Réjean Parisé

The moving party brought a motion to change a final order governing child support and section 7 expenses under the Divorce Act.

The court considered whether the payor’s reduced income following his voluntary decision to leave employment and start a business abroad constituted a material change in circumstances under s. 17 of the Divorce Act and the Federal Child Support Guidelines.

The court held that the risks associated with the payor’s career change were contemplated when the original order and settlement were made, and therefore no material change existed to justify varying the child support order.

However, the court addressed entitlement of adult children to support and recalculated arrears where one child was not a “child of the marriage” for part of the period.

The motion to vary the support order was largely dismissed and arrears and section 7 expenses were fixed and ordered payable from the payor’s retirement investments.

In a divorce proceeding, the respondent spouse sought a lump‑sum spousal support award to be satisfied through division of the applicant’s pension after the applicant’s post‑separation bankruptcy eliminated any potential equalization payment.

The court held that an equalization claim constitutes a provable debt in bankruptcy and is extinguished upon discharge unless the stay is lifted during the bankruptcy process.

The respondent had knowledge of the bankruptcy but failed to take timely steps to lift the stay and therefore could not indirectly pursue equalization through a lump‑sum spousal support award.

The court rejected compensatory and unjust enrichment claims but awarded limited periodic spousal support due to economic hardship caused by joint debts addressed through a consumer proposal.

Support was ordered to commence when the applicant resumed employment or received long‑term disability benefits and to terminate on December 31, 2015.

Following a trial addressing custody, access, and child support, the court determined outstanding claims for special and extraordinary expenses under s. 7 of the Federal Child Support Guidelines.

The court found daycare expenses incurred due to the custodial parent’s employment qualified as s. 7 expenses but limited retroactive recovery where documentation had not been provided to the other parent in advance.

Partial retroactive contributions for proven daycare costs were ordered, and ongoing proportional payment of daycare expenses was established.

Claims for extracurricular activity costs, including swimming lessons and dance-related expenses, were dismissed because the expenses were not “extraordinary” within the meaning of s. 7(1.1) of the Guidelines and would reasonably be covered by the basic table amount of child support.

A custody dispute following separation involved competing claims for sole custody versus joint custody of three children.

The court considered the best interests of the children under s. 16 of the Divorce Act and evidence regarding the parties’ historical parenting roles, communication abilities, and conduct affecting the children’s welfare.

While the father sought joint custody and a week‑about parenting schedule, the court found the parties lacked the level of cooperation and communication necessary for joint decision‑making.

The mother had historically been the primary caregiver and demonstrated a greater willingness to facilitate the children’s relationship with the father.

Sole custody was therefore granted to the mother, with a structured access regime granting the father regular parenting time and extended periods including a week every third week and shared holiday arrangements, together with updated child support obligations.

The applicant brought a motion to enforce an existing child support order and sought contribution toward post-secondary education and private school expenses.

The respondent argued that support should terminate because the adult child had ended the relationship with him and had completed secondary school.

The court found the estrangement was mutual and that the respondent had not proven a unilateral repudiation by the child, but also concluded that the applicant failed to establish that the child remained a dependent for support purposes under the principles set out in Farden.

The court declined to order payment of university expenses due to insufficient evidence regarding full‑time enrolment and commitment to studies.

The court also held that private school tuition incurred unilaterally by the applicant was neither necessary nor reasonable.

No new support payments were ordered unless future evidence demonstrates that the child qualifies as a dependent.

A costs decision following a family law trial involving child support, extraordinary expenses, and equalization of net family property.

The respondent sought substantial indemnity costs based on several settlement offers under Rule 18 of the Family Law Rules.

The court found that none of the offers were bettered at trial and therefore did not trigger Rule 18 consequences.

Although trial success was divided between the parties, the court found the applicant had behaved unreasonably during the proceedings by failing to properly disclose income, failing to support the children adequately after separation, and disregarding a court order.

