Heather C. Mackay

The appellant, Canada Christian College (CCC), appealed a Divisional Court decision that dismissed its application for judicial review.

CCC challenged the Minister of Training, Colleges and Universities' decision not to recommend proclamation of legislation that would grant CCC university status and degree-granting rights, following a negative recommendation from the Post-Secondary Education Quality Assessment Board.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the Divisional Court's findings, holding that the Minister's decision to refer CCC's application to the Board was within his authority (intra vires) and that his subsequent decision to delay proclamation was reasonable and not an unlawful attempt to override the Legislature's will.

The Court also found no breach of procedural fairness, clarifying the limits of ministerial discretion regarding legislative proclamation.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondents.

The defendant, His Majesty the King in Right of Ontario, brought a motion to strike the plaintiff's, Scott McAnsh's, proposed class action claim.

The plaintiff, a former adjudicator with a fixed-term appointment to the Assessment Review Board, sued for breach of contract, alleging that the government's failure to reappoint him after his term expired constituted a termination of employment and violated a promise of extended tenure.

The court dismissed the action, holding that statutory appointments to administrative tribunals are not employment contracts, and there is no legal obligation or right to reappointment after a fixed term expires.

The court affirmed that the decision to reappoint rests solely with Cabinet's discretion, which cannot be fettered by alleged promises or political considerations, and that fixed-term appointments are consistent with adjudicative independence.

The Crown (appellant) sought costs of the appeal and the motion below after successfully appealing a decision and having the respondent's statement of claim struck as a nullity due to non-compliance with the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act, 2019.

The respondent, acting in person, opposed the costs order, arguing the Crown's appeal lacked legal basis and that the relevant statutory provision (s. 18(6) of the CLPA) was added after her action commenced.

The Court of Appeal found the Crown was entitled to costs as it was completely successful and s. 18(6) of the CLPA expressly applied to actions commenced before its enactment.

The court awarded the Crown $7,500 in costs, inclusive of disbursements and taxes, a reduced amount from their actual costs to reflect the respondent's self-represented status and financial situation.

The Crown appealed the dismissal of its motion to strike a statement of claim as a nullity.

The claim was brought by the respondent without the required 60-day notice under the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act, 2019 (CLPA).

The motion judge dismissed the Crown's motion due to delay, but the Court of Appeal found this was an error in law, as the CLPA explicitly states such an action is a nullity from its commencement, and delay or estoppel cannot override this statutory provision.

The appeal was allowed, and the claim against the Crown was struck out as a nullity.

This decision addresses the costs of a motion brought by Her Majesty the Queen in the Right of Ontario and Detective Tracy Martel to strike the claim.

The Attorney General submitted that there should be no order as to costs, a position with which the plaintiff, Sheridan Margaret Diaz, did not take serious issue.

The court ultimately made no order for costs on the motion.

The defendant, the Attorney General of Ontario, brought a Rule 21 motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' action on the ground that it was barred by a limitation period.

The plaintiffs, police officers, alleged negligence and misfeasance in public office by Crown counsel.

The court, applying the principles from Beardsley v. Ontario Provincial Police, found that the limitation period issue involved legal and factual complexities, including the discoverability of a potentially novel claim, and therefore should not be determined at a preliminary stage before pleadings were closed.

The preliminary question was decided in favour of the plaintiffs, and the motion to dismiss on this ground was denied.