Kristin Spencer AuCoin

The court awarded full indemnity costs against the plaintiffs after dismissing their claims, which were found to be statute-barred, subject to res judicata and issue estoppel, abuses of process, and collateral attacks.

The claims were deemed devoid of merit and repetitive of earlier unsuccessful actions.

The court emphasized that the claims should never have been brought, especially for a third time, and that the plaintiffs' conduct, including unsubstantiated allegations, delaying tactics, and unrealistic settlement offers, warranted the highest scale of costs.

This is a costs endorsement following the dismissal of the respondents' motion to strike the applicants' amended notice of application.

The applicants sought substantial indemnity costs, but the court awarded partial indemnity costs, significantly reducing the amount claimed.

The court found the applicants' costs disproportionate, particularly regarding fees for amending their own deficient pleading, senior counsel rates for drafting, and unnecessary travel/disbursements for a virtual hearing.

The court emphasized that while the applicants won the underlying motion, their approach to costs was unreasonable.

The defendant, a court-appointed receiver, brought a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' action against it.

The plaintiffs had commenced the action without obtaining leave of the court or the receiver's written consent, contrary to section 215 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and prior court orders.

The court granted the motion, holding that obtaining leave is a strict condition precedent to bringing an action against a receiver, and dismissed the claims against the receiver with costs.

The respondents, Twitter, brought a motion to strike the applicants' notice of application under Rule 21.01(1)(b) for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The applicants alleged breach of contract after Twitter refused to sell them advertising space, arguing the refusal violated the duty of good faith, was unconscionable, and breached public policy informed by Charter values of freedom of expression.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the applicants pleaded sufficient facts to state causes of action and that it was not plain and obvious the claims would fail.

The appellant tenant appealed an order of the Landlord and Tenant Board terminating its tenancy because the landlords sold the premises and the purchaser required it for their own use.

The tenant argued that the landlords failed to pay the required one month's rent in compensation under s. 49.1 of the Residential Tenancies Act because the payment was made before the Notice to Terminate was served.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the Act does not require the compensation to be paid after the notice is served, provided it is paid prior to the termination date.

The applicant, Canada Christian College, sought judicial review of the Minister's decision not to recommend proclamation of legislative amendments that would grant it university status and expanded degree-granting authority.

The Minister had referred the applicant's request to the Postsecondary Education Quality Assessment Board, which concluded the applicant was not ready for the changes.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Board's recommendations were not reviewable, the Minister's referral was intra vires the Post-secondary Education Choice and Excellence Act, 2000, and the Minister's decision not to recommend proclamation was a legislative act not subject to procedural fairness and was reasonable.