Frank Edward Genesee

The accused was convicted of sexual interference and invitation to sexual touching of a 14-year-old complainant over a three-month period in 2016.

The offences involved multiple instances of sexual touching, both over and under clothing, occurring in the accused's motor vehicle.

A count of sexual assault was conditionally stayed under the Kienapple principle.

At sentencing, the Crown sought 18 months custody (12 months for sexual interference, 6 months for invitation to sexual touching, consecutive), while the defence sought 90 days concurrent, served intermittently.

The court imposed a 9-month concurrent custodial sentence, emphasizing the need for denunciation and deterrence given the youth of the victim, breach of trust, multiple occurrences, and significant impact on the complainant.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent on charges of impaired care or control and over 80 care or control of a motor vehicle.

The trial judge had found no realistic risk of danger, accepting the respondent's "alternate plan" to sleep in his vehicle after his initial plan to stay at a friend's house fell through.

The Superior Court of Justice, on appeal, found that the trial judge erred in law by failing to articulate a path of reasoning demonstrating appreciation of all relevant circumstances regarding the risk of danger, as required by R. v. Boudreault.

The trial judge's conclusion that it was "very unlikely" the respondent would have driven was deemed conclusory without sufficient analysis of factors such as the high blood alcohol level, the failed sleep-over plan, lack of corroboration for a morning plan, and the individual's isolation.

The appeal was allowed, and a new trial was ordered.

The accused was charged with sexual assault following an encounter with a 17-year-old complainant in a motel room.

The complainant alleged that she was intoxicated by alcohol and marijuana and was sexually assaulted despite expressing non-consent.

The accused maintained that the sexual activity was entirely consensual.

The court applied the W.(D.) framework to assess the conflicting testimony.

While the court found the accused's evidence to be incredible and incapable of raising a reasonable doubt, it also found significant reliability issues with the complainant's evidence, including memory gaps and inconsistencies.

Consequently, the court concluded that the Crown failed to prove the charge beyond a reasonable doubt and acquitted the accused.

The court ruled on the admissibility of videotaped police statements from the complainant (S.W.) under s. 715.1 of the Criminal Code.

The Crown sought to admit these statements for the truth of their contents.

The complainant experienced significant distress when attempting to watch the videos during testimony and indicated she was hallucinating and not "all there" during the first interview.

The court found that the complainant had not adopted the statements under oath and that their admission would interfere with the proper administration of justice due to compromised reliability and the complainant's distress.

The application for substantive admission was dismissed.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by drug contrary to section 253(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The charge was amended to include impairment by drug and/or alcohol.

The Crown proceeded summarily.

The accused's ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired primarily by a combination of central nervous system depressant drugs and alcohol.

The accused had consumed beer and was taking multiple prescription medications including benzodiazepines.

The accused displayed clear signs of impairment at the scene and during police testing, including poor motor coordination, slurred speech, and inability to maintain balance.

A Drug Recognition Expert evaluated the accused and formed the opinion of impairment by central nervous system depressants and alcohol.

Toxicology analysis confirmed the presence of multiple benzodiazepines and other central nervous system depressants in the accused's urine sample.

The defence argued alternative explanations including tiredness, a previous back injury, and depression/suicidal state, but the court found these explanations did not create reasonable doubt.

A finding of guilt was registered.

The accused was found sleeping in his vehicle with the engine running in a parking lot early in the morning.

He had a blood-alcohol level of 160 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The Crown charged him with care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired.

The defence established that the accused had planned to sleep at a friend's residence but was locked out when the friend passed out.

The court found that the presumption of care or control was rebutted on a balance of probabilities and that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused presented a realistic risk of danger in the particular circumstances.

The accused was acquitted.

The accused was charged with impaired care or control of a motor vehicle contrary to section 253(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown proceeded summarily.

The accused was found sleeping in the front passenger seat of his vehicle with the engine running in a strip club parking lot.

The Crown did not have the benefit of the presumption under section 258(1)(a) as the accused was not in the driver's seat.

The central issue was whether the elements of care or control had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, specifically whether there was a realistic risk that the vehicle could have been put in motion or a change of mind in deciding to drive while impaired.

The trial judge found the accused's evidence regarding his plans to avoid driving home to be incredible and defying common sense, and concluded there was a realistic risk the accused would drive the vehicle while impaired.

The applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and claimed income replacement benefits, alleging he was employed as a mechanic.

The arbitrator found that while the applicant was employed at the time of the accident, he failed to provide reliable evidence to substantiate the amount of his income, as the employment documents were created after the fact and contained inconsistencies.

Consequently, the applicant did not establish the amount of his income replacement benefits.

The insurer was granted an interim order for repayment of $3,239.34 for benefits previously paid in excess of the minimum rate, due to the applicant's wilful misrepresentation of his income.