Andras Schreck

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing the complainant's credibility and in refusing to allow him to show his arms to demonstrate he had no tattoos.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge fully appreciated the evidence, acknowledged the complainant's lies, and gave adequate reasons for accepting her testimony.

The court also held that the ruling on demonstrative evidence was a matter of the trial judge's discretion.

The appellant was convicted of robbery and having his face masked with intent.

At trial, an accomplice who had previously given a videotaped statement identifying the appellant recanted and testified that the appellant was not involved.

The trial judge gave a Vetrovec warning regarding the accomplice's evidence.

The appellant appealed, arguing the warning should not have been given for a witness whose trial testimony favoured the defence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal.

The majority held the trial judge did not err in giving the warning for a 'mixed witness' with a serious criminal record.

The concurring judge found the warning was an error but applied the curative proviso, concluding no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurred given the strong Crown case.

The appellant appealed his conviction for break and enter with intent to commit an indictable offence.

The trial judge relied on the statutory presumption under s. 348(2)(a) of the Criminal Code to find the requisite intent, as the appellant broke into an apartment but left after thirty seconds without committing an offence.

The appellant argued that leaving without committing an offence constituted 'evidence to the contrary' to displace the presumption.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the intent is ascertained at the point of entry and that merely failing to commit an offence inside does not constitute evidence to the contrary, as this would render the statutory presumption meaningless.

The appellant was briefly detained by a police officer for investigative purposes after an accomplice attempted to use a stolen gift certificate.

The officer asked exploratory questions before receiving additional information and arresting the appellant, at which point he was advised of his right to counsel.

The appellant argued his section 10(b) Charter rights were violated because he was not informed of his right to counsel immediately upon the initial detention.

The Court of Appeal held that in the context of a brief investigative detention, the phrase 'without delay' allows for a brief exploratory interlude before the right to counsel must be provided.

The appeal from conviction and sentence was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal found that while the verdict was not unreasonable, the trial judge erred by failing to instruct the jury that a co-accused's prior statement could not be used for its truth against the appellant unless adopted at trial.

The Crown conceded this misdirection.

As the court could not conclude the result would necessarily have been the same without the error, the conviction was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The appellant was convicted by a jury of selling imported liquor, smuggling spirits, possession of property obtained by crime, and trafficking in cocaine following an undercover investigation.

He appealed his convictions and sentence, arguing the trial judge erred by discharging a juror for internal strife, giving a Browne v. Dunn instruction, excluding him from an in camera stay proceeding, failing to properly instruct on reasonable doubt, and failing to leave an 'agent for the purchaser' defence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge properly exercised her discretion under s. 644 of the Criminal Code to discharge the juror and made no reversible errors in her instructions or procedural rulings.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the 12-month custodial sentence was fit for the offences.

The appellant appealed a conviction for sexual assault arising from prolonged sexual abuse of a child over several years and sought leave to appeal a three-year custodial sentence.

The court held that the trial judge's credibility analysis, while containing a minor error on one point, was substantially grounded in the evidentiary record and did not reverse the burden of proof or apply an unfairly different level of scrutiny to defence evidence.

The court distinguished authority on improper credibility reasoning and found the trial judge had carefully considered inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence in the context of the record as a whole.

On sentence, the court held that the sentencing judge properly used prior authority as guidance, recognized factual differences, and imposed a fit sentence given the position of trust and prolonged escalating abuse.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued a procedural endorsement consolidating three appeals involving the respondents Hamilton, Mason, and Spencer.

On consent, the court granted leave to intervene to several organizations, including the African Canadian Legal Clinic, the Native Women's Association of Canada, and Aboriginal Legal Services of Toronto.

The endorsement also established the timetable for perfecting the appeals, filing factums, and the allocation of time for oral arguments.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder.

At trial, the Crown relied heavily on the testimony of a jailhouse informant.

The trial judge gave a Vetrovec warning but erred by providing the jury with examples of potentially confirmatory evidence that were not capable of confirming the informant's testimony.

The trial judge also erred by allowing the Crown to introduce highly prejudicial investigative hearsay evidence regarding the appellant's antecedents, including alleged ties to terrorism and the drug trade, to rebut a defence claim of an inadequate police investigation.

The Court of Appeal found that both errors deprived the appellant of a fair trial.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The Crown appealed the refusal of trial judges to make DNA data bank orders for five adult offenders.

The Court of Appeal held that the appeal route follows the general scheme of the Criminal Code and that the standard of review is one of deference absent an error in principle.

The Court found that the DNA data bank provisions apply retrospectively to offenders still before the court after the legislation came into force.

The Court allowed the appeals, finding that the trial judges misapprehended the broad purposes of the DNA data bank, placed unreasonable emphasis on the offenders' privacy, and failed to properly weigh the offenders' criminal records and the nature of their offences.

DNA data bank orders were issued for all five offenders.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that a courier employee acted as an agent for the police when opening a package containing cocaine, thereby violating section 8 of the Charter.

The trial judge found that the employee acted independently based on his perceived obligation to his company, and the police officer did not encourage the search.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that no agency relationship existed and dismissed the appeal.

Supplementary reasons adjusting the specific counts of the indictment on which the appellant was convicted, in order to reduce the totality of the sentences to five years imprisonment.

The court varied the sentences to two years concurrent on most counts, with three one-year consecutive sentences for use of a firearm, as agreed upon by counsel.

The appellants were convicted of attempted murder, aggravated assault, and unlawful use of a firearm.

They appealed their convictions on several grounds, including the trial judge's charge to the jury on identification evidence and section 21(2) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed these grounds but allowed the appeal based on the Crown's closing address.

The Crown had improperly invited the jury to speculate on why one co-accused did not testify and to use that silence as positive evidence of the other's guilt.

The trial judge also erred in instructing the jury that a statement made by one co-accused to an undercover officer could be used against the other.

The appeals were allowed and a new trial was ordered.

The appellants were convicted of multiple offences arising from three home invasion robberies.

The Crown's case relied heavily on the testimony of an accomplice, supported by circumstantial and frail identification evidence.

On appeal, the appellants argued the trial judge erred in admitting the identification evidence, instructing the jury on confirmatory evidence, and defining reasonable doubt.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding no error in the trial judge's instructions or evidentiary rulings.

However, the sentence appeal was allowed, and the ten-year sentence was reduced to five years, considering the appellant's youth, rehabilitation efforts, and the appropriate sentencing range for first offenders.

The appellants challenged a s. 37 order sustaining Crown objections to questions that might reveal the identity of a confidential source described in a wiretap affidavit.

The Court of Appeal held that even if the source acted as a police agent in an unrelated stolen-goods transaction, that did not convert the source into an agent for all purposes or in relation to the appellants' drug investigation.

The court further held that, even assuming the Crown's earlier characterization of the source as an agent in the wiretap materials created prejudice and amounted to an abuse of process, compelled disclosure of identity was unavailable because informer privilege must be protected if it in fact applies.

Any appropriate remedy would instead lie, if warranted, in a Garofoli challenge to the authorization and possible exclusion of intercepted evidence.

The appellant sought leave to appeal sentence after pleading guilty to criminal negligence causing death arising from alcohol-impaired, high-speed driving through multiple red lights, causing a fatal collision.

The court held that this offence does not lend itself to a fixed sentencing range because it may be committed in an almost infinite variety of factual circumstances, although alcohol-related cases have attracted increasing severity over time.

Given the appellant’s extreme moral blameworthiness, prior record, and the need for denunciation and general deterrence, the five-year penitentiary sentence and 15-year driving prohibition were not clearly unreasonable.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.