Jordan Bryan Goldblatt

Meta brought a motion to dismiss or permanently stay Torstar's application, arguing that the dispute should be litigated in California pursuant to forum selection clauses in their News Innovation Agreement.

The court found that the forum selection clauses in Meta's Terms of Service and Commercial Terms applied to users of Meta's products, not to partners licensing content to Meta, and were therefore unclear and inapplicable.

Furthermore, the court held that even if the clauses applied, Torstar demonstrated strong cause not to enforce them, as the dispute involved the interpretation of the federal Online News Act and implicated Canadian public policy and constitutional values regarding freedom of the press.

In a bankruptcy proceeding, creditors brought a motion to lift the stay of proceedings against the bankrupt, who was allegedly involved in a mortgage fraud scheme.

In support, they filed affidavits detailing the alleged involvement of other defendants, including the moving parties on this cross-motion.

The moving parties sought to examine the affiant, strike portions of the affidavits, and seal the record.

The court dismissed the request to examine the affiant, finding it would not benefit the administration of the estate.

However, the court struck the impugned paragraphs under Rule 25.11, as they were irrelevant to the lift stay motion.

The request for a sealing order was dismissed without prejudice due to procedural failures and reliance on outdated case law.

The plaintiff brought an action for breach of contract, conspiracy, and unjust enrichment against the defendants for failing to deliver seven luxury watches purchased for $141,500 USD and failing to remit proceeds from three consigned handbags valued at $61,000 USD.

The defendants, who were self-represented, failed to respond to a Request to Admit and sought an adjournment at trial which was denied as the matter was peremptory.

The court granted judgment against both defendants jointly and severally for the Canadian equivalent of $194,500 USD, with prejudgment and postjudgment interest, but dismissed the claim for punitive damages.

Costs were deferred to the judicial official who determines the outstanding counterclaim.

The appellants challenged orders striking a defence and dismissing a related claim for disclosure non-compliance.

The court found the motion judge gave thorough reasons, exercised discretion within a case-managed context under rule 37.15, and committed no error warranting intervention.

The appeal was dismissed with substantial costs.

The moving party sought leave to appeal an order transferring a matter from the Family Law Team to the Civil Law Team in Toronto.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding that while there was good reason to doubt the motion judge's finding on jurisdiction, the decision to have the matter addressed by the Civil Law Team was an exercise of administrative discretion that did not raise a matter of such importance to warrant leave to appeal.

This is a costs endorsement in a contentious family business dispute between siblings who are trustees of their late father's estate.

The plaintiffs sought leave to amend their statement of claim substantially, adding new causes of action for restitution, unjust enrichment, and disgorgement, and adding a new defendant.

The defendants sought costs thrown away for all steps taken prior to the amendment, while the plaintiffs sought costs of their motion to amend.

The court declined to award costs thrown away at this stage, finding that the effect of the amendments on prior steps cannot be determined until trial.

However, the court awarded partial costs to the defendants for the protracted and inefficient amendment process itself.

This is a costs decision following the successful application by the applicants to set aside an arbitral award and associated costs award on grounds of procedural unfairness.

The applicants sought costs on a partial indemnity basis in the amount of $49,636.38 against Dr. Frank Fowlie.

The court awarded the full amount requested, finding the applicants were entirely successful and the quantum was fair and reasonable.

The court rejected Dr. Fowlie's argument that he should not bear costs as he was not responsible for the arbitrator's conduct, noting that he actively opposed the application and did not challenge the procedural ruling during the arbitration.

The court also rejected any suggestion that Wrestling Canada Lutte should share in the costs award.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario considered whether a medical office building in Toronto was held as an asset of a partnership or as a tenancy in common.

The appellants, majority owners, sought a declaration of partnership and related relief, while the respondents argued for a sale under the Partition Act.

The Court upheld the motion judge’s finding that no partnership existed, but found error in the order dispensing with the appellants’ consent to the sale of the property.

The Court directed a reference to an associate judge for the sale and denied leave to appeal the costs order.

The applicants, all lawyers previously retained by Jenny Tran, sought an order under section 140 of the Courts of Justice Act declaring Ms. Tran a vexatious litigant.

The court reviewed Ms. Tran’s extensive litigation history, including repeated and meritless proceedings, appeals, and actions against former counsel and judicial officers.

The court found that Ms. Tran displayed all hallmarks of a vexatious litigant and granted the application, prohibiting her from instituting or continuing proceedings without leave.

The court also fixed costs against Ms. Tran.

The defendant, Wrestling Canada Lutte, appealed a motion judge's decision declining to strike a breach of contract claim brought by the plaintiffs.

The plaintiffs alleged the defendant breached a dispute resolution clause by failing to engage in dispute resolution before terminating their independent contractor agreement without cause.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that a valid without-cause termination does not constitute a 'dispute' under the contract.

Because the contract was validly terminated and no dispute had been referred to arbitration prior to termination, the dispute resolution clause was not triggered.

The statement of claim was struck in its entirety.

The defendants brought a motion to dismiss a proposed class action for delay under section 29.1(1) of the Class Proceedings Act and Rule 24.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The action, commenced in 2016, involved allegations of breach of fiduciary duty and other claims against the Haudenosaunee Development Institute and co-defendants.

