Jordan Bryan Goldblatt

The appellants challenged orders striking a defence and dismissing a related claim for disclosure non-compliance.

The court found the motion judge gave thorough reasons, exercised discretion within a case-managed context under rule 37.15, and committed no error warranting intervention.

The appeal was dismissed with substantial costs.

This is a costs endorsement in a contentious family business dispute between siblings who are trustees of their late father's estate.

The plaintiffs sought leave to amend their statement of claim substantially, adding new causes of action for restitution, unjust enrichment, and disgorgement, and adding a new defendant.

The defendants sought costs thrown away for all steps taken prior to the amendment, while the plaintiffs sought costs of their motion to amend.

The court declined to award costs thrown away at this stage, finding that the effect of the amendments on prior steps cannot be determined until trial.

However, the court awarded partial costs to the defendants for the protracted and inefficient amendment process itself.

This is a costs decision following the successful application by the applicants to set aside an arbitral award and associated costs award on grounds of procedural unfairness.

The applicants sought costs on a partial indemnity basis in the amount of $49,636.38 against Dr. Frank Fowlie.

The court awarded the full amount requested, finding the applicants were entirely successful and the quantum was fair and reasonable.

The court rejected Dr. Fowlie's argument that he should not bear costs as he was not responsible for the arbitrator's conduct, noting that he actively opposed the application and did not challenge the procedural ruling during the arbitration.

The court also rejected any suggestion that Wrestling Canada Lutte should share in the costs award.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario considered whether a medical office building in Toronto was held as an asset of a partnership or as a tenancy in common.

The appellants, majority owners, sought a declaration of partnership and related relief, while the respondents argued for a sale under the Partition Act.

The Court upheld the motion judge’s finding that no partnership existed, but found error in the order dispensing with the appellants’ consent to the sale of the property.

The Court directed a reference to an associate judge for the sale and denied leave to appeal the costs order.

The applicants, all lawyers previously retained by Jenny Tran, sought an order under section 140 of the Courts of Justice Act declaring Ms. Tran a vexatious litigant.

The court reviewed Ms. Tran’s extensive litigation history, including repeated and meritless proceedings, appeals, and actions against former counsel and judicial officers.

The court found that Ms. Tran displayed all hallmarks of a vexatious litigant and granted the application, prohibiting her from instituting or continuing proceedings without leave.

The court also fixed costs against Ms. Tran.

The defendants brought a motion to dismiss a proposed class action for delay under section 29.1(1) of the Class Proceedings Act and Rule 24.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The action, commenced in 2016, involved allegations of breach of fiduciary duty and other claims against the Haudenosaunee Development Institute and co-defendants.

The court found that the plaintiffs had satisfied the requirements of section 29.1(1)(a) by filing a final and complete certification motion record and section 29.1(1)(c) as the court had established a timetable for advancing the proceeding.

While the overall delay of over eight years was deemed inordinate, it was found to be excusable, largely due to the defendants' own strategic delays in prosecuting their dismissal motion and their refusal to proceed with the certification motion concurrently.

The court also found no actual prejudice to the defendants' ability to have a fair trial.

Consequently, the defendants' motion to dismiss for delay was dismissed.

The appellant appealed an order striking his Notice of Application and refusing leave to amend, which sought Charter relief against the respondents.

The motion judge found the Charter claim could not succeed, was a collateral attack on a Law Society decision, and that the Charter did not apply to the individual respondents.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no error in the Charter interpretation or application, and that summary determination was not an abuse of process.

The Court also dismissed the appellant's motion for review of a single judge's order regarding joint representation, deeming it frivolous and an abuse of process.

This was a motion for a stay of an order issued by Akazaki J. following a summary judgment motion.

The appellants, who own 75% of a commercial property, sought to buy out the respondents, who own 25%, under the Partnerships Act.

The respondents counter-claimed for a sale under the Partition Act, which the motion judge granted, allowing them a unilateral 90-day period to sell the property.

The appellants sought a stay of this remedy pending their appeal.

Applying the RJR-MacDonald test, the court found the appeal had sufficient merit, particularly regarding the motion judge's imposition of an unrequested remedy.

