John S. Poupore

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the City of Greater Sudbury on six charges under the Occupational Health and Safety Act, following a fatal accident at a construction site.

The trial judge found that the City was neither a "constructor" nor an "employer" under the Act, and alternatively, exercised due diligence.

The appeal court upheld the trial judge's findings, concluding that the City's oversight role for quality control did not transform it into a constructor or employer, and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed his conviction for invitation to sexual touching.

The trial judge had inferred an invitation from the act of touching alone, despite the child complainant's unequivocal testimony that the appellant said nothing.

The appellate court found this inference to be an error involving an essential element of the offence, as it was demonstrably incompatible with the uncontradicted evidence.

Consequently, the verdict was deemed unreasonable, the conviction was set aside, and an acquittal was entered.

The applicants brought a motion under Rule 75.06 of the Rules of Civil Procedure requesting a trial of issues arising from the estate of the deceased.

The court directed a trial on the single issue of the validity of the deceased's will dated May 16, 1994, noting that resolving this issue would likely resolve all other issues or determine if further proceedings are necessary.

The court ordered the affidavits to form the pleadings and permitted cross-examinations.

No costs were awarded as success was split.

The plaintiff landlord leased a commercial property to the defendant tenant.

The tenant placed excessive landfill on the property, violating conservation authority regulations.

The landlord terminated the lease and seized the tenant's entire fleet of commercial vehicles, holding them for over four years as security for future remediation costs.

The court found the landlord's distraint was illegal and constituted conversion, as a landlord cannot both terminate a lease and distrain goods, nor can they distrain for non-rent damages.

The landlord was awarded damages for the remediation and site plan costs, while the tenant was awarded damages for the converted chattels and lost income.

After set-off, the tenant was granted a net judgment of $106,771.

The applicant husband and respondent wife brought a motion and cross-motion following a 27-year relationship.

The husband sought exclusive possession of the matrimonial home and spousal support, while the wife sought the sale of the home and occupation rent.

The court ordered the immediate sale of the matrimonial home pursuant to the Partition Act, dismissing the husband's claim for exclusive possession.

The court awarded the husband interim spousal support of $2,315 per month, noting his lower income as an artist compared to the wife's income as a pharmacist, and ordered the wife to secure the support with a life insurance policy.

The wife's claim for occupation rent was dismissed because she had not paid spousal support since separation and the husband had housed their dependent children.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on a charge of having care and control of a motor vehicle with an alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg.

The appeal raised issues regarding the investigating officer's belief in the proper working order of an Approved Screening Device (ASD), whether breath tests were administered "as soon as practicable," a Section 8 Charter violation, and the trial judge's Section 24(2) Charter analysis.

The Superior Court found that the trial judge erred in law on all grounds, specifically in requiring the officer to perform a self-test on the ASD, misapprehending evidence regarding delays in breath test administration, and consequently, erred in finding a Charter breach and in the Section 24(2) analysis.

The appeal was allowed, the acquittal set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The Crown applied under section 521 of the Criminal Code to vacate a Judicial Interim Release Order and substitute a Detention Order for the accused.

The court found that the Justice of the Peace erred by giving excessive weight to the accused's lack of sureties and insufficient weight to his extensive criminal record, particularly concerning primary and secondary grounds for detention.

The Justice of the Peace also failed to adequately analyze the accused's record, his drug problem, and the unsuitability of the proposed living arrangements.

The court granted the Crown's application, ordering the immediate detention of the accused.

Following a decision on the merits, the court requested written submissions on costs.

The defendants submitted bills of costs, but the self-represented plaintiff failed to respond within the allotted time.

The court reviewed the bills of costs, found them reasonable given the complexity of the matter and the number of parties, and awarded costs to the Crown and the police defendants on a partial indemnity basis.

A dispute arose regarding the passing of accounts of a trustee who had acted under a power of attorney for property.

Siblings of the trustee objected to certain expenditures contained in the accounts for a defined period.

The court determined that the evidentiary record was not sufficiently organized for adjudication and directed the objectors to prepare a detailed document identifying each contested expenditure, the trustee’s explanation, and any accountant’s treatment of the item.

The court ordered the document to be served on the trustee for further comment and directed the parties to obtain a judicial resolution date thereafter.

The Crown brought a motion under Rules 21 and 25 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to strike and dismiss claims brought against it in tort and for alleged Charter breaches.

The court held that the tort claims were a nullity because the plaintiff failed to comply with the notice requirements under the Proceedings Against the Crown Act.

With respect to the Charter claims, the statement of claim failed to plead a concise statement of material facts capable of supporting a viable cause of action or damages claim.

The court found the allegations largely constituted a collateral attack on judicial decisions made during the plaintiff’s bail proceedings.

All claims against the Crown were dismissed.

Police defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing a civil action alleging multiple intentional torts and Charter breaches arising from arrests for criminal harassment.

The plaintiff had previously resolved the criminal charge by entering into a peace bond.

The court held that this outcome demonstrated reasonable and probable grounds for the police actions and prevented the plaintiff from establishing key elements of claims such as malicious prosecution and negligent investigation.

