Susan Loraine Adam Metzler

The unrepresented appellant, through their litigation guardian, brought a motion for leave to appeal an order of Chalmers J. dated November 2, 2023.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal.

No costs were ordered for or against any party.

The appellants brought a motion for leave to appeal an order dated August 20, 2021.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal.

As no respondent filed responding motion materials, the court made no order as to costs.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for leave to appeal Paragraph 22 of the order of Perell J. dated February 11, 2022.

The Divisional Court granted the motion for leave to appeal and directed the parties to arrange a case conference regarding the conduct of the appeal.

The defendants and respondents brought a motion to declare the self-represented plaintiff a party under disability and to appoint the Public Guardian and Trustee as his litigation guardian.

The plaintiff opposed the motion, arguing he was capable of representing himself despite a history of mental health issues and a traumatic brain injury.

Applying the test from Huang v. Braga, the court found the plaintiff lacked the capacity to understand the litigation process, appreciate the consequences of his decisions, or maintain a consistent approach to the proceedings.

The court declared the plaintiff a party under disability and appointed the Public Guardian and Trustee as his litigation guardian.

At a case conference, the court established a timetable for a motion to determine the capacity of the self-represented plaintiff.

The defendants intend to bring a motion to appoint the Public Guardian and Trustee as litigation guardian for the plaintiff before any further steps are taken in the actions.

The plaintiff S.M. brought a motion to strike his jury notice, filed in 2014, seeking to proceed with a judge-alone trial in March 2021 due to anticipated delays in jury trials caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.

The primary defendant, Ero Longo, opposed the motion.

The court applied the "justice better served" test, considering factors such as the substantive right to a jury trial, the extent of delay, and the practicalities of trial scheduling.

The court found that a six-month delay to an October 2021 jury trial blitz was not unconscionable, especially given the plaintiff's own delays in the action and the availability of retrofitted court facilities.

The plaintiff failed to demonstrate sufficient prejudice beyond delay or that a judge-alone trial would better serve justice.

The motion was dismissed, the March 2021 trial dates were vacated, and the case was placed on the October 2021 trial blitz for an in-person jury trial.

The issue of striking the jury was left open for future reconsideration if the October trial does not proceed.

This is a costs endorsement on appeal from a jury trial judgment in a historical sexual assault case.

The appellant challenged the jury instruction on loss of income damages, the punitive damages award, and the prejudgment interest rate.

The Court of Appeal upheld the entitlement to and quantum of damages for loss of income and punitive damages but reversed the prejudgment interest award.

The respondent sought substantial indemnity costs of $179,660.31, relying on a presumption under the Victims' Bill of Rights.

The court awarded substantial indemnity costs of $100,000, finding that the full amount sought would not be in the interests of justice, particularly given the disproportionate relationship between trial costs and appeal costs.

The respondent was sexually abused by a priest while a student at a school run by the appellants.

The trial judge and jury found the appellants vicariously liable.

The jury awarded $350,000 in general damages, $75,000 in aggravated damages, $56,400 in future treatment costs, $1,588,781 for past and future income loss, and $500,000 in punitive damages.

The appellants appealed on three grounds: the jury instruction on burden of proof for past income loss was erroneous, the punitive damages award was excessive, and prejudgment interest should not have been set at 5 per cent.

The Court of Appeal upheld the jury instruction and punitive damages award but found the trial judge erred in setting prejudgment interest at 5 per cent instead of 1.3 per cent.

This costs endorsement followed a three-week jury trial where the plaintiff was awarded $2,570,181 for general, aggravated, economic, special, and punitive damages arising from historical sexual assault.

The court addressed the plaintiff's entitlement to substantial indemnity costs under the Victims' Bill of Rights and the calculation of prejudgment interest.

The court found the plaintiff was entitled to substantial indemnity costs throughout the proceedings, rejecting the defendants' argument for partial indemnity prior to the offer date.

While the court reduced the quantum of legal fees claimed due to perceived duplication and 'heavy-handed' process, it upheld the principle of substantial indemnity.

The court also determined that the default prejudgment interest rate of 5% applied to non-pecuniary damages, rejecting the defendants' argument for a lower rate based on the Insurance Act, as the case did not involve a motor vehicle accident.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to certify a class action against the Royal Winnipeg Ballet and a former instructor/photographer, Bruce Monk.

The plaintiffs alleged that Monk took intimate photographs of students in private settings and disseminated them without consent, constituting sexual assault, breach of fiduciary duty, and invasion of privacy.

The court found that the pleadings disclosed causes of action, there was an identifiable class, and there were 23 common issues.

The court also found that a class proceeding was the preferable procedure and that the representative plaintiffs were suitable.

The certification motion was granted.

During a family law trial, it was discovered that the applicant had communicated with her counsel about her evidence and the issues in the case while under cross-examination.

The court found that this improper communication fatally wounded the trial process and prejudiced the respondent's ability to conduct a fair cross-examination.

As no other curative measures would suffice without prejudicing the applicant, the court declared a mistrial.

The court also ordered terms, including the immediate listing of the matrimonial home for sale and the withdrawal of Statements of Arrears filed with the Family Responsibility Office.

The applicant, an ordained Priest, filed an application alleging reprisal and discrimination in employment based on race, colour, and place of origin following his re-assignment by the respondent Bishop.

The respondents argued the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction because the dispute was ecclesiastical and subject to the Code of Canon Law.