As a result, the applicant was disentitled from claiming costs despite partial success, and the respondent was awarded costs.

The parties separated after 12.5 years of marriage and resolved custody and access of their three children.

At trial, the court determined the applicant's income for child support purposes, imputing additional income due to undisclosed earnings from various side businesses.

The court ordered retroactive child support and found that the children's extensive athletic and musical activities qualified as Section 7 extraordinary expenses, requiring proportionate contribution from the applicant.

The court also valued the matrimonial home, accounting for necessary roof repairs, and calculated the equalization of net family properties, applying various set-offs against the equalization payment owed by the respondent.

The parties could not agree on a summer access schedule for their three children.

The father, a school teacher, proposed a week-about schedule where he would care for the children instead of sending them to daycare, while still paying the daycare costs to hold their spots.

The mother objected, arguing the children needed the daycare routine and activities.

The court found that the parents were putting their wishes above the children's best interests and that the father was capable of providing care and education.

The court ordered a week-about summer access schedule to commence immediately.

The father brought a motion seeking permission to enrol the parties’ children in a competitive lacrosse league despite a prior order requiring the other parent’s consent for competitive extracurricular activities.

The mother refused consent based on the strict wording of the order.

The court held that the best interests of the children required a reasonable approach to withholding consent, particularly where participation would not interfere with the other parent’s parenting time.

Finding the children would benefit from participating at a higher level and that the proposed schedule would not infringe on the mother’s parenting time, the court granted the requested order.

In a family law motion concerning parenting decision-making, the father sought permission to enrol the parties’ twin children in a community lacrosse association.

On consent of both parties, the court issued an endorsement permitting the enrolment for the 2012 season.

The order required that all lacrosse-related activities, including practices, meetings, and tournaments, occur only during the father’s parenting time.

Reasons for the endorsement were to follow.

The parties brought cross-motions regarding the sale of the matrimonial home, occupation rent, and child care expenses.

The applicant sought to purchase the respondent's interest in the home, which the court denied, ordering the property to be listed for sale on the open market.

The respondent sought occupation rent because the applicant thwarted a previous order to list the home.

The court found the respondent had a tenable claim for occupation rent due to the applicant's conduct, but calculated the quantum to be zero because the respondent's share of the carrying costs exceeded his share of the potential rent.

The court also ordered the respondent to pay his proportionate share of day care expenses going forward, but denied the applicant's claim for retroactive day care costs.

The appellant appealed a trial judge's decision apportioning the proceeds of sale of a home formerly occupied by the parties.

The parties, who lived together but were not married, had an agreement to share expenses and divide the proceeds of the home's sale equally after reimbursing the appellant's down payment.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in granting the respondent an allowance akin to occupation rent, as they were not joint owners or spouses under the Family Law Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge appropriately considered all circumstances, including the appellant's sole occupation of the property and the equitable claims of unjust enrichment and constructive trust, to arrive at an equitable division of the proceeds.

The appellant police officer appealed a decision of the Ontario Civilian Commission on Police Services, which upheld a Hearing Officer's findings of misconduct for unnecessary use of force and neglect of duty.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal in part, finding that the Hearing Officer erred by prematurely judging a witness's credibility, misapprehending evidence, and failing to provide adequate reasons for rejecting the appellant's evidence and accepting the evidence of the prosecution's key witness.

The misconduct finding for use of force was set aside and a new hearing ordered.

The neglect of duty finding for failing to make notebook entries was upheld, but the penalty was set aside and remitted.

The Children's Aid Society applied for judicial review of a Director's decision under s. 144 of the Child and Family Services Act to review the Society's refusal to place Crown ward children with extended family members for adoption.

The Divisional Court quashed the application, holding that the Director's decision to conduct a review was not a 'statutory power of decision' under the Judicial Review Procedure Act because it did not decide or prescribe anyone's legal rights.

In the alternative, the majority found the Director's decision to be reasonable and entitled to deference.