Irreparable harm was established due to the risk of the appeal becoming moot if the property sale proceeded.

The balance of convenience also favoured granting the stay.

The motion for a stay was granted, and costs were awarded to the appellants.

The applicant, Mississauga Fire Fighters Association (MFFA), sought leave to discontinue its defamation action against the respondent, Dr. Martin McNamara, to pre-empt an anti-SLAPP motion and avoid costs.

McNamara opposed, seeking to proceed with his anti-SLAPP motion for vindication and full indemnity costs.

The court granted MFFA leave to discontinue, finding no prejudice to McNamara that could not be neutralized by costs, and that the remaining defamatory posts did not constitute a bona fide cause of action.

The court awarded McNamara partial indemnity costs, setting off costs awarded to MFFA from a prior case conference.

The plaintiffs, including a corporate entity and Dr. Earl Schwartz, brought a summary judgment motion seeking a declaration that a medical office building they co-owned with the defendants (Dr. Martin Schwartz and Susan Schwartz) was a partnership asset, and to compel the defendants to sell their share to the corporate plaintiff at an appraised value.

The defendants denied the existence of a partnership and sought a sale of the property under the Partition Act.

The court dismissed the plaintiffs' partnership claim, finding that the co-owners did not operate the building as a business with a view to profit, but rather primarily for their own professional use at cost.

The court ordered the sale of the property by the defendants on the open market and determined a financial reconciliation for ownership expenses, to be paid from the sale proceeds.

The plaintiffs' claim for punitive damages was also dismissed.

The applicant, Andrew Spasiw, sought a declaration that the respondents (Law Society of Ontario, McMillan LLP, David Milosevic, and Benjamin Bathgate) violated his Charter rights and a remedy under s. 24(1) of the Charter.

The respondents brought motions to strike the Notice of Application without leave to amend, arguing it was an abuse of process (collateral attack) and disclosed no viable cause of action.

The court granted the motions to strike, finding that the application was a collateral attack on the LSO's complaints process and that the Charter claims against the LSO and the private lawyers had no prospect of success, as the Charter does not apply to private entities in this context and the LSO is immune from damages for good faith acts.

Leave to amend was denied as the deficiencies could not be cured.

Samine LLC, the successful respondent in a prior appeal, sought costs on a partial indemnity basis.

Samine requested $7,000, while the appellants, Digital Shovel Holdings Inc. and Scot Johnson (DSHI), proposed $5,192.92.

The court found Samine's requested amount reasonable, proportionate, and within the unsuccessful party's reasonable expectation, especially when compared to the time spent by DSHI's own counsel on the appeal.

The court awarded Samine LLC the full amount of $7,000 in costs.

The appellants appealed an Associate Judge's decision that allowed the respondent to amend its statement of claim to include a new cause of action for fraudulent misrepresentation.

The appellants argued the new claim was statute-barred.

The Associate Judge had found a discoverability issue that warranted leaving the limitation period determination to trial or summary judgment.

The appeal court dismissed the appeal, affirming that where a factual dispute exists regarding discoverability, amendments to pleadings should generally be allowed, and the limitation defence can be pleaded and determined at a later stage.

The court found no palpable and overriding error in the Associate Judge's decision.

The Superior Court of Justice heard motions and cross-motions arising from four identical actions.

The primary motion was brought by the plaintiffs' lawyers (the "Lawyers") to strike counterclaims asserted against them by the defendants by counterclaim (the "Lenders").

The Lenders' counterclaims alleged conspiracy, intentional interference with economic relations, and champerty and maintenance, and they sought to add a new claim for breach of privacy/misappropriation of confidential information.

The court dismissed the Lenders' motion for leave to tender evidence and granted the Lawyers' motion, striking the counterclaims in their entirety without leave to amend, finding that the claims against the Lawyers were untenable at law and contrary to public policy.

The defendants, RepVisor Portfolio Systems Inc. et al., brought a motion seeking $100,000 (later reduced to $81,000) in security for costs from the plaintiff, Ian McLean, in his capacity as Trustee of the JSL Trust.

