Réjean Parisé

The moving party brought a motion to dismiss the responding party's unperfected family law appeal and sought costs for both the appeal and the underlying Ontario Court of Justice (OCJ) trial.

The responding party consented to the dismissal of the appeal but opposed the costs requests.

The Superior Court dismissed the request to vary the OCJ trial judge's timeline for costs submissions, finding it lacked jurisdiction to amend the lower court's order on a motion.

However, the court granted the motion to dismiss the appeal and awarded the moving party $3,000 in costs for the appeal, noting the responding party filed the appeal solely to buy time and took no steps to perfect it, causing the moving party to incur unnecessary legal fees.

The Ontario Court of Justice considered a motion to strike pleadings based on a respondent father's breach of a prior final order regarding child support payments and income disclosure.

The court found the father had breached the order but declined to strike his pleadings, instead ordering disclosure within 90 days and precluding relief related to child support until compliance.

Both parties sought costs, but the court found success was divided and both parties engaged in unreasonable conduct.

Applying Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules and relevant case law, the court denied costs to both parties, emphasizing shared responsibility for the unnecessary motion.

This decision addresses a motion to strike pleadings under Rule 1(8) of the Family Law Rules due to the respondent father's failure to comply with a prior child support order, specifically non-payment and failure to provide required income disclosure.

The court confirms the father's breach of the Final Order but declines to strike pleadings, emphasizing the importance of proportionality, the timing of the mother's motion, and the best interests of the child.

Instead, the court orders the father to provide outstanding financial documents within 90 days and precludes him from obtaining child support relief until compliance.

The decision highlights the court's discretion in sanctioning non-compliance and balancing procedural fairness with substantive justice in family law matters.

The society brought a child protection application regarding a six-year-old Indigenous child.

The mother repeatedly made false allegations that the father sexually abused the child, alienating the child from the father and subjecting the child to invasive medical exams.

The mother also engaged in pseudo-legal arguments, breached court orders, and absconded with the child.

The court found the child in need of protection due to the risk of emotional harm caused by the mother's conduct.

Custody was granted to the father under s. 102 of the CYFSA, and the mother was limited to supervised virtual access.

The Office of the Children's Lawyer (OCL) brought an urgent motion to set aside a Summons to Witness served by Kina Gbezhgomi Child and Family Services (Kina) on the child A.L.P. in a Secure Treatment Application proceeding.

Kina sought to question the child, arguing it was permissible under the Family Law Rules.

The OCL argued that Secure Treatment Applications fall under Part VII of the CYFSA, not Part V (Child Protection), and therefore Rule 20(3) regarding questioning as a right does not apply.

The court agreed with the OCL, finding that Rule 20(3) does not apply to Secure Treatment Applications and that Kina should have brought a motion under Rule 20(5) for an order to question the child, which it failed to do.

The OCL's motion was granted, and the Summons to Witness was set aside.

This decision concerns a contested passing of estate accounts.

The beneficiaries (respondents) challenged the estate trustee's (applicant's) accounting, alleging unaccounted assets from real estate sales and a life insurance policy, as well as improper payment of legal fees from the estate.

The court found that the estate trustee failed to adequately account for $107,321 in corporate assets and $53,220 in personal assets, and improperly paid $21,074 in legal fees from the estate.

The court ordered the estate trustee to pay $181,615 to the estate by way of damages.

The respondents' claim for a resulting trust on property transferred to the estate trustee prior to the deceased's death was dismissed due to the presumption of advancement between married spouses.

The defendant brought an anti-SLAPP motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss the plaintiffs' defamation claim.

The plaintiffs alleged defamation by a "cease and desist" letter sent by the defendant to their employer and funding body, containing false allegations about their professional conduct and their organization.

The court found the defendant's expression related to a matter of public interest, satisfying the first stage of the anti-SLAPP test.

However, at the second stage, the court found grounds to believe the plaintiffs' claim had substantial merit and that the defendant had no valid defence (justification or qualified privilege), noting the fragility of the defendant's evidence and potential malice.

The court concluded that the public interest in allowing the plaintiffs' legitimate claim to proceed, particularly to resolve a long-standing conflict impacting publicly funded services, outweighed the public interest in protecting the defendant's expression.

The motion was dismissed without costs.

The father (M.H.) appealed orders from the Ontario Court of Justice in a child protection application, including the striking of his answer and the award of custody to the mother (M.D.) with supervised access for him.

The father had refused to participate in virtual proceedings due to religious beliefs.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding that while the motion judge did not err in denying an adjournment, she erred in interpreting or applying Rule 1(8.2) of the Family Law Rules by striking the father's answer without considering if the delay would be unfair, and by failing to fully consider the child's best interests when making the final custody order, relying on an incomplete Statement of Agreed Facts.

The matter was remitted to the Ontario Court for an expedited hearing.

The respondent wife brought a motion for interim spousal and child support.

The applicant husband, a cardiologist, historically earned around $1 million annually but claimed a reduced income of $596,000 for 2021.

The court imputed the husband's income at $712,526 and the wife's income at $192,400 due to her lack of financial disclosure regarding her corporate interests.

The court found the wife had a strong prima facie entitlement to non-compensatory spousal support and ordered the husband to pay $12,127.50 per month in interim spousal support and $2,880 per month in interim child support for their adult child.

The husband was also ordered to designate the wife as the irrevocable beneficiary of a $500,000 life insurance policy.

The moving party sought costs against one of the respondents personally following a motion for directions regarding the appointment of an estate trustee.

