Tina Yuen

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed Osama Filli’s appeal from his conviction for manslaughter in the stabbing death of Nahom Berhane.

Filli, who was found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder after trial, challenged the trial judge’s findings on self-defence, the use of mental health evidence, and the reasonableness of the verdict.

The appellate court found no error in the trial judge’s assessment of the threat, the opportunity to retreat, or the use of mental health evidence, and held that the verdict was supported by the evidence and reasoning.

The appellant appealed her conviction for importing cocaine after returning from Jamaica with approximately three kilograms of cocaine concealed in her suitcase.

The sole issue at trial was knowledge—whether the appellant knew the controlled substance was in her suitcase.

The appellant raised multiple grounds of appeal, including allegations that the Crown's closing address improperly invited speculation, that the trial judge's charge was deficient regarding good character evidence and the element of knowledge, and that the jury was left with an unbalanced view of the case.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding that the Crown's submissions were supported by circumstantial evidence, that the charge adequately addressed the permissible uses of character evidence in context, and that the jury received proper instructions on the burden and standard of proof.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of child pornography entered by the trial judge on March 13, 2015.

The central issue was whether there was sufficient evidence for the trial judge to find that the appellant had knowledge of the child pornography on his computer.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions, finding that the evidence supported the trial judge's conclusion that the only rational explanation was that the appellant had knowledge of the contents of the computer, given his control and regular use of the computer, the vast quantities of child pornography found by police, and the absence of evidence that anyone else occupied the home.

The appellant was convicted of possession for the purpose of trafficking and assault following his arrest by Toronto Parking Authority security guards in a parking lot.

For the first time on appeal, the appellant raised Charter violations by police, claiming the police illegally continued an unreasonable citizen's arrest and conducted an unlawful search.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellant could not raise new Charter issues for the first time on appeal because he had expressly conceded at trial that police had not violated his Charter rights.

The court found the appellant failed to meet the preconditions for raising new issues on appeal, including an incomplete evidentiary record and uncertainty regarding whether the failure to raise the issue was tactical.

The court also upheld the trial judge's credibility findings regarding the assault charge.

The appellant was convicted of multiple drug trafficking and possession offences arising from events in spring 2011.

He appealed his convictions on the grounds that the trial judge misdirected the jury on the prohibition against applying evidence across counts in a multi-count case, failed to correct improper cross-examination and closing arguments by the Crown, and failed to properly instruct on propensity reasoning.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by providing ambiguous instructions on cross-count reasoning, failing to correct the Crown's improper invitations to the jury to use evidence from one count to determine guilt on other counts, and providing contradictory responses to jury questions.

The court concluded that the jury's verdicts were tainted by legally impermissible reasoning and ordered a new trial.

The appellant, Rahman Wahab, appealed his conviction for operating a motor vehicle with excess blood/alcohol, arguing that his s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel of choice was violated.

The trial judge had misapprehended the timing of the appellant's assertion of this right.

However, the appeal court found that the appellant was not reasonably diligent in communicating his request for specific counsel, and the police had made reasonable efforts to facilitate counsel.

Therefore, no s. 10(b) Charter violation occurred.

Even if there had been a breach, the breath sample analyses would not be excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter, given the minimal impact on rights and the strong societal interest in adjudicating drinking and driving cases.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant brought a summary conviction appeal from convictions for assault and sexual assault following a trial.

He sought to introduce fresh evidence arising from a later civil discovery in which the complainant made statements inconsistent with her trial testimony regarding whether she worked the day after the alleged sexual assault.

Applying the principles governing fresh evidence under s. 683(1) of the Criminal Code and the Palmer test, the court held the inconsistent statements were admissible and had significant impeachment value concerning the credibility of the key Crown witness.

The court also found the trial judge’s reasons were deficient, particularly in addressing the third step of the W.(D.) analysis and in failing to grapple with major inconsistencies and evidentiary conflicts.

The convictions were therefore set aside and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed convictions and sentence for offences involving the killing and wounding of two dogs contrary to the Criminal Code.

The conviction appeal alleged errors in credibility assessment and sought admission of extensive fresh evidence, including veterinary expert evidence suggesting vasculopathy, accidental injuries from falls, and revised dating of rib fractures.

Applying the Palmer test, the court held the proposed evidence failed the due diligence, credibility, and impact requirements and was not admissible.

The conviction appeal was therefore dismissed.

However, the court found an error in principle in sentencing where denunciation and deterrence were overemphasized relative to rehabilitation for a first offender, and reduced the custodial sentence while adjusting ancillary orders.