Réjean Parisé

The appellant, Smartech Installations, successfully appealed a trial judgment obtained by the respondent, Yvan Rolland Pilon, resulting in an order for a new trial.

The appellant sought partial indemnity costs for the appeal.

The court noted that the respondent had refused a substantial settlement offer during the appeal hearing.

Applying section 131(1) of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court awarded the appellant partial indemnity costs fixed at $5,122.55.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiff's actions, the successful defendants sought costs.

The self-represented plaintiff also sought costs despite being entirely unsuccessful.

The court denied the plaintiff's request and awarded costs to the defendants, noting the plaintiff's unrelenting and vengeful pursuit of doomed litigation.

The court balanced the plaintiff's conduct with the need for costs to be fair, reasonable, and proportionate, awarding $9,500 to the Queen and $3,500 to the defendant Ramage.

The appellant, a contest sponsor, appealed a Small Claims Court decision awarding the respondent $25,000 for an uncollected radio contest prize.

The trial judge found a contract existed between the sponsor and the winner but provided no analysis to support this conclusion.

The Divisional Court held that the trial judge erred in law by failing to articulate a legal basis for finding a contract, which prevented meaningful appellate review.

The appeal was allowed, the trial decision was set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

Unmarried parents dispute custody and access of their child.

The father seeks joint custody with equal week-about sharing of care and control.

The mother seeks sole custody with biweekly access to the father.

The court finds that the father's history of emotional abuse, controlling behaviour, sexual assault, and inability to communicate effectively with the mother render him unsuitable for joint custody.

The mother is found to be the child's primary caregiver throughout the child's life and better positioned to serve the child's best interests.

The court awards sole custody to the mother with biweekly access to the father.

Following the breakdown of a 13‑year common‑law relationship, the applicant sought spousal support and a monetary remedy based on unjust enrichment.

The court found entitlement to spousal support on a non‑compensatory basis under ss. 30 and 33 of the Family Law Act due to economic dependency and hardship following separation.

Applying the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines, the court awarded retroactive and ongoing support, including a lump‑sum payment reflecting discounted retroactive amounts and ongoing monthly support for a limited duration.

The court also examined the claim for unjust enrichment using the joint family venture framework from Kerr v. Baranow but concluded the distribution of wealth between the parties was not inappropriately disproportionate.

As a result, no property remedy was granted.

The court determined costs following a motion brought by the father to enforce compliance with three provisions of a consent order, particularly a provision requiring the mother to afford the father the first opportunity to care for the child when she was unable to do so.

The father was successful on the motion, and the court awarded costs to the father while considering the mother's financial circumstances as a custodial parent and the best interests of the child.

The court fixed costs at $2,000 inclusive of disbursements and taxes, payable in monthly instalments.

The parties each brought motions regarding child support and section 7 expenses, both of which were dismissed.

The applicant subsequently sought costs of $9,250 on a full recovery basis, arguing she was the successful party because the respondent's motion was dismissed and she succeeded on the dominant issue of jurisdiction.

The respondent argued for no costs, as both parties failed on the merits.

The court agreed with the respondent, finding that neither party was successful and the presumption in Rule 24(1) of the Family Law Rules did not apply.

The court ordered that neither party be awarded costs.

Following a successful Norwich application compelling disclosure of the identities of individuals who made allegedly malicious anonymous reports to a children’s aid society, the self‑represented applicant sought substantial costs against the society and the Child and Family Services Review Board.

The society argued that no costs should be ordered.

The court held that although the society could not legally consent to the disclosure order due to statutory confidentiality obligations, its strong opposition unnecessarily increased the effort required by the applicant.

Reasonable costs were therefore awarded against the society but not against the tribunal.

The father brought a motion to enforce compliance with a December 11, 2013 consent order, specifically paragraph 8(j), which required the mother to afford the father the first opportunity to care for the child when she was unable to do so.

The father claimed the mother failed to provide her work schedule and had unilaterally placed the child in daycare without offering him the opportunity to provide care.

The court found the mother's interpretation of paragraph 8(j) was incorrect and that it applied to all periods when she was unable to provide personal parental care, including work commitments.

The court found a material change in circumstances and amended the order to include specific requirements for the mother to provide her work schedule, school details, alternate childcare information, and authorization forms to service providers.

The applicant father sought a Norwich order compelling a children's aid society to disclose the identities and telephone numbers of anonymous informants who had made protection reports that were investigated and found unsubstantiated.

The court held that the applicant had demonstrated an arguable case that the informants may have acted maliciously and without reasonable grounds for suspicion, and that the requested disclosure was the only practicable source of the information needed to pursue a contemplated civil action.

The court further held that the interests of justice favoured disclosure.

The disclosure order superseded prior confidentiality orders of the review board, and an earlier sealing order was no longer required.

The appellant appealed a discretionary order deferring the determination of her entitlement to post-retirement spousal support until the respondent's retirement.

The trial judge recognized that the operation of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act could create an inequity, but concluded the issue was best addressed when the parties' means and needs had crystallized.

The Court of Appeal found no error in principle given the parties' ages and the time-limited support order already in place.

The appeal was dismissed, though the Court noted the appellant should be protected against unilateral dissipation of the pension prior to retirement.