The moving parties argued that the plaintiff was a nominal plaintiff and lacked sufficient assets in Ontario to cover a potential costs award.

The plaintiff countered that he was not a nominal plaintiff, possessed sufficient assets, and that section 249(3) of the Ontario Business Corporations Act (OBCA) provided immunity from posting security for costs for oppression remedies.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the plaintiff, as a trustee with fiduciary duties, was not a nominal plaintiff, and the moving parties failed to demonstrate insufficient assets.

Furthermore, the court noted that the action, in substance, was an oppression remedy, which weighs against ordering security for costs under the OBCA.

The plaintiff was awarded $5,000 in costs.

This decision addresses a motion for summary judgment and to strike portions of a Statement of Claim.

The Plaintiffs, a corporation and its principal, sued for breach of contract after their independent contractor agreement was terminated.

The Defendants sought to strike the claim for wrongful termination and other allegations, arguing compliance with the contract's notice provision and irrelevance of other pleaded facts.

The court found that the termination claim had no reasonable prospect of success as proper notice was given.

It also struck claims against individual defendants due to privity of contract and ordered the removal of scandalous, frivolous, or vexatious allegations, including those related to defamation, the organization's history, and a Ministry of Labour investigation.

However, the court allowed the claim for breach of the contract's dispute resolution clause to proceed, granting leave for the Plaintiffs to amend their pleading to properly articulate this claim and associated aggravated and punitive damages, and to establish the principal's standing as a party.

Money Gate Corporation (MGC) brought a motion for an extension of time to file its notice of appeal and a declaration that it had an appeal as of right under s. 193(c) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA), or alternatively for leave to appeal under s. 193(e).

The underlying matter involved a receivership where a motion judge had dismissed MGC's claim for payment from the proceeds of a property sale, finding no valid assignment of a second mortgage and that MGC was not the registered owner.

The Court of Appeal granted the extension of time, finding MGC's grounds of appeal not frivolous and no real prejudice to the responding parties.

Crucially, the court declared that MGC had an appeal as of right under s. 193(c) of the BIA, concluding that the motion judge's order finally determined MGC's economic interests in the property proceeds, distinguishing it from a mere priorities dispute.

This class action motion sought approval of a proposed settlement and class counsel fees concerning denied travel insurance claims by TD Home and Auto Insurance Company during the early COVID-19 pandemic, specifically regarding denials based on the availability of non-monetary compensation (credits/vouchers).

The parties reached a settlement of $5.1 million, with $4.8 million available for class members.

The settlement provides $100 for cash-refunded claims and at least 40% of the value for non-cash-refunded claims, allowing class members to retain travel credits.

The court found the settlement fair, reasonable, and in the best interest of the class, noting the risks of litigation and the absence of objections.

Class counsel's request for fees, based on a 21.5% contingency rate (reduced to 17% for the class after defendant's contribution), was also approved as fair and reasonable, proportionate to the settlement size, and reflecting the work and risks undertaken.

This motion concerned an application by 2524991 Ontario Corporation (252) for an interim order to stay the enforcement of an arbitral award (the Final Award) obtained by 2650795 Ontario Inc. (265), pending the resolution of an oppression action brought by 252 against 265. 252 argued that 265 engaged in oppressive acts by refusing to cooperate in the sale of a jointly owned property, which would allow 252 to satisfy the Final Award.

The court granted judgment in the Enforcement Application by consent but then heard 252's motion to stay.

The court found that allowing enforcement would be oppressive and an abuse of process, and that 252 met the stringent test for a stay under s. 106 of the Courts of Justice Act and the three-part RJR-MacDonald test for interim relief under s. 248(3) of the Business Corporations Act.

The court also determined that the "clean hands" doctrine did not apply as the impugned conduct (misrepresentation) was already litigated and compensated in arbitration.

The stay was granted, without prejudice to a future application for a court-directed sale of the property.

The appellants sought to overturn a motion judge's decision to dismiss their action under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

The underlying action concerned a mortgage whose validity had been previously decided.

The Court of Appeal found the action, which included 40 causes of action in a 300-page statement of claim, to be plainly vexatious and an abuse of process, upholding the motion judge's discretionary decision.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.