Applying the Court of Appeal's decision in Hart, the Tribunal found that the essential nature of the dispute concerned the assignment of a priest, which is an ecclesiastical issue.

Because the Code of Canon Law provides an internal review process that meets the requirements of natural justice, the applicant was required to pursue those avenues.

The application was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

Following a trial where the Plaintiff was awarded damages against Maryvale for sexual assault but his action against the Archdiocese of London and Father Horvath was dismissed, this endorsement addresses costs.

The Plaintiff sought substantial indemnity costs against Maryvale and a Sanderson or Bullock order to make Maryvale responsible for the costs of the successful co-defendants.

The Archdiocese and Father Horvath, having successfully defended, sought costs from the Plaintiff.

The court awarded the Archdiocese and Father Horvath $125,500 in costs payable by the Plaintiff, finding no basis for a Sanderson or Bullock order due to the independent nature of the claims and lack of blame-shifting.

The court awarded the Plaintiff $175,000 in substantial indemnity costs against Maryvale, accounting for the time spent on the unsuccessful claims against the other defendants.

The plaintiff sought to admit the evidence of Dr. Kerry Smith, a mental health clinician who provided therapy to the plaintiff in prison, as a participant expert in a civil action for damages for alleged sexual abuse.

The court ruled on the admissibility and scope of Dr. Smith's evidence, qualifying him as an expert and finding his evidence relevant to psychological harm and the occurrence of abuse.

The court applied the "participant expert" framework from Westerhof v. Gee Estate, allowing testimony based on observations, impressions, and treatment documented in his reports, but precluding opinions extending beyond these limits without compliance with Rule 53.03.

This endorsement addresses the costs of motions brought by both parties, which involved parenting and procedural issues.

The court found that neither party achieved clear success on the parenting issues, and success was divided on procedural matters.

The respondent sought partial or substantial indemnity costs, while the applicant sought substantial indemnity costs, alleging bad faith by the respondent.

The court declined to find bad faith, noting that both parties contributed to the procedural wrangling and conflict.

Despite the applicant making a timely offer to settle, the court concluded that neither party should be vindicated by a costs award.

Consequently, no costs were awarded to either party for the motions.

The appellant appealed a trial decision that rejected his undocumented claim to a half-interest in a residential property.

The trial judge had found the appellant's evidence incredible and accepted the respondent's evidence that a $130,000 payment was a gift.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual findings and credibility assessments.

The court also upheld the trial judge's decisions regarding a breach of trust claim, an order for the appellant to pay $3,000 for property damage, and a no-costs award at trial.

The cross-appeal was abandoned and dismissed.

Following marital breakdown, the court determined unresolved property issues concerning ownership of the matrimonial home and equalization of net family property.

The court rejected the applicant's position that title in her sole name reflected intended sole ownership, and declared a resulting trust in favour of the respondent for a one-half ownership interest in the matrimonial home.

Applying the statutory equalization scheme and the unconscionability analysis under s. 5(6) of the Family Law Act, the court held that equal sharing remained appropriate despite the substantial post-separation increase in the home's value.

The court accepted the respondent's business valuation evidence, rejected multiple allegations of hidden assets or depletion, ordered an equalization payment of $390,658.60, awarded prejudgment interest only on that amount, and awarded costs to the respondent.

Following the breakdown of a common law relationship, the applicant claimed a 50% beneficial interest in the respondent's home based on an alleged agreement, proprietary estoppel, constructive trust, and resulting trust, and also sought a larger share of proceeds from a jointly held investment property.

The court found the applicant's $130,000 payment toward the home was a gift rather than a purchase of equity, and rejected all equitable trust and estoppel claims to the home.

The court held the parties owned the investment property equally as tenants in common and awarded the applicant 50% of the net sale proceeds, less amounts already paid.

Claims for breach of trust, intentional infliction of mental suffering, aggravated and punitive damages, investment-loss damages, website-removal relief, and a non-harassment order were all dismissed, except that the applicant was ordered to pay $3,000 for damage to the home.

In a family trial following lengthy post-separation financial conflict, the court dismissed both parties' claims for post-separation accounting adjustments because the evidentiary record consisted largely of unreliable calculation charts unsupported by source documents.

The parties had agreed to equalization through a pension transfer, and a divorce was granted.

On child support, the court imputed income to the respondent based on his demonstrated standard of living and found him intentionally unemployed in the absence of admissible medical evidence establishing inability to work.

The court also imputed minimum-wage income to the applicant, found the adult daughter remained a child of the marriage while in full-time university studies, and ordered a formula for post-secondary expenses allocating net expenses 50 percent to the respondent, 25 percent to the applicant, and 25 percent to the child after disclosure and deduction of grants, bursaries, and scholarships.

The appellant, a deaf individual with limited communication skills, was involuntarily committed under the Mental Health Act and detained in a maximum security psychiatric facility for 19 years.

He challenged the constitutionality of the involuntary committal provisions under s. 7 of the Charter and alleged a violation of his s. 15(1) equality rights due to inadequate sign language interpretation.

The Court of Appeal held that the Mental Health Act violates s. 7 when applied to long-term detainees because the Consent and Capacity Board lacks the authority to ensure that liberty is restricted no more than necessary.

The Court also found a violation of s. 15(1) due to the systemic failure to provide adequate interpretation services.

The Court severed the words 'or subsequent' from s. 20(4)(b)(iii) of the Act, suspending the declaration of invalidity for 12 months, and granted a declaration of the appellant's equality rights.