Jessica Greenwood

This is a costs endorsement following a motion where the Defendants were wholly successful and beat their offer to settle under Rule 49.

The court found the Defendants' claimed hours excessive for a straightforward, non-complex motion and fixed costs at $3,750.00, inclusive of HST, payable by the Plaintiff to the Defendants.

The decision emphasizes proportionality and reasonableness in costs awards.

The plaintiff sought leave to amend her Statement of Claim to proceed under Simplified Procedure, limiting her claim to $200,000.

The primary issue on the motion was whether the defendants were entitled to costs thrown away due to the amendment, and if so, the timing and quantum of such costs.

The court found that Rule 76.13 of the Rules of Civil Procedure mandated the payment of costs unnecessarily incurred by the opposing party up to the date of the amendment.

The court ordered the plaintiff to pay the defendants $8,000 all-inclusive for costs thrown away, calculated on a substantial indemnity basis, and declined to defer the decision to the trial judge.

The defendant brought an unsuccessful motion for summary dismissal of the plaintiff's wrongful dismissal action.

The plaintiff sought costs of $28,000, while the defendant argued for costs in the cause or fixed at $5,000.

The court awarded the plaintiff costs on a partial indemnity scale, noting the motion was important but relatively uncomplicated.

Costs were fixed at $13,560 inclusive of HST.

The defendant employer brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's wrongful dismissal claim.

The defendant argued the claim was based solely on the Employment Standards Act and that the plaintiff sued prematurely before the 35-week temporary layoff period expired.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the statement of claim was broad enough to encompass common law claims, including allegations of deceit regarding the layoff notice, and that genuine issues of credibility required a trial.

The complainant alleged that the employer failed to comply with a previous Board decision directing the development of a training plan following his reinstatement.

Subsequently, the complainant's employment was terminated again, and he filed a new complaint alleging unjust dismissal, citing the lack of proper training as a factor.

The Board found that the two complaints shared common questions of fact and that the relief claimed arose from the same series of occurrences.

Consequently, the Board ordered the consolidation of the two files for hearing.

Following his reinstatement, the complainant argued that his earnings from alternate sources should be applied towards his legal fees rather than deducted from the retroactive compensation owed by the employer.

The employer argued this was a disguised claim for legal costs.

The Public Service Grievance Board dismissed the complainant's request, finding that legal costs and mitigation are separate legal categories.

The Board reaffirmed its practice of declining to award costs except in cases of egregious employer misconduct, which was not present here.

The complainant, an Operational Manager at a detention centre, was terminated for failing to properly intervene in an inmate-on-inmate assault and for failing to complete compatibility assessments.

The employer argued his lack of action and poor judgment warranted discharge.

The Public Service Grievance Board found that while the complainant's failure to take control of the situation and repeat his direction to open the cell door was serious misconduct, he was not solely responsible.

Applying the McKinley factors, the Board concluded that the employment relationship could be repaired given the complainant's discipline-free record, insight, and remorse.

The termination was substituted with a six-month unpaid suspension and reinstatement.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and refusing to provide a breath sample.

The defence brought Charter applications alleging violations of sections 7, 8, 9, and 10(b).

The accused, who suffered from bipolar disorder, PTSD, severe depression and anxiety, was living in her car with her therapy dog when stopped by police.

The court found that while the arrest was lawful and the breath demand was made as soon as practicable, there was a breach of the accused's section 10(b) rights to counsel.

Police failed to exercise adequate diligence in contacting the accused's counsel of choice and did not offer her the option of speaking to alternative counsel when her preferred lawyer was unavailable.

The evidence was excluded as its admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The accused pleaded guilty to breaking and entering into a dwelling and failing to comply with a Probation Order.

The court conducted a sentencing circle, an innovative restorative justice process involving the accused, his parents, Aboriginal Legal Services representatives, and counsel.

The court considered the serious nature of residential break and enters, the accused's Aboriginal background documented in a Gladue Report, his drug addiction, and his significant rehabilitative potential.

Despite the gravity of the offence and the accused's prior similar conviction six weeks earlier, the court imposed a suspended sentence with probation, crediting pre-trial custody at 1.5 multiplier as equivalent to an 8-month sentence.

The accused pleaded guilty to exposing his genital organs to his 11-year-old step-daughter contrary to section 173(2) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown proceeded by indictment.

The offence was the beginning of a pattern of sexual exploitation of the victim.

The accused is a recidivist with a prior conviction for sexual assault on his niece.

The court considered 812 text messages exchanged between the accused and the victim over a six-month period as evidence of uncharged conduct under section 725(1)(c) of the Criminal Code.

The parties disagreed on the amount of presentence custody to be attributed to the sentence, with the Crown seeking 10 months and the defence seeking 5 months and 29 days to avoid immigration consequences.

The court imposed a suspended sentence with three years probation and ancillary orders.

A 40-year-old offender was sentenced for serious sexual offences committed as a young person between ages 13 and 17.

The offender was convicted of sexual assault involving repeated non-consensual sexual intercourse with his step-sister, who was 8 years old at the onset of the abuse and 13 when she stopped it.

The defence sought a 6-month deferred custody sentence, emphasizing the offender's exemplary life since the offences and familial obligations.

The Crown sought 18 months to 2 years incarceration.

The court imposed 12 months total custody (8 months in custody followed by 4 months community supervision), finding that accountability required incarceration despite the significant passage of time and the offender's rehabilitation.

The accused was charged with arson for deliberately setting fires at his family home on December 25, 2014, and with breaching a probation order.

The Crown's case relied on circumstantial evidence including the accused's bizarre destructive behavior earlier that morning, his presence in the vicinity of the home shortly before the fire was discovered, his possession of a lighter, and the absence of signs of forced entry.

The defense argued that the circumstantial evidence could not exclude the reasonable possibility that an intruder had set the fires.

The court found that the accused's pattern of destructive conduct throughout the day, combined with the unlikelihood of a random arsonist targeting the home on Christmas Day, established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on both counts.

A young person was charged with repeated sexual assault against his step-sister over a five-year period from 1988 to 1993, when the complainant was between 8 and 13 years old.

The trial involved credibility assessments of the adult complainant testifying about childhood abuse, corroborating testimony from her step-brother regarding an admission by the accused, and the accused's denials.

The court found the complainant and her step-brother credible and rejected the accused's evidence as contrived and self-serving.

The court convicted the accused on all counts, finding the identity of the perpetrator established beyond a reasonable doubt.