Heather C. Mackay

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Independent Police Review Director to screen out his complaint as frivolous.

The applicant alleged that the police failed to adequately investigate his claims that CSIS was conducting an unlawful campaign of surveillance and attacks against him using directed energy weapons.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Director's decision was reasonable, as the complaint lacked an air of reality and the police have broad discretion in determining whether to investigate.

The applicant, whose first language is French, sought judicial review of a decision by the Office of the Independent Police Review Director (OIPRD) not to remit her complaint against the Toronto Police Service for further investigation.

The applicant raised concerns about miscommunication and language barriers during the initial police investigation.

The Divisional Court found the Director's decision unreasonable because he failed to address the procedural fairness concerns regarding the language barrier and relied on having received the applicant's submissions without actually reading them, as they were in French.

The application was allowed and the matter remitted to the Director.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Office of the Independent Police Review Director (OIPRD) regarding her complaints of misconduct against five police officers.

The complaints stemmed from the officers' handling of her allegations of sexual assault and assault.

The OIPRD had referred the investigation back to the same police service, which found two officers committed 'less serious' misconduct and unsubstantiated the rest.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the OIPRD's decisions to refer the investigation, uphold the findings on charges, and classify the misconduct as less serious were all reasonable and did not breach procedural fairness or equality rights.

The appellant, Canada Christian College (CCC), appealed a Divisional Court decision that dismissed its application for judicial review.

CCC challenged the Minister of Training, Colleges and Universities' decision not to recommend proclamation of legislation that would grant CCC university status and degree-granting rights, following a negative recommendation from the Post-Secondary Education Quality Assessment Board.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the Divisional Court's findings, holding that the Minister's decision to refer CCC's application to the Board was within his authority (intra vires) and that his subsequent decision to delay proclamation was reasonable and not an unlawful attempt to override the Legislature's will.

The Court also found no breach of procedural fairness, clarifying the limits of ministerial discretion regarding legislative proclamation.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondents.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Chief of Police dismissing her complaint against certain police officers as unsubstantiated, based on an investigative report.

Before the independent review of the decision could be completed, the subject officers resigned, causing the review to be halted pursuant to section 90 of the Police Services Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application as premature, noting that the complaint process is held in abeyance for five years and could resume if the officers are re-employed.

The court also held that statutory secrecy provisions prevent the investigative report from being used against the applicant in other civil proceedings.

The defendant, His Majesty the King in Right of Ontario, brought a motion to strike the plaintiff's, Scott McAnsh's, proposed class action claim.

The plaintiff, a former adjudicator with a fixed-term appointment to the Assessment Review Board, sued for breach of contract, alleging that the government's failure to reappoint him after his term expired constituted a termination of employment and violated a promise of extended tenure.

The court dismissed the action, holding that statutory appointments to administrative tribunals are not employment contracts, and there is no legal obligation or right to reappointment after a fixed term expires.

The court affirmed that the decision to reappoint rests solely with Cabinet's discretion, which cannot be fettered by alleged promises or political considerations, and that fixed-term appointments are consistent with adjudicative independence.

The Attorney General for Ontario brought a motion to strike out parts of an affidavit filed by the applicants in an application for judicial review.

The underlying application challenged the vires of O. Reg. 382/19.

The moving party argued the affidavit contained inadmissible legal argument, opinion, and irrelevant evidence that did not fall within the narrow exceptions for supplementing the record on judicial review.

The court adopted a hybrid approach, striking out paragraphs containing clear legal argument and opinion, while adjourning the balance of the motion to the panel hearing the application on its merits.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Office of the Independent Police Review Director (OIPRD) to screen out her complaints regarding a police homicide investigation.

The OIPRD had determined the complaints were frivolous and that police have inherent discretion in conducting investigations.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application for judicial review under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, finding it frivolous because mandamus is not available to compel police to investigate a matter in a particular way.

The Crown (appellant) sought costs of the appeal and the motion below after successfully appealing a decision and having the respondent's statement of claim struck as a nullity due to non-compliance with the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act, 2019.

The respondent, acting in person, opposed the costs order, arguing the Crown's appeal lacked legal basis and that the relevant statutory provision (s. 18(6) of the CLPA) was added after her action commenced.

The Court of Appeal found the Crown was entitled to costs as it was completely successful and s. 18(6) of the CLPA expressly applied to actions commenced before its enactment.

The court awarded the Crown $7,500 in costs, inclusive of disbursements and taxes, a reduced amount from their actual costs to reflect the respondent's self-represented status and financial situation.

The Crown appealed the dismissal of its motion to strike a statement of claim as a nullity.

The claim was brought by the respondent without the required 60-day notice under the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act, 2019 (CLPA).

The motion judge dismissed the Crown's motion due to delay, but the Court of Appeal found this was an error in law, as the CLPA explicitly states such an action is a nullity from its commencement, and delay or estoppel cannot override this statutory provision.

The appeal was allowed, and the claim against the Crown was struck out as a nullity.