The court found that the plaintiffs had satisfied the requirements of section 29.1(1)(a) by filing a final and complete certification motion record and section 29.1(1)(c) as the court had established a timetable for advancing the proceeding.

While the overall delay of over eight years was deemed inordinate, it was found to be excusable, largely due to the defendants' own strategic delays in prosecuting their dismissal motion and their refusal to proceed with the certification motion concurrently.

The court also found no actual prejudice to the defendants' ability to have a fair trial.

Consequently, the defendants' motion to dismiss for delay was dismissed.

The appellant appealed an order striking his Notice of Application and refusing leave to amend, which sought Charter relief against the respondents.

The motion judge found the Charter claim could not succeed, was a collateral attack on a Law Society decision, and that the Charter did not apply to the individual respondents.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no error in the Charter interpretation or application, and that summary determination was not an abuse of process.

The Court also dismissed the appellant's motion for review of a single judge's order regarding joint representation, deeming it frivolous and an abuse of process.

The defendants brought a motion for leave to amend their Statement of Defence to add a counterclaim and new parties, alleging breach of contract and copyright infringement related to the transfer of intellectual property.

The plaintiffs opposed the motion, arguing the proposed counterclaim was statute-barred.

The court found that the defendants knew or ought to have known the material facts giving rise to the claim more than two years prior to seeking the amendment.

The court dismissed the motion, concluding the claims were statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002, and that allowing the amendment would cause non-compensable prejudice to the plaintiffs given the imminent trial date.

This was a motion for a stay of an order issued by Akazaki J. following a summary judgment motion.

The appellants, who own 75% of a commercial property, sought to buy out the respondents, who own 25%, under the Partnerships Act.

The respondents counter-claimed for a sale under the Partition Act, which the motion judge granted, allowing them a unilateral 90-day period to sell the property.

The appellants sought a stay of this remedy pending their appeal.

Applying the RJR-MacDonald test, the court found the appeal had sufficient merit, particularly regarding the motion judge's imposition of an unrequested remedy.

Irreparable harm was established due to the risk of the appeal becoming moot if the property sale proceeded.

The balance of convenience also favoured granting the stay.

The motion for a stay was granted, and costs were awarded to the appellants.

The applicant, Mississauga Fire Fighters Association (MFFA), sought leave to discontinue its defamation action against the respondent, Dr. Martin McNamara, to pre-empt an anti-SLAPP motion and avoid costs.

McNamara opposed, seeking to proceed with his anti-SLAPP motion for vindication and full indemnity costs.

The court granted MFFA leave to discontinue, finding no prejudice to McNamara that could not be neutralized by costs, and that the remaining defamatory posts did not constitute a bona fide cause of action.

The court awarded McNamara partial indemnity costs, setting off costs awarded to MFFA from a prior case conference.

The plaintiffs, including a corporate entity and Dr. Earl Schwartz, brought a summary judgment motion seeking a declaration that a medical office building they co-owned with the defendants (Dr. Martin Schwartz and Susan Schwartz) was a partnership asset, and to compel the defendants to sell their share to the corporate plaintiff at an appraised value.

The defendants denied the existence of a partnership and sought a sale of the property under the Partition Act.

The court dismissed the plaintiffs' partnership claim, finding that the co-owners did not operate the building as a business with a view to profit, but rather primarily for their own professional use at cost.

The court ordered the sale of the property by the defendants on the open market and determined a financial reconciliation for ownership expenses, to be paid from the sale proceeds.

The plaintiffs' claim for punitive damages was also dismissed.

The appellants appealed a decision granting the respondent leave to bring a derivative action.

The appellants argued the motions judge applied the wrong burden of proof regarding good faith, erred in finding the action was in the corporation's best interest, and failed to consider whether an oppression remedy was more appropriate.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the motions judge's factual findings on good faith and the corporation's best interests.

The court also declined to consider the oppression remedy argument as it was not raised before the motions judge.

The applicant, Andrew Spasiw, sought a declaration that the respondents (Law Society of Ontario, McMillan LLP, David Milosevic, and Benjamin Bathgate) violated his Charter rights and a remedy under s. 24(1) of the Charter.

The respondents brought motions to strike the Notice of Application without leave to amend, arguing it was an abuse of process (collateral attack) and disclosed no viable cause of action.

The court granted the motions to strike, finding that the application was a collateral attack on the LSO's complaints process and that the Charter claims against the LSO and the private lawyers had no prospect of success, as the Charter does not apply to private entities in this context and the LSO is immune from damages for good faith acts.

Leave to amend was denied as the deficiencies could not be cured.

The plaintiff brought a motion for leave to discontinue its defamation action.

The defendant argued that his intended anti-SLAPP motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act triggered an automatic stay, precluding the plaintiff's motion as a 'further step'.

The court held that the anti-SLAPP motion had not yet been 'made' as it had not been served.

Furthermore, relying on appellate authority, the court found that a motion to discontinue is not a prohibited 'step' under s. 137.1(5), as it achieves the anti-SLAPP goal of terminating the proceeding efficiently.

The court ordered the plaintiff's motion for leave to discontinue to be heard first.

The defendants brought a motion for leave to appeal the order of Mirza J. dated June 6, 2023.

The Divisional Court allowed the motion for leave to appeal.

Costs were fixed at $5,000, with the ultimate determination of costs left to the panel hearing the appeal.