Robin Prihar

The defendant was charged with nine criminal offences, including uttering threats, criminal harassment, and breaching bail orders, against his former spouse and her mother.

The court assessed witness credibility and circumstantial evidence, applying the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

The defendant was found guilty of four counts (contact contrary to a release order, uttering threats to the complainant, criminal harassment, and uttering threats to the complainant's mother) and acquitted of five counts due to insufficient proof of authorship of certain social media messages or lack of evidence regarding specific release orders.

The defendant, Jonathan Williams, was found guilty by a jury of harbouring a person to facilitate the sale of sexual services (s. 286.3 Criminal Code) and receiving financial benefit from the commission of such an offence (s. 286.2 Criminal Code).

The Crown sought a three-year sentence, while the defendant requested an 18-month conditional sentence.

The court rejected the conditional sentence, emphasizing the need for denunciation and general deterrence in human trafficking cases, which are considered inherently violent and exploitative.

The judge imposed a concurrent sentence of 28 months for harbouring and 20 months for receiving financial benefit, along with a three-year no-contact order and a DNA order.

The court considered mitigating factors such as the defendant being a first-time offender with strong community support and low risk of re-offending, but found the aggravating factors, including exploitation of trust and control over the victim's sexual services, to be more compelling.

The accused, Jude Egwu, was arrested for sexual assault and gave a statement to police after invoking his right to counsel.

His lawyer, a casual friend practicing family and immigration law, provided no legal advice regarding his right to silence or self-incrimination.

A blended voir dire was held to determine the admissibility of the statement.

The court found that while the police complied with s. 10(b) Charter, the lawyer's complete failure to provide advice, coupled with the accused's lack of comprehension of the primary police caution, created a fundamental unfairness in the interrogation process.

Although not a Charter violation attributable to the state, the court exercised its common law power under s. 24(1) of the Charter to exclude the portion of the accused's statement where he became evasive and conspicuously dodged questions about having sex with the complainant, as its admission would infect the appearance of a fair trial.

The appellant, Salim Mohamad, appealed his sentence of 16 months custody for sexual assault, arguing that the trial judge failed to adequately consider his post-conviction diagnosis of schizophrenia and its impact on sentencing, and erred in finding premeditation.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly considered the appellant's mental illness and its treatment, and that the finding of premeditation was supported by the evidence.

The court affirmed that denunciation and general deterrence were paramount sentencing principles, and a conditional sentence was insufficient given the serious nature of the offence.

The accused was charged with multiple sexual offences after an undercover police officer posing as a 14-year-old boy on social media applications received sexually explicit communications and images.

The Crown's case on identity was entirely circumstantial, relying on the use of the accused's phone number, his likeness in the images, and his residence.

The court found that while the evidence was cogent, the lack of metadata, the failure to investigate another resident's devices, and the possibility of shared login credentials left a reasonable doubt as to whether the accused was the person communicating with the officer.

The accused was acquitted of all charges.

The accused was tried for two counts of first-degree murder in the stabbing deaths of his wife and mother-in-law.

The Crown argued for constructive first-degree murder on the basis that the killings occurred during a forcible confinement.

The accused conceded he killed the victims but argued he lacked the requisite intent due to intoxication and denied forcible confinement.

The court rejected the intoxication defence, finding the accused had the intent to murder based on his actions, the extent of the injuries, and his post-offence conduct.

The court also found that the accused forcibly confined the victims by dragging them from an upstairs bedroom to the kitchen where the fatal wounds were inflicted.

The accused was found guilty of two counts of first-degree murder.

In a criminal trial involving charges related to sexual services, the defence requested several specific jury instructions during a pre-charge conference.

The trial judge declined to give a Vetrovec warning, finding the complainant was not an inherently unreliable witness.

The judge also refused to instruct the jury on the material benefit exception under s. 286.2(4) of the Criminal Code, as the evidence did not support its application.

The judge agreed to provide a specific instruction regarding the frailty of text message evidence due to the complainant's admission of deleting texts.

Finally, the judge ruled that 'control, direction, or influence over the movements of a person' under s. 286.3(1) includes non-physical movements such as setting prices for sexual services.

During a trial involving allegations of selling sexual services, the Crown sought to introduce the accused's hotel registration cards as business records.

