Colin Pendrith

Appeal from a summary judgment order finding the appellants liable for civil fraud in connection with a fraudulent warranty repair scheme.

The appellants, through Eaton Equipment Ltd., submitted falsified invoices and receipts to Canadian Tire Corporation for repairs that were never performed, resulting in losses exceeding $3.2 million.

The Court of Appeal upheld the summary judgment against all appellants except Carleigh Milburn, finding that the motion judge's reasoning regarding her knowledge of the fraud was insufficiently explained and contained an inferential gap.

The appeal was allowed in part as it relates to Carleigh Milburn, but dismissed as it relates to the other appellants.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed a motion by the appellants for a Norwich-type order seeking production of insurance-related documents from non-parties in the context of an appeal.

The court held that Norwich orders are a pre-trial remedy and are not available at the appellate stage.

The court also found that, even if such an order were available, it would not be appropriate in this case given the findings of fraud against the appellants and the lack of relevance of insurance proceeds to the damages award.

Costs were awarded to the respondent.

The applicants, a group of companies undergoing CCAA proceedings, sought to extend the existing stay of proceedings to DAK Capital Inc., a non-debtor third-party guarantor involved in an arbitration with Canopy Growth Corporation.

Canopy opposed, arguing that CCAA s. 11.04 prohibits such an extension for guarantors.

The court, relying on the broad inherent jurisdiction under CCAA s. 11 and recent Ontario precedents, found that s. 11.04 is a clarifying provision, not a prohibitive one, and granted the temporary stay against DAK Capital to prevent distraction from the ongoing restructuring efforts.

BZAM Ltd. and Cortland Credit Lending Corporation brought a motion for security for costs against Final Bell Holdings International Ltd. within an ongoing CCAA proceeding.

Final Bell had initiated a claim alleging fraudulent misrepresentation against BZAM and seeking damages and equitable relief, including a constructive trust.

The court determined that Rule 56.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, concerning security for costs, applies to claims within CCAA proceedings, and that Cortland, as a directly affected stakeholder, was entitled to seek such security.

Finding that Final Bell was ordinarily resident outside Ontario and had insufficient assets to satisfy a costs award, the court ordered Final Bell to post security for costs in favour of BZAM ($350,000) and Cortland ($147,000).

Additionally, Final Bell was ordered to pay the costs of the motion to BZAM ($20,000) and Cortland ($8,500).

The defendants in two related oppression actions brought a motion to compel the plaintiffs to re-attend examinations for discovery to answer refused questions and to produce a solicitor's file.

The defendants also sought leave to examine a non-party.

The refused questions related to the plaintiffs' consultations with lawyers, which the defendants argued were relevant to their limitation period defence and discoverability.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the requested information and files were protected by solicitor-client privilege, which had not been waived, and were not relevant to the discoverability issue since the consultations occurred within the two-year limitation period.

The request to examine the non-party was also dismissed as the communications were privileged.

This is an appeal from a motion judge's decision dismissing a Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation (SLAPP) motion.

The appellants (defendants in the original action) sought to dismiss Canadian Tire's fraud action, arguing it arose from their expressions related to public interest (complaints about privacy violations and defective products).

The motion judge found the action did not arise from an expression and that the plaintiff's motive was irrelevant at the threshold stage of a SLAPP analysis under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The Court of Appeal affirmed this, holding that a plaintiff's motive is not a relevant factor at the first stage of the SLAPP analysis, which is restricted to determining if the action arises from an expression related to a matter of public interest.

The appeal on costs was also dismissed, as the motion judge properly exercised discretion.

Canopy Growth Corporation brought an unopposed motion under section 69.4 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act to lift the stay of proceedings against 3 Sixty Secure Corp. and 3 Sixty Risk Solutions Ltd. The purpose was to pursue a claim related to a fire at Canopy's property, seeking recovery on a potential insurance contract.

The court granted the order, finding no prejudice to the company or other creditors, as any insurance proceeds would only be available to third parties like Canopy, not general creditors.

The appellant, Cipponeri Construction Services Inc. (CCSI), appealed a motion judge's order dismissing its 2020 action against Westin Homes Ltd. and Michael Orsi as an abuse of process.

The 2020 action was commenced to preserve a limitation period for a claim against Westin that had been ineffectively asserted in a prior 2018 counterclaim.

The Court of Appeal found the motion judge erred in dismissing the 2020 action against Westin as an abuse of process, as it was initiated to preserve a limitation period.

The court varied the order, staying the 2020 action against Westin, requiring CCSI to promptly move to amend the 2018 counterclaim to add itself as a plaintiff, and stipulating that no limitation period defense prior to March 16, 2020, would be asserted.

The dismissal against Orsi personally was upheld.

The plaintiffs, Resolute Forest Products Inc. and its affiliates, brought a motion seeking an order to waive the deemed undertaking rule under Rule 30.1.01(8) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

They sought to use discovery evidence, including documents, from the Ontario action in a related defamation and intentional interference with economic relations action commenced in the United States District Court of the Northern District of California.

The defendants, Greenpeace Canada and its employees, opposed the motion.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that Resolute failed to demonstrate a superior public interest that would outweigh the privacy protections of the deemed undertaking rule.

The court noted that the parties and issues in the Canadian and US actions were not sufficiently similar to warrant a waiver, and that Rule 30.1.01(6) already permits the use of discovery evidence for impeachment in another proceeding, including foreign ones.

The court also found that Resolute was not sufficiently particular about what specific evidence was required.

The defendants brought a motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss the plaintiff's action, arguing it was a SLAPP intended to silence their complaints about the plaintiff selling defective products and violating privacy laws.

