Daphne Grace Jarvis

The applicants sought a declaration that their deceased son's written consent for his cryopreserved sperm complied with the Assisted Human Reproduction Act and its regulations, and an order for its release to create an embryo.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the Act prohibits the use of human reproductive material for embryo creation without specific written consent for third-party use, and that posthumous donation is limited to a spouse or common-law partner.

The court also found that distributing the sperm in Canada for use outside Canada would still breach the Act due to distribution prohibitions and lack of required testing.

The appellants brought a motion for leave to appeal an order dated August 20, 2021.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal.

As no respondent filed responding motion materials, the court made no order as to costs.

This application concerned the legal definition of death and the withdrawal of life support for Shalom Ouanounou, a devout Orthodox Jew, who was declared brain dead but whose family believed he was alive under Jewish law.

The applicant sought an injunction to prevent the withdrawal of life support, rescission of the initial death certificate, and a declaration that the Consent and Capacity Board had jurisdiction over such disputes.

Following Ouanounou's natural death, the court considered whether the application was moot.

Citing a recent decision in *McKitty v. Hayani*, which addressed similar issues, the court found the application moot as there was no longer a live controversy and declined to exercise its discretion to hear the academic issues.

A lawyer brought an application for an interim injunction to restrain a hospital from withdrawing life support from her client without instructions to do so and without notice to the client's family.

The application was granted ex parte but subsequently set aside by the reviewing judge after the client was declared brain dead.

The lawyer then appealed both the substantive decision and the costs award against her personally.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding that the lawyer had no authority to bring the application, acted without instructions, and seriously interfered with the administration of justice by misusing the court process during an emotionally sensitive family decision regarding end-of-life care.

The applicant's lawyer brought an emergency ex parte application to enjoin a hospital from withdrawing life support from a patient.

The court initially granted the order but rescinded it the next day after the hospital and treating physician provided evidence that the patient was brain dead and the family had consented to withdrawing support.

The hospital and physician sought costs personally against the applicant's lawyer.

The court found the lawyer brought the application without instructions, submitted misleading material, and caused costs to be incurred unnecessarily.

The court ordered the lawyer to personally pay $15,000 in costs to the respondents.

The court heard an urgent motion to vary an interlocutory order that had prohibited the withdrawal of life support for Fernando Ferreira.

Mr. Ferreira had suffered a cardiac arrest, leading to brain death.

His wife, as substitute decision-maker, and family had agreed to discontinue life support and proceed with organ donation.

An ex parte order prohibiting withdrawal of life support had been obtained by Mr. Ferreira's motor vehicle accident lawyer.

The court, treating the matter as a motion to vary, found that given the patient's brain-dead status and family consensus, the previous order should be set aside.

The application to prohibit life support withdrawal was dismissed.

The Attorney General of Ontario brought a motion to clarify the court's previous decision regarding a child with leukemia whose parents sought to pursue traditional Haudenosaunee medicine alongside or instead of chemotherapy.

The court had previously found that the mother's constitutionally protected right under section 35 of the Constitution to pursue traditional medicine meant the child was not in need of protection.

The Attorney General, rather than appealing, engaged in dialogue with all parties, resulting in a joint submission.

The court clarified its decision by adding paragraphs confirming that while the aboriginal right to traditional medicine must be respected, the best interests of the child remain paramount, and that the family could pursue both traditional and Western medicine collaboratively.

An 11-year-old First Nations child from Six Nations of the Grand River was diagnosed with acute lymphoblastic leukemia with a 90-95% cure rate with chemotherapy.

The child's mother withdrew consent for chemotherapy to pursue traditional medicine consistent with their longhouse beliefs.

The hospital applied under section 40(4) of the Child and Family Services Act seeking a protection order.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the mother's decision to pursue traditional medicine constituted an exercise of an aboriginal right protected under section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982.

The court held that the child could not be found in need of protection when the substitute decision-maker exercised a constitutionally protected right.

The plaintiff's estate brought a civil action against a nurse and a hospital for damages arising from alleged sexual assaults.

The nurse had previously been acquitted of criminal charges related to the same allegations, with the criminal trial judge expressing a belief in the nurse's factual innocence.

The hospital successfully moved to dismiss the civil action as an abuse of process, arguing it was an impermissible relitigation of the criminal court's findings.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that a criminal acquittal, even one accompanied by strong reasons asserting innocence, does not constitute a formal declaration of factual innocence that bars a subsequent civil action with a lower burden of proof.

The plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of a medical malpractice action on summary judgment.

The respondents had relied on expert opinion evidence that the standard of care was met, while the plaintiffs had no expert evidence supporting negligence.

The court held that neither the alleged "high forceps" theory nor the "excessive force" theory raised a genuine issue for trial.

The appeal was dismissed and no costs were awarded.