Réjean Parisé

Following a successful one-day family law trial regarding the interpretation of a separation agreement, the applicant sought costs of $10,000 to $13,000.

The respondent argued for no costs due to divided success on other issues resolved prior to trial.

The court excluded costs related to an earlier motion that were not reserved to the trial judge, and awarded the applicant $9,000 in costs.

This case involved the interpretation of a separation agreement concerning child support and equalization payments.

The wife sought an interpretation that would retroactively adjust child support based on the husband's actual income from July 2009 to May 2011, leading to arrears and a faster exhaustion of the equalization payment credit.

The court, applying contract interpretation principles rather than the Divorce Act, found the agreement clear and unambiguous.

It upheld the husband's position that the agreed-upon child support of $2,500 per month was consistent with the Guidelines at the time of the agreement and that no arrears existed prior to its execution.

The wife's request for a retroactive adjustment and payment of $54,922 was denied.

The plaintiff brought a wrongful dismissal action against his former employer and its owners, alleging age discrimination.

The personal defendants brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the age discrimination claims against them.

The plaintiff brought a cross-motion for summary judgment on the entire claim.

The court granted the personal defendants' motion, finding no employment relationship and no factual foundation for the age discrimination claim.

On the plaintiff's motion, the court found no cause for termination and that the plaintiff had mitigated his damages, leaving only the quantum of notice to be determined at a later date.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiff's actions, the successful defendants sought costs.

The self-represented plaintiff also sought costs despite being entirely unsuccessful.

The court denied the plaintiff's request and awarded costs to the defendants, noting the plaintiff's unrelenting and vengeful pursuit of doomed litigation.

The court balanced the plaintiff's conduct with the need for costs to be fair, reasonable, and proportionate, awarding $9,500 to the Queen and $3,500 to the defendant Ramage.

Unmarried parents dispute custody and access of their child.

The father seeks joint custody with equal week-about sharing of care and control.

The mother seeks sole custody with biweekly access to the father.

The court finds that the father's history of emotional abuse, controlling behaviour, sexual assault, and inability to communicate effectively with the mother render him unsuitable for joint custody.

The mother is found to be the child's primary caregiver throughout the child's life and better positioned to serve the child's best interests.

The court awards sole custody to the mother with biweekly access to the father.

Following a successful Norwich application compelling disclosure of the identities of individuals who made allegedly malicious anonymous reports to a children’s aid society, the self‑represented applicant sought substantial costs against the society and the Child and Family Services Review Board.

The society argued that no costs should be ordered.

The court held that although the society could not legally consent to the disclosure order due to statutory confidentiality obligations, its strong opposition unnecessarily increased the effort required by the applicant.

Reasonable costs were therefore awarded against the society but not against the tribunal.

The defendants brought a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's action for delay.

The action arose from a 1997 bicycle accident on the defendants' property, with the statement of claim issued in 2001.

The court found that the 13.5-year delay was inordinate and inexcusable, and that the plaintiff failed to rebut the presumption of prejudice, especially given that the defendants were now mentally incapable of instructing counsel.

The court exercised its inherent jurisdiction to dismiss the action.

The applicant spouse sought an order restraining the respondent from withdrawing or transferring funds from his OMERS pension pending the disposition of her appeal concerning post‑retirement spousal support.

She relied on s. 40 of the Family Law Act and alternatively sought injunctive relief under the Rules of Civil Procedure to prevent depletion of the pension.

The court held that the appropriate forum for interim relief pending an appeal was the Court of Appeal under s. 134 of the Courts of Justice Act.

It also found the motion procedurally flawed and concluded that s. 40 of the Family Law Act was unavailable because the spousal support order was made under the Divorce Act.

In any event, the evidentiary record did not establish irreparable harm required for injunctive relief.

The responding party brought a motion seeking an interim and permanent reduction in child support and adjustments to post‑secondary expense contributions pending a motion to change a final support order.

The other party opposed the request and sought continued application of an earlier interim order, along with additional child support adjustments for a child attending university and another engaged in post‑secondary studies.

The court reviewed the jurisdiction to temporarily vary final or interim support orders under the Divorce Act and relevant jurisprudence.

It held that while courts may have jurisdiction in exceptional circumstances, such variations should only occur where there is urgent hardship, absurdity, or pressing need.

The evidence did not establish such circumstances, and the issues regarding entitlement to support and section 7 expenses were better addressed at the final hearing of the motion to change.

The responding spouse brought a motion to change an existing spousal support order following retirement and reduced income.

The parties agreed that a material change in circumstances existed under s. 17(7) of the Divorce Act due to the payor’s retirement and the recipient’s inability to work because of medical issues.

The court found the recipient remained entitled to compensatory and needs‑based support given the long marriage and her role raising the children, but that the payor’s retirement justified a reduction in support.

Applying the principles in Boston v. Boston regarding double dipping and considering the recipient’s cohabitation with a new partner, the court declined to include double dipping in calculating support.

The existing order was varied to reduce spousal support to $946 per month with no retroactive adjustment.

The moving party brought a motion to change a final order governing child support and section 7 expenses under the Divorce Act.

The court considered whether the payor’s reduced income following his voluntary decision to leave employment and start a business abroad constituted a material change in circumstances under s. 17 of the Divorce Act and the Federal Child Support Guidelines.