The plaintiff's action alleged the defendants perpetrated a fraudulent scheme involving false repair receipts.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the defendants failed to meet the threshold burden under s. 137.1(3) because the plaintiff's claim was grounded in fraud, not in any expressions made by the defendants.

Costs were awarded to the plaintiff.

This endorsement addresses three motions in an oppression action concerning the Paramount Group, a food services business facing shareholder deadlock.

The plaintiffs (Mohamad Fakih et al.) moved to strike portions of the defendants' counterclaim alleging fraudulent misrepresentation and for security for costs.

The defendants (AHM Investments Corporation et al.) moved for compliance with financial disclosure and the appointment of an auditor.

The court partially granted the motion to strike due to insufficient particulars of fraud.

The motion for security for costs was dismissed, as the counterclaim was inextricably linked to the defence and, at its core, an oppression remedy claim, which is exempt from security for costs under the OBCA.

The defendants' motion for financial disclosure and the appointment of an auditor was granted, affirming shareholders' mandatory right to audited financial statements, with the Paramount Group responsible for the audit fees.

The defendants brought a cross-motion under Rule 21.01(3)(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking to dismiss the plaintiffs' action on the grounds that the plaintiffs lacked legal capacity to commence or continue the action.

The defendants argued that the loan funds were not advanced by Scott Dorey, that the Dorey Capital Family Trust (DCFT) had conveyed its rights to the funds to other entities, and that Ora Trustees Limited had not proven its trusteeship.

The plaintiffs disputed these claims, asserting that Scott Dorey was a proper party, that no valid transfer of receivables occurred, or that they were transferred back to DCFT, and provided evidence of Ora's trusteeship.

The court applied the "plain and obvious" test for Rule 21 motions, noting that such motions are not for resolving serious factual disputes or credibility issues.

Given the numerous disputed facts and credibility determinations required regarding the alleged transfers of the loan receivable and the chain of trusteeship, the court dismissed the defendants' motion.

The applicant sought leave to appeal an arbitration award regarding the calculation of a net profits interest in a mining property.

The respondent argued the arbitration agreement precluded appeals, but the court found no such exclusion.

However, the court dismissed the application for leave to appeal, concluding that the arbitrator's interpretation of the agreement involved questions of mixed fact and law, and the applicant failed to identify any extricable errors of law.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiff's $10.5 million claim and the granting of the defendant's counterclaim on a motion for summary judgment, the successful defendant sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis.

The court rejected the claim for substantial indemnity costs, finding the plaintiff's conduct did not meet the requisite standard of reprehensible conduct.

Applying the factors under Rule 57.01 and the principle of proportionality, the court reduced the defendant's claimed hours and fixed costs at $80,000 inclusive of disbursements and HST.

Following a successful appeal of a Master's order regarding a certificate of pending litigation, the appellants sought substantial indemnity costs based on an ex parte non-disclosure and settlement offers.

The court declined substantial indemnity but awarded partial indemnity costs with a premium for a bona fide settlement offer made prior to the hearing.

Costs were fixed at $24,805.22 inclusive of the motion below and the appeal.

The defendant, King Packaged Materials Company, brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's (Construction Distribution & Supply Co. Inc.) action for insufficient termination notice of a distribution agreement and to grant its counterclaim for unpaid products.

The court found that the unwritten, non-exclusive distribution agreement, which lasted 18 years, implied a term for reasonable notice of termination based on industry custom.

Considering factors such as the plaintiff's low dependence on the defendant's products (less than 5% of total sales) and lack of substantial investment, the court determined that the three months' notice provided by the defendant was reasonable.

Consequently, the plaintiff's claim for damages was dismissed, and the defendant's counterclaim for $93,890.49 plus interest for unpaid products was granted.

This is an appeal from a Master's decision concerning an ex parte certificate of pending litigation.

The Superior Court found that the plaintiff failed to make full and fair disclosure of material facts when obtaining the certificate, misstating the nature and purpose of underlying agreements related to an interest in land.

The Master also erred in ordering all proceeds of sale into court, exceeding the plaintiff's claimed interest.

The appeal was allowed, the Master's order set aside, and the certificate of pending litigation discharged.

The plaintiff sued ten fuel providers for losses arising from fraudulent fuel card transactions.

The defendants brought motions to sever the proceedings.

The parties agreed to sever the claims against the Imperial defendants and stay the remaining claims pending the outcome of the Imperial action.

Shell brought a separate motion to stay the action against it based on a forum selection clause designating Alberta as the exclusive jurisdiction.

The court dismissed Shell's motion, finding that the policy against a multiplicity of proceedings constituted 'strong cause' to override the forum selection clause.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiffs' $7.5 million action for negligent enforcement of a sign by-law, the successful defendant municipality sought costs on an elevated partial indemnity basis.

The plaintiffs argued for a distributive costs order or no costs, claiming the action was public interest litigation.

The court rejected the public interest argument and declined to make a distributive costs order, but reduced the defendant's fees by 25% to account for time spent on an unsuccessful defence regarding a 1988 by-law.

The court also declined to award elevated costs, finding no reprehensible conduct by the plaintiffs.

Costs were fixed at $275,000 for fees and $79,510.26 for disbursements.

The defendants sought leave to appeal an interlocutory order dismissing their motion to strike portions of a reply in a defamation action.

The underlying action alleged defamatory statements and economic interference arising from publications about forestry practices in the Canadian boreal forest.

The reply pleading introduced allegations concerning a decades-long history of alleged unlawful campaigns by environmental organizations unrelated to the pleaded claim.

The court held there was good reason to doubt the correctness of the motions judge’s order permitting the expanded reply because it risked significantly broadening the scope of the litigation beyond the pleaded dispute.

Leave to appeal was granted given the importance of defining the permissible scope of reply pleadings and the risk of prejudice, delay, and unnecessary litigation costs.