The Crown conceded it failed to meet the notice requirements under s. 30 of the Canada Evidence Act but argued the records were admissible under the common law exception to the hearsay rule.

The court found the records met the common law requirements for reliability and necessity.

However, the court excluded the accused's records because the Crown had explicitly stated in its pre-trial conference form that it would not rely on hearsay or its exceptions, and had never amended the form.

In a pre-trial motion, the Crown sought to admit the accused's police statement as voluntary, while the accused sought its exclusion under s. 24(2) of the Charter, alleging breaches of his s. 10(a) and 10(b) rights.

The accused was arrested for uttering threats in front of his family but was not advised of his right to counsel or the additional procuring charges until 11 minutes later in a separate room.

The court found the statement was voluntary and that the accused had an operating mind.

Although the court found breaches of s. 10(a) and 10(b) due to the 11-minute delay, it declined to exclude the statement under s. 24(2), concluding the breach was minor and society's interest in adjudicating the serious charges on their merits outweighed the impact of the breach.

On a pre-trial Charter application, the accused sought exclusion of hotel registration records obtained by police directly from hotel staff without prior judicial authorization.

Applying the reasonable expectation of privacy analysis for third-party records, the court held that hotel registration information such as name, address, telephone number, payment details, and vehicle information did not attract a reasonable expectation of privacy in the circumstances.

The court preferred appellate authority declining to extend s. 8 protection to this type of commercial transaction record and rejected the argument that the records indirectly revealed intimate lifestyle choices.

The application was dismissed.

The court added that, even if a breach had been established, exclusion under s. 24(2) would not have been warranted.

The applicant sought bail pending his appeal of a sexual assault conviction and a 15-month sentence.

While the applicant met the criteria for showing the appeal was not frivolous and that he would surrender into custody, the court found his detention was necessary in the public interest.

The court noted the applicant's recent diagnoses of severe mental health issues and subsequent charges for attempted murder and assault while on bail.

The application for bail pending appeal was dismissed, but the court ordered the appeal hearing to be expedited.

The applicant sought a bail review under s. 520 of the Criminal Code, challenging his detention on secondary and tertiary grounds.

The court found a material change in circumstances due to significant trial delay and the introduction of new, more vigilant sureties (the applicant's sister and grandmother).

On the secondary ground, despite the seriousness of the charges (robbery with a firearm, arson, mischief) and rising gun violence, the court was satisfied the applicant discharged his onus, considering his lack of prior violent convictions, physical disability from a self-inflicted gunshot wound, and the strict house arrest plan.

On the tertiary ground, the court weighed the applicant's positive COVID-19 diagnosis amidst an outbreak at the detention centre, along with his youth, lack of convictions, physical disability, and the prospect of pre-trial custody approaching a potential sentence, concluding that public confidence would not be undermined by his release.

Bail was granted with stringent conditions, and the court explicitly removed "keep the peace and be of good behaviour" and "follow rules of the home" conditions, citing R. v. Zora on principles of restraint and judicial oversight of bail terms.

Mr. Amiri applied for certiorari to quash an information charging him with failing to comply with a bail order.

He argued that cc'ing his wife on emails to her lawyer, sent for the purpose of discussing settlement of a family matter, constituted communication "in the presence of legal counsel" and thus did not violate his bail condition.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the laying of the information did not constitute legal or jurisdictional error, and that the issue was a trial matter.

The court also noted the Supreme Court's guidance in R. v. Zora on the subjective intent required for bail breaches and the "over criminalization" of such charges, suggesting the case might be appropriate for a judicial referral hearing under s. 523.1 of the Criminal Code.

Sentencing following guilty pleas to sexual interference involving a 14-year-old complainant and two breaches of bail prohibiting contact with the complainant.

After a Gardiner hearing, the court found the sexual interference occurred without the complainant’s actual consent and treated the offence as a highly invasive, cruel, and exploitative act marked by significant psychological harm, abuse of a friendship-based trust relationship, and aggravating post-offence threats and contact.

The court balanced denunciation and deterrence against the offender’s youth, lack of prior record, some remorse, and rehabilitative prospects.

A penitentiary sentence of 46 months less enhanced credit for pre-trial custody resulted in a final sentence of 44 months, together with DNA, weapons prohibition, SOIRA, and no-contact orders.

