Shantona Chaudhury

The plaintiffs brought an urgent motion to extend the time permitted for cross-examinations of the defendants' affiants on pending anti-SLAPP motions.

The defendants had filed 14 affidavits across four separate motions.

The court found that limiting the plaintiffs to the statutory seven hours would prevent meaningful cross-examination and that it was in the interests of justice to extend the time to 15 hours.

The moving party sought leave to appeal an order transferring a matter from the Family Law Team to the Civil Law Team in Toronto.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding that while there was good reason to doubt the motion judge's finding on jurisdiction, the decision to have the matter addressed by the Civil Law Team was an exercise of administrative discretion that did not raise a matter of such importance to warrant leave to appeal.

Roger Poirier (appellant) sued multiple defendants for fraud and misrepresentation related to a failed business investment.

He settled his claim with one defendant, Jerry Friedberg, but failed to disclose this settlement to the other defendants for six months.

The motion judge stayed the action against the remaining defendants, finding the non-disclosure to be an abuse of process.

Poirier appealed, arguing the motion judge applied an incorrect legal test and made palpable and overriding errors of fact.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that immediate disclosure of settlement agreements that fundamentally alter the litigation landscape is mandatory, and failure to do so constitutes an abuse of process warranting a stay of proceedings, regardless of prejudice to the non-settling parties.

The Law Foundation of Ontario brought a motion for directions regarding its statutory authority to administer the Class Proceedings Fund during the individual issues stage of a class action.

The court held that the Law Foundation has the statutory authority to provide litigation support and adverse costs protection for individual issues trials, but is not obliged to do so even if it funded the common issues stage.

Furthermore, the court determined that the Law Foundation's statutory levy applies to all recoveries, including individual issues judgments, regardless of whether it provides funding for that specific stage.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued a costs endorsement following its decision to allow the appeal brought by Factory Mutual Insurance Company (FM Global) against MDS Inc. and MDS (Canada) Inc. The original appeal concerned insurance coverage for losses from an unplanned reactor shutdown, where the Court found no coverage.

This endorsement addresses the quantum of trial costs to be awarded to FM Global, which was entirely successful on appeal.

The court considered factors under s. 131(1) of the Courts of Justice Act and r. 57.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, including the complexity of issues, counsel rates, and the recoverability of expert disbursements.

This appeal concerned an all-risk insurance policy's coverage for business interruption losses suffered by the insured due to an unplanned shutdown of a nuclear reactor caused by corrosion.

The Court of Appeal reversed the trial judge's decision, holding that the term "corrosion" in the exclusion clause was unambiguous and applied to all forms of corrosion, including unanticipated corrosion.

Furthermore, the exception to the exclusion for "physical damage" did not extend to economic losses such as loss of use, as "physical damage" refers to tangible alteration of property.

The appeal was allowed, and coverage was denied.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their anti-SLAPP motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The underlying defamation action arose from the appellants protesting outside the respondents' law office with signs alleging unpaid accounts for rehabilitation services.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the expression related to a private commercial dispute, not a matter of public interest, despite the motion judge improperly considering the appellants' motives and the manner of expression.

The appeal was dismissed, and leave to appeal the costs order was denied.

Following the release of the appeal judgment, the parties requested on consent to amend the partial indemnity costs of the applications below.

The Court of Appeal allowed the amendment, reducing the costs awarded to the appellants for the proceedings below from $93,000 to $55,000, inclusive of disbursements and taxes.

In a class action where core negligence claims were dismissed on appeal and the remaining "knowing assistance" claim was conceded as having no prospect of success, the action was formally dismissed.

The defendant auditor sought $485,000 in costs for defending the action.

The Law Foundation of Ontario (LFO), which funded the plaintiff through the Class Proceeding Fund, resisted this amount, arguing that previous costs awards covered the merits.

The court found the defendant was entitled to costs for the "knowing assistance" claim but deemed the requested amount excessive.

Applying a 40% discount to the plaintiff's estimated actual costs for this component, the court awarded $68,000 for the action and an additional $4,000 for the costs motion, totaling $72,000, payable by the LFO/CPF to the defendant.

This appeal concerned a property dispute between neighbours over a two-foot wide strip of land.

The application judge had declared a prescriptive easement over a driveway portion and ownership by adverse possession over a backyard portion in favour of the respondents (original applicants).

The Court of Appeal found that the application judge made palpable and overriding errors.

Specifically, the court determined that the alleged prescriptive easement over the driveway was not "reasonably necessary" for the better enjoyment of the dominant tenement, but rather a personal convenience.

For the adverse possession claim, the court found the application judge misapprehended evidence regarding the true owner's exclusion from the backyard portion.

The appeal was allowed, setting aside the lower court's judgment and declaring the appellants' title unencumbered.

This is a costs endorsement on appeal from a jury trial judgment in a historical sexual assault case.

The appellant challenged the jury instruction on loss of income damages, the punitive damages award, and the prejudgment interest rate.

The Court of Appeal upheld the entitlement to and quantum of damages for loss of income and punitive damages but reversed the prejudgment interest award.

