Réjean Parisé

The applicant father brought a motion for contempt against the respondent mother for failing to provide access to their child as per a 2012 consent order.

The court found the mother in contempt, noting her deliberate non-compliance despite warnings from two judges.

However, the court imposed a nominal fine of one cent, emphasizing that contempt motions are a last resort and not for varying final orders.

The issue of compensatory access, sought by the father as a remedy, was remitted to the trial judge in the ongoing Motion to Change proceeding, as the contempt motion was procedurally flawed and brought in the wrong proceeding.

A motion to remove counsel for a foster parent in a child protection application.

The respondent child and family services agency sought to disqualify the applicant's lawyer, who had previously represented the agency in related proceedings involving the same child.

The court applied the test from MacDonald Estate v. Martin to determine whether a conflict of interest existed.

The court found that the lawyer had access to confidential information as counsel of record for the agency in prior proceedings, including the Customary Care Agreement and the termination of the Crown Wardship Order.

The court held that the public, represented by the reasonably informed person, would not be satisfied that no misuse of confidential information would occur.

The lawyer was removed from the record.

The applicant, a long-term foster parent who had cared for a child with severe physical and cognitive disabilities for nearly 15 years under a Customary Care Agreement, sought a status review application after the child was removed from his care by a child protection agency.

The respondent agency argued the court lacked jurisdiction because there was no existing protection order affecting the child's status.

The court found it had no jurisdiction to hear the status review application, as the child was not in extended society care under a valid protection order.

The application was dismissed without prejudice, with the court noting concerns about the characterization of the removal as a "change in placement" rather than an apprehension, but finding the applicant could pursue alternative remedies under custody and access provisions.

The applicants, foster parents of an Indigenous child, applied to the Child and Family Services Review Board to review the respondent society's decision to remove the child from their care.

The society challenged the Board's jurisdiction, arguing that the child's First Nation had proposed the removal as an exercise of its inherent authority and customary care, and that the society was merely acting as a resource.

The Board held that under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, only a society has the statutory authority to remove a child from a foster home, and the First Nation does not have this authority.

The Board concluded it had jurisdiction to review the proposed removal and directed that a hearing on the merits be scheduled.

The applicants (maternal grandparents) brought a motion seeking an order that police records from the Greater Sudbury Police Service and records from the Children's Aid Society of the Districts of Sudbury and Manitoulin be declared admissible as evidence for the truth of their content in a custody and access dispute.

The respondents (biological parents) opposed the motion on the grounds that the documents contained inadmissible hearsay and opinion evidence.

The court granted the motion in part, holding that the documents qualify as business records under section 35 of the Ontario Evidence Act and are admissible for the truth of their content, subject to specific limitations regarding hearsay and opinion evidence.

The respondent husband brought a motion for summary judgment seeking to dismiss the applicant wife's application for spousal support, equalization of net family property, and to set aside a separation agreement.

The respondent argued that the wife's claims were barred by res judicata and abuse of process, as a divorce judgment had already been granted.

The applicant contended that the issues of support and equalization were never adjudicated in the divorce application.

The court dismissed the respondent's motion for summary judgment, finding that res judicata did not apply because the specific issues of support and pension entitlement were not previously adjudicated, and the Family Law Act permits such claims within two years of divorce.

The applicants (maternal grandparents) brought a motion requesting an order pursuant to sections 89 and 112 of the Courts of Justice Act that the Office of the Children's Lawyer be requested to investigate the circumstances of claims for custody and/or access to the child.

The respondents (biological parents) opposed the motion.

The court granted the motion, finding that the involvement of the Office of the Children's Lawyer would be helpful in determining the child's best interests given the complex factual disputes, the child's age and ability to express herself, and the child protection overtones in the case.

The appellant mother appealed an order interpreting a separation agreement regarding child support and an equalization payment set-off.

The parties had shared custody and agreed to a set-off of child support against a $97,000 equalization payment owed by the mother.

The mother argued the set-off should be calculated from the date of separation based on the father's actual higher income, rather than the date of the agreement.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the application judge made no reviewable error in interpreting the contract and concluding the set-off began at the date of the agreement, noting the discretion under section 9 of the Child Support Guidelines for shared parenting.

The appellant father appealed a Superior Court decision dismissing his motion to change custody of a 12-year-old child.

The original custody order was made on consent to the mother in 2007.

The father argued that a psychological report ordered under the Children's Law Reform Act established a material change in circumstances affecting the child.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding that while the report documented parental conflict and the mother's anger negatively impacting the child, the continuation of parental conflict does not constitute a material change in circumstances.

The court noted that the mother had taken reasonable steps to address the identified issues, including enrolling in parenting programs and increasing the father's time with the child.

The applicant and respondent each brought motions concerning a temporary custody order, child support, spousal support, and compliance with previous orders and undertakings.

The applicant sought sole custody, increased child support, and section 7 expenses, while the respondent sought to dismiss the applicant's motion, vary custody to his care, and disentitle the applicant due to non-compliance.

The court found jurisdiction to vary the interim custody order, amended the order to reflect the children's primary residence with the applicant, increased child support, and adjourned issues of retroactive child support, section 7 expenses, and spousal support to trial.

The respondent's claims for disentitlement were dismissed.

The plaintiff vendor sued the defendant purchasers for breach of contract after the defendants failed to close a real estate transaction.

The defendants argued there was an implied term that their obligation to close was conditional on the sale of their own home, which had fallen through.

The court rejected this argument, finding no such implied term in the unambiguous agreement.