The court held that the risks associated with the payor’s career change were contemplated when the original order and settlement were made, and therefore no material change existed to justify varying the child support order.

However, the court addressed entitlement of adult children to support and recalculated arrears where one child was not a “child of the marriage” for part of the period.

The motion to vary the support order was largely dismissed and arrears and section 7 expenses were fixed and ordered payable from the payor’s retirement investments.

In a divorce proceeding, the respondent spouse sought a lump‑sum spousal support award to be satisfied through division of the applicant’s pension after the applicant’s post‑separation bankruptcy eliminated any potential equalization payment.

The court held that an equalization claim constitutes a provable debt in bankruptcy and is extinguished upon discharge unless the stay is lifted during the bankruptcy process.

The respondent had knowledge of the bankruptcy but failed to take timely steps to lift the stay and therefore could not indirectly pursue equalization through a lump‑sum spousal support award.

The court rejected compensatory and unjust enrichment claims but awarded limited periodic spousal support due to economic hardship caused by joint debts addressed through a consumer proposal.

Support was ordered to commence when the applicant resumed employment or received long‑term disability benefits and to terminate on December 31, 2015.

Following a trial addressing custody, access, and child support, the court determined outstanding claims for special and extraordinary expenses under s. 7 of the Federal Child Support Guidelines.

The court found daycare expenses incurred due to the custodial parent’s employment qualified as s. 7 expenses but limited retroactive recovery where documentation had not been provided to the other parent in advance.

Partial retroactive contributions for proven daycare costs were ordered, and ongoing proportional payment of daycare expenses was established.

Claims for extracurricular activity costs, including swimming lessons and dance-related expenses, were dismissed because the expenses were not “extraordinary” within the meaning of s. 7(1.1) of the Guidelines and would reasonably be covered by the basic table amount of child support.

A custody dispute following separation involved competing claims for sole custody versus joint custody of three children.

The court considered the best interests of the children under s. 16 of the Divorce Act and evidence regarding the parties’ historical parenting roles, communication abilities, and conduct affecting the children’s welfare.

While the father sought joint custody and a week‑about parenting schedule, the court found the parties lacked the level of cooperation and communication necessary for joint decision‑making.

The mother had historically been the primary caregiver and demonstrated a greater willingness to facilitate the children’s relationship with the father.

Sole custody was therefore granted to the mother, with a structured access regime granting the father regular parenting time and extended periods including a week every third week and shared holiday arrangements, together with updated child support obligations.

The applicant brought a motion to enforce an existing child support order and sought contribution toward post-secondary education and private school expenses.

The respondent argued that support should terminate because the adult child had ended the relationship with him and had completed secondary school.

The court found the estrangement was mutual and that the respondent had not proven a unilateral repudiation by the child, but also concluded that the applicant failed to establish that the child remained a dependent for support purposes under the principles set out in Farden.

The court declined to order payment of university expenses due to insufficient evidence regarding full‑time enrolment and commitment to studies.

The court also held that private school tuition incurred unilaterally by the applicant was neither necessary nor reasonable.

No new support payments were ordered unless future evidence demonstrates that the child qualifies as a dependent.

The parties separated after 12.5 years of marriage and resolved custody and access of their three children.

At trial, the court determined the applicant's income for child support purposes, imputing additional income due to undisclosed earnings from various side businesses.

The court ordered retroactive child support and found that the children's extensive athletic and musical activities qualified as Section 7 extraordinary expenses, requiring proportionate contribution from the applicant.

The court also valued the matrimonial home, accounting for necessary roof repairs, and calculated the equalization of net family properties, applying various set-offs against the equalization payment owed by the respondent.

The parties could not agree on a summer access schedule for their three children.

The father, a school teacher, proposed a week-about schedule where he would care for the children instead of sending them to daycare, while still paying the daycare costs to hold their spots.

The mother objected, arguing the children needed the daycare routine and activities.

The court found that the parents were putting their wishes above the children's best interests and that the father was capable of providing care and education.

The court ordered a week-about summer access schedule to commence immediately.

The father brought a motion seeking permission to enrol the parties’ children in a competitive lacrosse league despite a prior order requiring the other parent’s consent for competitive extracurricular activities.

The mother refused consent based on the strict wording of the order.

The court held that the best interests of the children required a reasonable approach to withholding consent, particularly where participation would not interfere with the other parent’s parenting time.

Finding the children would benefit from participating at a higher level and that the proposed schedule would not infringe on the mother’s parenting time, the court granted the requested order.

In a family law motion concerning parenting decision-making, the father sought permission to enrol the parties’ twin children in a community lacrosse association.

On consent of both parties, the court issued an endorsement permitting the enrolment for the 2012 season.

The order required that all lacrosse-related activities, including practices, meetings, and tournaments, occur only during the father’s parenting time.

Reasons for the endorsement were to follow.

The parties brought cross-motions regarding the sale of the matrimonial home, occupation rent, and child care expenses.

The applicant sought to purchase the respondent's interest in the home, which the court denied, ordering the property to be listed for sale on the open market.

The respondent sought occupation rent because the applicant thwarted a previous order to list the home.

The court found the respondent had a tenable claim for occupation rent due to the applicant's conduct, but calculated the quantum to be zero because the respondent's share of the carrying costs exceeded his share of the potential rent.

The court also ordered the respondent to pay his proportionate share of day care expenses going forward, but denied the applicant's claim for retroactive day care costs.