S. Casey Hill

The Crown appealed an acquittal for second degree murder arising from a fatal stabbing after key youth witnesses recanted their videotaped police statements implicating the accused.

The Supreme Court reconsidered the orthodox common law rule limiting prior inconsistent statements to credibility use only and held that, for witnesses other than the accused, such statements may be admitted substantively on a principled hearsay basis where reliability and necessity are established through a voir dire.

The majority required threshold guarantees addressing hearsay dangers, while concurring reasons proposed a more flexible reliability framework.

Because the trial judge had considered himself bound by the orthodox rule and had not assessed substantive admissibility under the new approach, a new trial was ordered.

The appellant was stopped by police during a random routine traffic check without any suspicion of unlawful activity.

He admitted his driver's licence was suspended and was convicted of driving while suspended.

He appealed, arguing the random stop violated his Charter rights against arbitrary detention and unreasonable search and seizure.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the random stop constituted an arbitrary detention under section 9 of the Charter, it was a reasonable limit demonstrably justified under section 1 due to the pressing and substantial concern of highway safety.

The appellants were acquitted at trial on a directed verdict of robbery and using a firearm.

The Ontario Court of Appeal quashed the acquittal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge erred in ruling confessions inadmissible based on language comprehension, which goes to weight rather than admissibility.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, substantially agreeing with the reasons of the Court of Appeal.

The appellant, a Mental Retardation Counsellor, appealed her conviction for common assault against a moderately retarded adult patient under her supervision.

She argued that she was protected by section 43 of the Criminal Code as a person standing in the place of a parent or a schoolteacher.

Applying its concurrent decision in Ogg-Moss v. The Queen, the Supreme Court of Canada held that a Mental Retardation Counsellor is neither a person standing in the place of a parent nor a schoolteacher, and a mentally retarded adult is neither a child nor a pupil within the meaning of section 43.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, a Mental Retardation Counsellor, was charged with common assault after striking a severely mentally retarded adult patient.

The appellant claimed the protection of section 43 of the Criminal Code, arguing he was a person standing in the place of a parent or a schoolteacher correcting a child or pupil.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that section 43 does not apply, as a mentally retarded adult is not a 'child' or 'pupil', and a counsellor is not a 'parent' or 'schoolteacher' within the meaning of the provision.

The appeal was dismissed and the conviction upheld.

The Ontario Association for the Mentally Retarded sought to intervene in two criminal appeals before the Supreme Court of Canada.

The Court disallowed the interventions, holding that Rule 18(2) of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada has no application to purely criminal appeals.

The respondent was a passenger in a stolen car and was charged with possession of stolen goods.

The trial judge disbelieved the respondent's testimony that he did not know the car was stolen and convicted him.

The Court of Appeal quashed the conviction, holding that some evidence of control was necessary to establish possession under the Criminal Code.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the Crown's appeal, confirming that a measure of control is a constituent and essential element of possession under the Code.

The respondent pleaded guilty to assault causing bodily harm.

At the sentencing hearing, the Crown and the respondent presented conflicting versions of the assault.

The trial judge applied the balance of probabilities standard to the disputed aggravating facts and sentenced the respondent to four and a half years.

The Court of Appeal held that the Crown must prove aggravating facts beyond a reasonable doubt and reduced the sentence.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the Crown's appeal, holding that it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal on a question of law, and affirming that the Crown must prove disputed aggravating facts beyond a reasonable doubt at a sentencing hearing.

The appellant was convicted of breaking and entering a dwelling.

At trial, his counsel waived the holding of a voir dire regarding the voluntariness of a statement made to police.

The appellant appealed, arguing that the trial judge erred in failing to conduct a voir dire despite the waiver, and in failing to conduct one to determine if the statement was actually made or after the appellant testified about alleged threats and inducements.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that an accused or their counsel may expressly waive a voir dire, and that the trial judge did not err in his exercise of discretion.

The appellant, diagnosed as a paranoid schizophrenic, was convicted of non-capital murder.

On appeal, he argued that the trial judge erred in admitting inculpatory statements made to police, contending that statements by an insane person are inadmissible or that the wrong test for voluntariness was applied.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that there is no absolute rule barring statements from insane persons.

The Court found the trial judge properly considered whether the statements were freely and voluntarily made and represented an operating mind.