analysis, which is restricted to determining if the action arises from an expression related to a matter of public interest.

The appeal on costs was also dismissed, as the motion judge properly exercised discretion.

The defendants brought a motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss the plaintiff's action, arguing it was a SLAPP intended to silence their complaints about the plaintiff selling defective products and violating privacy laws.

The plaintiff's action alleged the defendants perpetrated a fraudulent scheme involving false repair receipts.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the defendants failed to meet the threshold burden under s. 137.1(3) because the plaintiff's claim was grounded in fraud, not in any expressions made by the defendants.

Costs were awarded to the plaintiff.

The defendants brought a cross-motion under Rule 21.01(3)(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking to dismiss the plaintiffs' action on the grounds that the plaintiffs lacked legal capacity to commence or continue the action.

The defendants argued that the loan funds were not advanced by Scott Dorey, that the Dorey Capital Family Trust (DCFT) had conveyed its rights to the funds to other entities, and that Ora Trustees Limited had not proven its trusteeship.

The plaintiffs disputed these claims, asserting that Scott Dorey was a proper party, that no valid transfer of receivables occurred, or that they were transferred back to DCFT, and provided evidence of Ora's trusteeship.

The court applied the "plain and obvious" test for Rule 21 motions, noting that such motions are not for resolving serious factual disputes or credibility issues.

Given the numerous disputed facts and credibility determinations required regarding the alleged transfers of the loan receivable and the chain of trusteeship, the court dismissed the defendants' motion.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court decision awarding $10,000 in punitive damages to the respondent consumer.

The consumer had signed a pre-printed HVAC rental agreement after being told she was purchasing the equipment at zero percent interest, and she handwrote these terms onto the contract.

The trial judge found the transaction was a fraud and awarded punitive damages.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that while the trial judge made some factual errors regarding an 'elaborate scheme', the appellant's conduct—including relying on a fraudulently obtained contract, attempting to intimidate the consumer, and breaching multiple provisions of the Consumer Protection Act—justified the punitive damages award.

BSMW Financial Inc. moved to convert an application brought by Triumph Capital Limited into an action, and sought alternate relief to strike certain paragraphs of Triumph's affidavit.

The court considered factors for converting an application to an action, including material facts in dispute, complex issues, need for discovery, and impact of relief.

Finding significant material facts in dispute, issues beyond document interpretation, and credibility concerns requiring viva voce evidence, the court granted the motion to convert Triumph's application into an action.

BSMW's cross-application was also converted to an action to be heard concurrently due to intermingled and interdependent issues.

The plaintiff, Rosemary Sheldon, succeeded in her personal injury action against the defendant, Manuel Reyna, following a 15-day judge-alone trial.

This endorsement addresses the plaintiff's requests for correction of a damages award for gardening services, prejudgment interest, postjudgment interest, costs on a partial indemnity basis, and an order for periodic payments.

The court confirmed the total judgment amount, awarded prejudgment and postjudgment interest, and granted partial indemnity costs to the plaintiff, with a minor reduction in disbursements.

An order for periodic payments was also made.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for leave to amend their statement of claim.

The defendant opposed several proposed amendments, including the addition of an alternative claim for damages for spoliation and claims related to the loss of long-term disability benefits.

The Master granted leave to amend to plead the independent tort of spoliation, noting it remains an open question in Ontario.

However, leave was denied for the proposed amendment claiming damages against the tort defendant for a long-term disability insurer's denial of benefits.

The motion was granted in part, with parties bearing their own costs.

During a personal injury trial, the plaintiff's counsel brought a motion under Rule 53.01(3) to recall the plaintiff as a witness after new documents were produced during the cross-examination of the plaintiff's family doctor.

The documents, which had not been disclosed prior to trial, contained notes and handwriting suggesting the plaintiff was attempting to manage her medical case.

The court granted the motion, finding that the interests of justice and trial fairness required giving the plaintiff an opportunity to explain the newly produced documents, and imposed restrictions on counsel's communications with the plaintiff prior to her recall.

The appellants appealed a judgment from the Superior Court of Justice rendered by Justice Paul B. Kane following a jury trial.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and awarded the appellants costs of the appeal in the amount of $22,000.

The costs of the trial were reserved to the discretion of the judge presiding over the re-trial.

The plaintiff was rear-ended in a motor vehicle accident and claimed soft tissue damages, chronic pain, anxiety, and depression.

The defendant admitted liability, and the sole issue at trial was damages.

The trial judge qualified a defence psychiatrist as an expert despite serious reservations about his methodology and independence.

The expert's testimony focused primarily on alleged inconsistencies between what the plaintiff told him and her medical records, essentially attacking her credibility rather than providing independent psychiatric assessment.

The jury awarded only general damages of $23,500 and rejected all other heads of damages.

On appeal, the court found the trial judge failed to properly discharge his gatekeeper duty by not conducting a cost-benefit analysis at the qualification stage and failed to exercise his ongoing gatekeeper function when the expert's lack of impartiality became apparent during testimony.

The applicants sought a declaration that their insurers had a duty to defend and indemnify them in an underlying tort action, along with punitive damages and costs.

The insurers eventually acknowledged the duty to defend and indemnify for reasonable legal fees.

The court found the declaration issue moot due to the insurers' acknowledgment, assessed the reasonable costs for both the tort defence and the coverage dispute, and dismissed the claim for punitive damages, finding the insurers' conduct did not meet the high threshold for such an award.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment seeking to dismiss a social host liability claim arising from a party where an underage guest became intoxicated and was seriously injured in a car accident after leaving.

The court dismissed the motion, finding genuine issues of material fact that could not be fairly and justly determined on summary judgment.

The court also held that the established law on social host liability, particularly *Childs v. Desormeaux*, did not preclude a duty of care in this case, especially given the presence of underage drinking and the host's supervisory role.