The applicants sought judicial review of the Crown's decision to enact amendments to the Environmental Assessment Act and revoke the Forestry Regulation, arguing these actions breached the Crown's duty to consult under s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application.

The majority held that the duty to consult does not apply to the legislative process, relying on Mikisew Cree.

Regarding the revocation of the Forestry Regulation, the majority found no constitutional duty to consult as the revocation did not adversely affect Aboriginal or treaty rights, and even if a duty existed, it was at the low end of the spectrum and the Crown's consultation was adequate.

The applicant, operator of Sunset Manor long-term care home, sought judicial review of a Director's decision ordering the home to cease admitting new residents due to a risk of harm.

The applicant argued the decision was tainted by a reasonable apprehension of bias because one of the inspectors was a former employee, that it was denied procedural fairness, and that the decision was unreasonable.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding no reasonable apprehension of bias, that the procedural fairness owed was met, and that the Director's decision was reasonable and justified based on a history of non-compliance.

The appellant held an aggregate licence on property owned by the respondent.

The Ministry of Natural Resources and Forestry decided to transfer the licence to the property owner.

The appellant challenged this at the Local Planning Appeal Tribunal, arguing it should receive financial compensation.

The Tribunal ruled on a preliminary motion that it lacked jurisdiction to consider financial compensation.

The appellant appealed to the Divisional Court.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal as premature, finding that without a full factual record and substantive decision from the Tribunal, it could not properly review the jurisdictional and policy findings.

The Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) applied for judicial review of a Coroner's preliminary ruling in an inquest into a fatal helicopter crash.

The Coroner had ordered the disclosure of certain aggregate and specific information about witness statements obtained during the TSB's investigation.

The TSB argued this information was protected by the statutory privilege in s. 30 of the Canadian Transportation Accident Investigation and Safety Board Act (CTSA).

The Divisional Court granted the application, finding the Coroner's decision unreasonable as it conflicted with the broad statutory privilege and the mandatory procedure for disclosure under s. 30(5) of the CTSA.

The applicant, Canada Christian College, sought judicial review of the Minister's decision not to recommend proclamation of legislative amendments that would grant it university status and expanded degree-granting authority.

The Minister had referred the applicant's request to the Postsecondary Education Quality Assessment Board, which concluded the applicant was not ready for the changes.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Board's recommendations were not reviewable, the Minister's referral was intra vires the Post-secondary Education Choice and Excellence Act, 2000, and the Minister's decision not to recommend proclamation was a legislative act not subject to procedural fairness and was reasonable.

The moving parties, Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ontario and Joel Breault, brought a motion for leave to appeal an order of Croll J. dated September 24, 2021.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal.

Costs were fixed at $2,500 for the Landry plaintiffs and $2,500 for the Davies defendants, payable by the moving parties.

The plaintiff, previously declared a vexatious litigant, brought a motion seeking retroactive leave under s. 140(4) of the Courts of Justice Act to commence and continue an action against the police board and several officers for false arrest and related claims.

The court reviewed the plaintiff's history of litigation against the police and the evidence provided in support of the current claim.

The court found that while the proceeding was not an abuse of process, the plaintiff failed to meet the onus of showing reasonable grounds for the proceeding, as he provided only a bald affidavit adopting the statement of claim and failed to refute police disclosure records indicating he was intoxicated and caused a disturbance.

The motion for leave was dismissed.

The applicants, environmental advocacy organizations, brought applications for judicial review challenging the failure of various Ontario Ministers to conduct public consultations under the Environmental Bill of Rights, 1993 (EBR) before enacting the COVID-19 Economic Recovery Act, 2020.

The applicants argued that the Ministers acted unreasonably by failing to post proposed amendments to several statutes on the Environmental Registry.

The Divisional Court dismissed most of the challenges, finding the Ministers' decisions reasonable or shielded by retroactive legislation.

However, the court granted the application in part, issuing a declaration that the Minister of Municipal Affairs and Housing acted unreasonably and unlawfully by failing to post proposed amendments respecting Ministerial Zoning Orders under the Planning Act prior to implementation.

Three Toronto police officers sued the Attorney General of Ontario for negligence and misfeasance in public office, alleging that Crown Attorneys failed to properly investigate and defend against allegations of police misconduct made by an accused during a criminal trial, causing reputational harm to the officers.

The Attorney General moved to strike the claim under Rule 21.01(1)(b).

The court struck the negligence claim, finding that while a prima facie duty of care might exist, it was negated by policy concerns regarding the diversion of Crown Attorneys from their primary duties and the potential chilling effect on prosecutorial discretion.

However, the court allowed the misfeasance in public office claim to proceed, finding that the plaintiffs had properly pleaded the necessary elements of deliberate and unlawful conduct.

The Attorney General submitted that there be no order as to costs regarding the motion by Ontario to strike the claim.

The plaintiff did not take serious issue with this disposition.

The court ordered no costs on the motion.