The responding parties sought their costs from the moving party.

The court found that while the moving party was an inappropriate candidate for estate trustee, his application was necessary to advance the administration of the estate.

The court ordered the moving party's costs to be paid from the estate on a substantial indemnity basis.

The responding parties' costs were also ordered to be paid from the estate, but on a partial indemnity basis, as they failed to propose an alternate candidate.

The Nogdawindamin Family and Community Services brought a child protection application and a motion for temporary care and custody concerning three children.

The court critically reviewed the society's procedural haste in bringing the application and motion on short notice, noting it circumvented standard Family Law Rules for respondent reply times and motion notice periods.

The judge emphasized the importance of procedural fairness, particularly given the power imbalance between societies and parents in child protection cases.

The court dismissed the society's motion for temporary care and custody and access claims, instead making a temporary care and custody order keeping the children in their current customary and kinship placements without society supervision, adjourning the society's motion for a proper hearing.

The applicant father brought a motion to change a 2012 parenting order, seeking "week-about" parenting time for his 9-year-old son.

The respondent mother opposed this, requesting supervised access and programs for the father.

The court considered the child's best interests under the Children's Law Reform Act, including the child's expressed wishes for more time with his father.

However, the court found the father's relationship with the child to be "excessive" and "self-centered" concluding that further increasing parenting time beyond the existing interim order would not be in the child's best interests.

The father's motion for increased parenting time was dismissed, and no costs were awarded.

The moving party, the separated spouse of the deceased, sought to be appointed as estate trustee.

The respondents, the deceased's son and common-law partner, objected to the appointment.

The court found that the moving party had an irreconcilable conflict of interest with the estate and its beneficiaries, as he was a defendant in potential family law and child support claims by the estate, and had failed to pay child support since the deceased's death.

The court denied the moving party's application and ordered that he be passed over as estate trustee.

The applicant father brought a motion for contempt against the respondent mother for failing to provide access to their child as per a 2012 consent order.

The court found the mother in contempt, noting her deliberate non-compliance despite warnings from two judges.

However, the court imposed a nominal fine of one cent, emphasizing that contempt motions are a last resort and not for varying final orders.

The issue of compensatory access, sought by the father as a remedy, was remitted to the trial judge in the ongoing Motion to Change proceeding, as the contempt motion was procedurally flawed and brought in the wrong proceeding.

A motion to remove counsel for a foster parent in a child protection application.

The respondent child and family services agency sought to disqualify the applicant's lawyer, who had previously represented the agency in related proceedings involving the same child.

The court applied the test from MacDonald Estate v. Martin to determine whether a conflict of interest existed.

The court found that the lawyer had access to confidential information as counsel of record for the agency in prior proceedings, including the Customary Care Agreement and the termination of the Crown Wardship Order.

The court held that the public, represented by the reasonably informed person, would not be satisfied that no misuse of confidential information would occur.

The lawyer was removed from the record.

The applicant, a long-term foster parent who had cared for a child with severe physical and cognitive disabilities for nearly 15 years under a Customary Care Agreement, sought a status review application after the child was removed from his care by a child protection agency.

The respondent agency argued the court lacked jurisdiction because there was no existing protection order affecting the child's status.

The court found it had no jurisdiction to hear the status review application, as the child was not in extended society care under a valid protection order.

The application was dismissed without prejudice, with the court noting concerns about the characterization of the removal as a "change in placement" rather than an apprehension, but finding the applicant could pursue alternative remedies under custody and access provisions.

The applicants (maternal grandparents) brought a motion seeking an order that police records from the Greater Sudbury Police Service and records from the Children's Aid Society of the Districts of Sudbury and Manitoulin be declared admissible as evidence for the truth of their content in a custody and access dispute.

The respondents (biological parents) opposed the motion on the grounds that the documents contained inadmissible hearsay and opinion evidence.

The court granted the motion in part, holding that the documents qualify as business records under section 35 of the Ontario Evidence Act and are admissible for the truth of their content, subject to specific limitations regarding hearsay and opinion evidence.

The respondent husband brought a motion for summary judgment seeking to dismiss the applicant wife's application for spousal support, equalization of net family property, and to set aside a separation agreement.

The respondent argued that the wife's claims were barred by res judicata and abuse of process, as a divorce judgment had already been granted.

The applicant contended that the issues of support and equalization were never adjudicated in the divorce application.

The court dismissed the respondent's motion for summary judgment, finding that res judicata did not apply because the specific issues of support and pension entitlement were not previously adjudicated, and the Family Law Act permits such claims within two years of divorce.

The applicants (maternal grandparents) brought a motion requesting an order pursuant to sections 89 and 112 of the Courts of Justice Act that the Office of the Children's Lawyer be requested to investigate the circumstances of claims for custody and/or access to the child.

The respondents (biological parents) opposed the motion.

The court granted the motion, finding that the involvement of the Office of the Children's Lawyer would be helpful in determining the child's best interests given the complex factual disputes, the child's age and ability to express herself, and the child protection overtones in the case.

The appellant mother appealed an order interpreting a separation agreement regarding child support and an equalization payment set-off.

The parties had shared custody and agreed to a set-off of child support against a $97,000 equalization payment owed by the mother.

The mother argued the set-off should be calculated from the date of separation based on the father's actual higher income, rather than the date of the agreement.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the application judge made no reviewable error in interpreting the contract and concluding the set-off began at the date of the agreement, noting the discretion under section 9 of the Child Support Guidelines for shared parenting.