The pleadings also failed to disclose genuine issues for trial for other alleged torts including false arrest, false imprisonment, defamation, invasion of privacy, trespass to chattels, misfeasance in public office, and intentional infliction of mental distress.

Summary judgment was granted dismissing the action.

The insurer sought leave relating to a decision refusing to appoint an appraiser under the appraisal provisions of an insurance policy following a loss.

The court noted that the insurer had not demanded an appraisal until more than six years after the loss.

The court held that the appraisal provisions under the statutory conditions in s. 148 of the Insurance Act are not mandatory in multi‑period policies.

The motion judge’s refusal to appoint an appraiser was a discretionary decision and consistent with prior case law.

Leave was denied.

The applicant sought prerogative relief challenging the Attorney General’s decision to intervene in and assume carriage of a private prosecution against a police officer for alleged assault during an arrest.

The applicant alleged bias and abuse of process, arguing that Crown counsel’s handling of prior charges against him and the disclosure of a police video demonstrated partiality.

The court held that the Attorney General has authority to intervene in private prosecutions and that such prosecutorial decisions fall within core Crown discretion, subject to review only for abuse of process.

The evidence relied on by the applicant was largely hearsay and insufficient to establish a reasonable apprehension of bias or abuse of process.

The court found no improper conduct in the Crown’s disclosure practices or earlier settlement discussions.

A bankrupt applicant sought an order under s. 178(1.1) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act declaring that the statutory non-dischargeability of student loan debt under s. 178(1) did not apply.

The court considered the applicant’s circumstances, including long‑term financial hardship, limited earning capacity, and significant personal and medical challenges.

Applying the statutory two‑part test, the court was satisfied the applicant had acted in good faith in connection with the student loans and continued to experience financial difficulty that would prevent repayment.

The court concluded the statutory criteria were met and granted relief permitting the discharge of the student loan debt.

The respondent in a family law proceeding brought a motion to change a consent order requiring payment of child and spousal support following the breakdown of a common-law relationship.

The applicant alleged that a prior assault by the respondent caused injuries rendering her incapable of remunerative employment and entitling her to continued spousal support despite the short duration of the relationship.

The court held that the applicant bore the onus of establishing that her alleged incapacity was caused by the assault.

Medical evidence did not establish on a balance of probabilities that the injuries were attributable to the assault or that the applicant was incapable of employment.

Child support was terminated retroactively to December 31, 2010, and spousal support was terminated effective May 31, 2013.

The accused brought a motion to reopen a previously dismissed Charter application challenging the validity of a search warrant under ss. 8 and 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The motion arose after a mistrial in a jury trial when the Crown disclosed a production order related to a seized cell phone.

The defence argued the new information might have assisted in challenging the information to obtain the search warrant.

Applying s. 653.1(1) of the Criminal Code, the court held that prior rulings remain binding after a mistrial unless it would not be in the interests of justice.

The defence failed to demonstrate how the cell phone information would have been relevant to the prior Charter ruling, and the application to reopen the motion was dismissed.

The parties appeared self-represented seeking to resolve the amount of arrears owed for child and spousal support under a prior order.

After reviewing the agreed income figures and the payment history reported by the Family Responsibility Office, the court calculated that the payor had technically overpaid support relative to guideline amounts.

However, the court found the payor had unreasonably delayed bringing the application and declined to grant any credit for the overpayment.

The court varied the arrears of child and spousal support to zero as of December 31, 2012 and set ongoing support at a nominal amount due to the payor’s current lack of income.

A high‑conflict family law trial addressing custody, access, and child support following separation.

The applicant sought sole custody while the respondent sought custody with equal access.

The court found evidence of controlling and abusive conduct by the respondent and determined that granting him final decision‑making authority would not be in the children’s best interests under s. 24 of the Children’s Law Reform Act.

Sole custody was granted to the applicant with structured and generous access to the respondent, together with a detailed holiday schedule.

The court also found the respondent to be voluntarily under‑employed and ordered ongoing child support, arrears payment, and annual financial disclosure.

The plaintiffs brought materials seeking court approval of an infant settlement arising from civil litigation involving multiple defendants and a hospital.

The court invited submissions regarding the characterization of future care payments to the parents, whether settlement materials should be sealed, and whether the solicitor’s affidavit should be sealed and service waived.

The court held that the possible taxation of future care payments is a matter for the Canada Revenue Agency and not determinative for the approval motion.

Applying the open court principle and exercising parens patria jurisdiction, the court declined to grant a sealing order over the settlement documents.

However, the court permitted plaintiffs’ counsel to refile a substitute affidavit after service on opposing counsel.

Following a successful summary judgment motion dismissing the action as statute‑barred, the defendants sought costs.

The plaintiffs argued costs should be denied because the court had found the defendants committed a fraud or misrepresentation in the underlying real estate transaction.

The court held that, despite sympathy for the plaintiffs, the action had been commenced outside the applicable limitation period and should not have been brought so late.

Costs therefore followed the result, though the defendants’ claimed partial indemnity costs were reduced.

The court fixed partial indemnity fees at 66 percent of the full indemnity amount, with HST applied and disbursements allowed as claimed.