Jordan Bronte Robertson Palmer

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed Kenneth Reed's appeal from a summary judgment in favour of the Bank of Nova Scotia regarding two lines of credit for his farming operation.

The court found that summary judgment was appropriate, the Consumer Protection Act did not apply as Reed was not a consumer, and a stay under the Farm Debt Mediation Act did not apply to the appeal itself but did stay enforcement of the judgment pending mediation.

Costs of $7,500 were awarded to the Bank.

This costs endorsement addresses the appropriate quantum of costs following a motor vehicle accident trial in which the plaintiff was awarded damages by the jury, but the award was reduced to zero by operation of the Insurance Act.

The defendant sought $269,264.87 in costs, later reducing the request to $230,000.

The plaintiff argued for a much lower award, citing financial hardship and litigation conduct.

The court fixed costs at $185,000, finding the defendant entitled to costs but reducing the amount for duplication, lack of particulars, and proportionality.

The court awarded full indemnity costs against the plaintiffs after dismissing their claims, which were found to be statute-barred, subject to res judicata and issue estoppel, abuses of process, and collateral attacks.

The claims were deemed devoid of merit and repetitive of earlier unsuccessful actions.

The court emphasized that the claims should never have been brought, especially for a third time, and that the plaintiffs' conduct, including unsubstantiated allegations, delaying tactics, and unrealistic settlement offers, warranted the highest scale of costs.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing her action for damages, including assault, against the respondent, which was barred by the two-year limitation period.

The appellant argued that her claim was not discovered earlier due to fear (s. 5(1)(a)(iv) of the Limitations Act, 2002) or that it fell under the exception for assault in an intimate relationship (s. 16(1)(h.2)(i)).

The motion judge found no evidence of "assault" meeting the "imminent" contact standard and deemed the fear evidence unpersuasive.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, affirming the strict definition of assault requiring "imminent" harm, consistent with its prior ruling in Barker v. Barker.

A lawyer brought an application for an interim injunction to restrain a hospital from withdrawing life support from her client without instructions to do so and without notice to the client's family.

The application was granted ex parte but subsequently set aside by the reviewing judge after the client was declared brain dead.

The lawyer then appealed both the substantive decision and the costs award against her personally.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding that the lawyer had no authority to bring the application, acted without instructions, and seriously interfered with the administration of justice by misusing the court process during an emotionally sensitive family decision regarding end-of-life care.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing her claim for Statutory Accident Benefits (SAB) on the ground that the limitation period had expired.

The respondent insurer issued an OCF-9 denying benefits in January 2007, and the claim was not commenced until approximately six years later.

The court upheld the summary judgment, finding that the denial of benefits was unequivocal and sufficient to trigger the running of the limitation period, even if the reasons provided were legally incorrect.

The court also rejected the appellant's submission that she was denied a fair hearing.