The accused were charged with robbery, pointing and discharging a firearm, and in one case, breaching bail conditions, arising from an incident at a bar in Mississauga on October 9, 2019.

The Crown's case relied heavily on the identification evidence of the victim, who gave inconsistent statements to police and at trial.

The court admitted the victim's prior police statement under the principled exception to the hearsay rule based on procedural reliability.

However, the court found that the victim's evidence contained significant inconsistencies regarding the timing and circumstances of the alleged shooting, and that video evidence did not support her account.

The court concluded that the victim's evidence could not safely carry the whole weight of the Crown's case and acquitted both accused on all charges.

The accused was charged with obstruct justice, intimidation of a witness, criminal harassment, and mischief based on allegations made by his mother.

The investigating officer grossly overstated and falsified the mother's allegations in the bail synopsis, leading to the accused being held in custody for three nights before being released on bail.

The accused brought an application to stay the proceedings for abuse of process.

The court found that the police conduct in falsifying the allegations and overholding the accused constituted an arbitrary detention under s. 9 of the Charter and an abuse of process in the residual category.

The court also found that the interviewing officer violated the accused's s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel by disparaging his lawyer.

The proceedings were stayed.

The applicant brought a motion for a stay of proceedings based on an alleged breach of his Charter right under section 11(b) to be tried within a reasonable time.

The trial was scheduled to conclude on January 8, 2021, which would be 18 months and 7 days from the commencement of proceedings on July 1, 2019, exceeding the presumptive 18-month ceiling established in Jordan.

The applicant demonstrated no defence delay and made sustained efforts to expedite the proceedings.

The Crown failed to establish exceptional circumstances to justify the delay, particularly regarding the complainant's unavailability due to high school examinations, which was foreseeable given the nature of the charges.

The court found the Crown fell short of its obligations to anticipate scheduling problems and take reasonable steps to avoid them.

A stay of proceedings was granted.

The applicant, Jehroomien Rajendram, sought a bail review under s. 520 of the Criminal Code, challenging his detention by a Justice of the Peace on secondary and tertiary grounds.

He argued legal errors in the initial detention and, alternatively, a material change in circumstances due to a new supervision plan and the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court found no legal error in the Justice of the Peace's assessment of the sureties or the supervision plan.

Regarding the material change, the court acknowledged the new sureties and enhanced electronic monitoring but found them insufficient to mitigate the substantial likelihood of reoffending, given the serious allegations (discharging a firearm, breaching prior orders, threatening text messages) and the applicant's criminal record.

While acknowledging the enhanced risk of COVID-19 in prisons, the court concluded it did not tip the scale in favor of release, especially as the applicant had no pre-existing medical conditions and there was no significant outbreak at the correctional facility.

The application for bail review was denied.

Following guilty pleas to sexual interference and bail breaches, the court conducted a Gardiner hearing to determine whether the admitted intercourse was factually non-consensual for sentencing purposes, and also adjudicated related counts of uttering a threat, sexual assault, and sexual interference.

The court held that the complainant's account of forced intercourse was credible despite significant reliability problems, relying on the contemporaneous video statement, forensic DNA evidence confirming ejaculation, and post-event emotional state evidence used for limited permissible purposes.

The court rejected defence theories of fabrication based on fear of pregnancy, lateness for curfew, and alleged stereotypical expectations of victim behaviour.

The court found the intercourse occurred without actual consent, acquitted on the threat count because the particularized threat was not proven as directed to the complainant, and acquitted on the August 15 touching counts because the sexual nature of the act was not established.

The accused was charged with assault causing bodily harm to his four-month-old infant daughter.

The Crown's case was based primarily on circumstantial evidence, including medical evidence of a skull fracture, four rib fractures, and a metatarsal fracture.

The accused initially provided a false explanation for the skull fracture (a fall from a change table) and later suggested to the child's mother that he may have caused injuries through a medical exercise.

The defence argued the Crown failed to prove exclusive opportunity and that the medical evidence could not establish when the injuries occurred.

The court found that while the accused did not have exclusive opportunity to cause the injuries, and while the evidence was circumstantial, there remained reasonable doubt as to guilt.

The accused was acquitted.