The respondent sought substantial indemnity costs of $179,660.31, relying on a presumption under the Victims' Bill of Rights.

The court awarded substantial indemnity costs of $100,000, finding that the full amount sought would not be in the interests of justice, particularly given the disproportionate relationship between trial costs and appeal costs.

A teenage plaintiff was catastrophically injured when she deliberately jumped from a moving school bus on the last day of Grade 8 as part of an informal tradition among graduating students.

The bus operator had received prior reports of students jumping from buses but failed to report these incidents to the school as required by its own handbook.

A jury found the defendant 75 per cent liable and the plaintiff 25 per cent contributorily negligent, awarding substantial damages.

The defendant appealed on grounds of improper jury charge regarding causation and contributory negligence, erroneous removal of the mitigation issue from the jury, and failure to deduct statutory accident benefits.

The Court of Appeal upheld the jury verdict on causation and contributory negligence, found the trial judge erred in removing mitigation from the jury but determined no miscarriage of justice resulted, and remitted the statutory accident benefits deduction issue to the Superior Court for determination.

The respondent was sexually abused by a priest while a student at a school run by the appellants.

The trial judge and jury found the appellants vicariously liable.

The jury awarded $350,000 in general damages, $75,000 in aggravated damages, $56,400 in future treatment costs, $1,588,781 for past and future income loss, and $500,000 in punitive damages.

The appellants appealed on three grounds: the jury instruction on burden of proof for past income loss was erroneous, the punitive damages award was excessive, and prejudgment interest should not have been set at 5 per cent.

The Court of Appeal upheld the jury instruction and punitive damages award but found the trial judge erred in setting prejudgment interest at 5 per cent instead of 1.3 per cent.

Appeal from a motion judge's decision ordering release of a cryopreserved in vitro embryo to the respondent ex-wife for her reproductive use.

The motion judge applied contract and property law principles to conclude the embryo should be released based on the parties' prior contractual agreement.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the Assisted Human Reproduction Act and its regulations establish a consent-based model, not a contract-based model.

The parties remain "donors" under the regulations despite divorce, and the appellant retained the right to withdraw his consent under section 14(3) of the Consent Regulations.

The court found that consent cannot be frozen in time and that the statutory protections cannot be contracted away.

A motion for leave to intervene in an appeal was dismissed.

The proposed intervener, a non-profit organization with expertise in architectural conservation, sought to participate in an appeal concerning a municipal decision.

The court found that the proposed intervener failed to clearly articulate how its submissions would differ from those of the appellant, and that granting leave at such a late stage in the proceedings would cause unfairness to the respondents who had already filed their materials.

Following the dismissal of two proposed class action certification motions and a Rule 21 motion regarding the unauthorized sale of hospital patient contact information to RESP sales representatives, the successful defendants sought costs totaling over $690,000.

The Law Foundation of Ontario, which had indemnified the plaintiffs, argued that no costs should be awarded due to the novelty of the legal issues and the significant public interest in the protection of health privacy.

The court agreed, finding that the case raised novel questions about commercial liability for purloined patient information and engaged important public policy issues.

Applying section 31 of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, the court exercised its discretion to make no order as to costs.

This addendum addresses procedural issues arising from the Court of Appeal's March 28, 2018 decision allowing both appeals and a cross-appeal.

The court clarified that: (1) a "no order as to costs" provision can apply to both parties and interveners; (2) conclusions regarding statutory interpretation and waiver applicability should not be reflected in the formal order but only in the reasons; and (3) separate formal orders must be taken out for the merits decision and the costs decision, each bearing the date of its respective release.

This is a costs endorsement following the Court of Appeal's decision allowing both appeals and a cross-appeal in two consolidated ski resort injury cases.

The court set aside the orders of the Superior Court and remitted the matters back for further proceedings.

The primary issue on costs was whether any party should recover their appellate costs.

Blue Mountain Resorts and the respondents argued for no costs award due to the novelty of the legal issues, while Snow Valley sought partial indemnity costs of $25,000.

Two consolidated appeals concerning the enforceability of liability waivers executed by ski resort patrons.

The central issue was whether the Consumer Protection Act (CPA) or the Occupiers' Liability Act (OLA) governs the relationship between ski resorts and patrons who purchased ski tickets and executed waivers as a condition of entry.

The lower courts held that the CPA applied and voided the waivers.

The Court of Appeal held that the OLA and CPA conflict, and that the more specific OLA provisions prevail over the general CPA provisions.

The court allowed the appeals and held that the waivers were valid and enforceable.

Following the dismissal of the appellants' appeal from an Ontario Securities Commission decision finding them guilty of securities fraud, the Commission and the intervenors sought costs.

The Commission sought $40,000, which the court awarded in full on a partial indemnity basis.

The intervenors, who were the appellants' former counsel and intervened to defend against allegations of ineffective assistance, sought over $53,000 on a substantial indemnity basis.

The court held that the intervenors were entitled to costs as parties to the appeal, but reduced the scale to partial indemnity and fixed their costs at $20,000.