The court also dismissed the defendants' argument that the plaintiff failed to mitigate her damages.

The plaintiff was awarded damages of $110,588.66, assessed as of the date she successfully sold the property to a third party, representing the difference in purchase price and carrying costs.

Following a successful one-day family law trial regarding the interpretation of a separation agreement, the applicant sought costs of $10,000 to $13,000.

The respondent argued for no costs due to divided success on other issues resolved prior to trial.

The court excluded costs related to an earlier motion that were not reserved to the trial judge, and awarded the applicant $9,000 in costs.

The Children's Aid Society of Algoma brought a motion to transfer carriage of a child protection status review proceeding to Nogdawindamin Family and Community Services, a newly designated native children's aid society.

The motion involved determining whether Nogdawindamin CAS had jurisdiction under its ministerial designation to act as the applicant society.

The court examined the complex jurisdictional issues arising from the designation, including territorial jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction based on aboriginal status, and the conditions imposed on the designation.

The court granted the motion, finding that Nogdawindamin CAS had jurisdiction to carry out its mandate as a children's aid society in this case involving an Indian child identified as a member of one of the seven listed First Nations.

This decision addresses a motion by Children's Aid Society of Algoma (Algoma CAS) seeking to substitute Nogdawindamin Family and Community Services (Nogdawindamin CAS) as the applicant in child protection proceedings.

The motion arose from the recent designation of Nogdawindamin, a native agency, as a children's aid society effective April 1, 2017.

The court examined the Minister's designation of Nogdawindamin CAS, which imposed conditions restricting its jurisdiction over certain categories of persons.

The court determined that it has authority to adjudicate jurisdictional issues and that transfer motions require more than mere notification to the court.

The court found that the subject child fell within Nogdawindamin CAS's jurisdiction under paragraph 1 of the designation (geographic jurisdiction on First Nation reserves) and ordered the transfer.

This decision addresses a motion by Children's Aid Society of Algoma seeking to substitute Nogdawindamin Family and Community Services as the applicant in a child protection proceeding.

The motion arose from the recent designation of Nogdawindamin as a native children's aid society effective April 1, 2017.

The court examined the Minister's designation of Nogdawindamin and determined that the child in question did not fall within any of the paragraphs of the designation that were currently in effect.

The court dismissed the transfer motion, finding that Nogdawindamin lacked jurisdiction to act as the applicant society in this particular case.

The Children's Aid Society of Algoma brought a motion to transfer carriage of child protection proceedings to Nogdawindamin Family and Community Services, a newly designated native children's aid society.

The court examined the ministerial designation of Nogdawindamin CAS and determined that it had jurisdiction only over children who were members of the seven specified First Nations bands residing on reserves or who met specific criteria under the designation.

The court granted the transfer motion with respect to one child (A.M.) who was an identified Indian child entitled to membership in one of the designated bands and residing on reserve.

The court dismissed the transfer motion with respect to three other children (N.M., P.F., and M.M.) who had no connection to the designated First Nations or aboriginal status.

The decision addresses the complexities of jurisdictional issues arising from the creation of native children's aid societies and the interplay between geographical and personal designations.

This decision addresses a motion by the Children's Aid Society of Algoma to transfer carriage of a child protection proceeding to Nogdawindamin Family and Community Services, a newly designated native children's aid society.

The case involves a non-Indian child (C.C.2) whose mother is a registered member of a First Nation band.

The court examined the Minister's designation of Nogdawindamin CAS, which contains complex geographical and personal jurisdictional criteria, including conditions restricting certain services pending consultation with other communities.

The court determined that Nogdawindamin CAS has jurisdiction to provide services on First Nation reserves under paragraph 1 of its designation, as the bulk of child protection services were being provided on a reserve.

The transfer was granted, though the court expressed concerns about the superficial evidence presented and the lack of information from respondents.

The Children's Aid Society of Algoma brought a motion to transfer carriage of child protection proceedings to Nogdawindamin Family and Community Services, a newly designated native children's aid society.

The motion involved two children whose father was a registered member of a First Nation band.

The court examined the ministerial designation of Nogdawindamin CAS, the jurisdictional limitations imposed by conditions in that designation, and the statutory framework governing native societies under the Child and Family Services Act.

The court determined that Nogdawindamin CAS had jurisdiction over the children as members of the father's First Nation band and granted the transfer motion, while also addressing broader issues regarding the interpretation of ministerial designations and the court's role in adjudicating society jurisdiction in child protection proceedings.

This case involved the interpretation of a separation agreement concerning child support and equalization payments.

The wife sought an interpretation that would retroactively adjust child support based on the husband's actual income from July 2009 to May 2011, leading to arrears and a faster exhaustion of the equalization payment credit.

The court, applying contract interpretation principles rather than the Divorce Act, found the agreement clear and unambiguous.

It upheld the husband's position that the agreed-upon child support of $2,500 per month was consistent with the Guidelines at the time of the agreement and that no arrears existed prior to its execution.

The wife's request for a retroactive adjustment and payment of $54,922 was denied.

The plaintiff brought a wrongful dismissal action against his former employer and its owners, alleging age discrimination.

The personal defendants brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the age discrimination claims against them.

The plaintiff brought a cross-motion for summary judgment on the entire claim.

The court granted the personal defendants' motion, finding no employment relationship and no factual foundation for the age discrimination claim.

On the plaintiff's motion, the court found no cause for termination and that the plaintiff had mitigated his damages, leaving only the quantum of notice to be determined at a later date.