The defendants brought a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's action for delay.

The action arose from a 1997 bicycle accident on the defendants' property, with the statement of claim issued in 2001.

The court found that the 13.5-year delay was inordinate and inexcusable, and that the plaintiff failed to rebut the presumption of prejudice, especially given that the defendants were now mentally incapable of instructing counsel.

The court exercised its inherent jurisdiction to dismiss the action.

The applicant spouse sought an order restraining the respondent from withdrawing or transferring funds from his OMERS pension pending the disposition of her appeal concerning post‑retirement spousal support.

She relied on s. 40 of the Family Law Act and alternatively sought injunctive relief under the Rules of Civil Procedure to prevent depletion of the pension.

The court held that the appropriate forum for interim relief pending an appeal was the Court of Appeal under s. 134 of the Courts of Justice Act.

It also found the motion procedurally flawed and concluded that s. 40 of the Family Law Act was unavailable because the spousal support order was made under the Divorce Act.

In any event, the evidentiary record did not establish irreparable harm required for injunctive relief.

The responding party brought a motion seeking an interim and permanent reduction in child support and adjustments to post‑secondary expense contributions pending a motion to change a final support order.

The other party opposed the request and sought continued application of an earlier interim order, along with additional child support adjustments for a child attending university and another engaged in post‑secondary studies.

The court reviewed the jurisdiction to temporarily vary final or interim support orders under the Divorce Act and relevant jurisprudence.

It held that while courts may have jurisdiction in exceptional circumstances, such variations should only occur where there is urgent hardship, absurdity, or pressing need.

The evidence did not establish such circumstances, and the issues regarding entitlement to support and section 7 expenses were better addressed at the final hearing of the motion to change.

The applicant filed a Request for Order During Proceedings seeking the production of various documents from the respondent in a human rights application alleging discrimination in employment on the basis of disability and age.

The Tribunal found that the requested documents, including property manager reports, bookkeeping records, cancelled cheques, Board meeting minutes, and financial statements, were arguably relevant to the issues in dispute.

The respondent was ordered to produce the requested documents.

The responding spouse brought a motion to change an existing spousal support order following retirement and reduced income.

The parties agreed that a material change in circumstances existed under s. 17(7) of the Divorce Act due to the payor’s retirement and the recipient’s inability to work because of medical issues.

The court found the recipient remained entitled to compensatory and needs‑based support given the long marriage and her role raising the children, but that the payor’s retirement justified a reduction in support.

Applying the principles in Boston v. Boston regarding double dipping and considering the recipient’s cohabitation with a new partner, the court declined to include double dipping in calculating support.

The existing order was varied to reduce spousal support to $946 per month with no retroactive adjustment.

The applicant father and respondent mother separated after a turbulent marriage and sought a determination of custody and access for their three young daughters.

The father sought joint or shared custody on an alternating weekly basis, while the mother sought sole custody with access reflecting the status quo.

The court found that both parents loved the children but were unable to communicate effectively or shield the children from their conflict.

Relying on the mother's role as the historical primary caregiver and the stability she provided, the court awarded sole custody to the mother.

However, to protect the father's relationship with the children, the court expanded his access to include a mid-week overnight and required his written consent for major decisions regarding relocation, education, and religion.

The court also granted a divorce and ordered the father to pay child support.

The moving party brought a motion to change a final order governing child support and section 7 expenses under the Divorce Act.

The court considered whether the payor’s reduced income following his voluntary decision to leave employment and start a business abroad constituted a material change in circumstances under s. 17 of the Divorce Act and the Federal Child Support Guidelines.

The court held that the risks associated with the payor’s career change were contemplated when the original order and settlement were made, and therefore no material change existed to justify varying the child support order.

However, the court addressed entitlement of adult children to support and recalculated arrears where one child was not a “child of the marriage” for part of the period.

The motion to vary the support order was largely dismissed and arrears and section 7 expenses were fixed and ordered payable from the payor’s retirement investments.

In a divorce proceeding, the respondent spouse sought a lump‑sum spousal support award to be satisfied through division of the applicant’s pension after the applicant’s post‑separation bankruptcy eliminated any potential equalization payment.

The court held that an equalization claim constitutes a provable debt in bankruptcy and is extinguished upon discharge unless the stay is lifted during the bankruptcy process.

The respondent had knowledge of the bankruptcy but failed to take timely steps to lift the stay and therefore could not indirectly pursue equalization through a lump‑sum spousal support award.

The court rejected compensatory and unjust enrichment claims but awarded limited periodic spousal support due to economic hardship caused by joint debts addressed through a consumer proposal.

Support was ordered to commence when the applicant resumed employment or received long‑term disability benefits and to terminate on December 31, 2015.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination on the basis of disability by her former employer and her union.

The Tribunal issued a Notice of Intent to Dismiss on the basis of delay, as the application was filed more than one year after the last alleged incident of discrimination.

The applicant argued that the delay was incurred in good faith because she was waiting for the union to pursue her grievances and was unaware of her rights.

The Tribunal rejected these arguments, finding that waiting for another proceeding to conclude and ignorance of rights without making inquiries do not constitute good faith reasons for delay.

The application was dismissed as untimely.