John K. Lefurgey

The accused was found not criminally responsible for sexual assault and referred to the Ontario Review Board for an initial disposition hearing.

The Board found that the accused, who is diagnosed with schizophrenia and sedative use disorder, continues to experience perceptual disturbances and lacks community support.

The Board concluded that the accused poses a significant threat to the safety of the public and ordered a detention order at the hospital with specific privileges and prohibitions, including abstention from intoxicants and a weapons prohibition.

The Ontario Review Board held an annual review hearing for an accused found not criminally responsible for arson-related offences.

The accused, diagnosed with schizophrenia and a neurocognitive disorder, remained stable in a hospital setting but continued to experience symptoms and lacked insight.

The treatment team opined that she required a 24/7 supervised setting, such as a long-term care facility, but none was currently available.

The Board found that the accused continued to represent a significant threat to public safety and ordered the continuation of her detention disposition without change, while noting concerns about bureaucratic delays in securing a long-term care placement.

The applicant, Kenneth Bettes, brought a pre-trial application under s. 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging a violation of his s. 11(b) right to trial within a reasonable time.

The total delay was 1447 days (47.5 months), exceeding the 30-month presumptive ceiling for Superior Courts set by R. v. Jordan.

The court analyzed the delay, deducting periods attributable to defence conduct (illegitimate actions of first counsel, new counsel's failure to schedule, illegitimate scheduling of a voir dire, and a speculative s. 278 application) and discrete events (COVID-19 court closure, late disclosure by complainant).

The court found the net delay to be 774 days (25.46 months), well below the Jordan ceiling.

Consequently, the defence failed to establish that the delay was unreasonable, and the application to stay proceedings was dismissed.

The defendant, K.B., a 27-year-old first offender with no criminal record and significant family caregiving responsibilities, was found guilty of sexual assault involving two sleeping victims, one with digital penetration.

The Crown sought six months of real jail, while the defence sought a conditional sentence.

The court, emphasizing proportionality and the individualized nature of sentencing for first offenders, determined that a conditional sentence was appropriate, capable of achieving denunciation and deterrence without requiring incarceration.

K.B. received a 12-month conditional sentence (9 months house arrest, 3 months curfew) followed by 18 months probation and community service.

The appellant appealed a conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding the timing and location of the assaults.

The complainant testified about assaults occurring between 1995 and 1999, when she was 11-13 years old.

A key inconsistency involved a distinctive tattoo on the appellant, which the complainant claimed to have seen throughout the assaults, but which the trial judge found was acquired after the appellant moved out and the abuse allegedly stopped.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge was entitled to reconcile inconsistencies in the complainant's memory regarding precise timing and location, while still accepting the essential nature of the sexual assaults.

The appeal was dismissed.

The accused, Jordan Bolger, was charged with sexual interference and sexual assault involving a 15-year-old complainant, E.B., at a waterpark.

The Crown's case relied primarily on E.B.'s testimony, which described multiple attempts and one successful touching by the accused in a hot tub.

The accused denied the allegations.

The court applied the principles of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the W.(D.) analysis for assessing conflicting evidence, and specific considerations for child testimony and victim reactions in sexual assault cases.

Despite finding E.B.'s evidence more reliable and probable, the court concluded that it did not meet the high standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt required for a criminal conviction.

The applicant, charged with human trafficking and prostitution-related offences, brought a constitutional challenge arguing that ss. 286.2(1), 286.3(1) and 286.4 of the Criminal Code violate s. 7 of the Charter.

The applicant relied on a previous Superior Court decision that declared the provisions invalid.

The court found the previous decision to be plainly wrong, as it misidentified the purpose of the legislative scheme and incorrectly interpreted the provisions.

Applying the correct statutory interpretation, the court held that the provisions are rationally connected to their objectives, are not overbroad, and do not have grossly disproportionate effects.

The application was dismissed.

The Crown appealed acquittals for making and distributing child pornography and child luring arising from sexualized text messages sent by an adult to a 14‑year‑old boy about the boy's friend.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge committed legal errors in interpreting ss. 163.1 and 172.1 of the Criminal Code.

Private electronic communications can constitute “written material” capable of meeting the statutory definition of child pornography, and the analysis must focus objectively on the content of the communications rather than the accused's claimed joking motive.

The trial judge also erred by importing a requirement that luring be for a sexual purpose and by failing to consider the facilitation element of s. 172.1.

Because the legal errors affected the acquittals, the court set them aside and ordered a new trial on all counts.

The accused, Jeremy Gough, charged with first-degree murder, brought a pre-trial motion challenging the admissibility of two videotaped statements made to police.

The first statement was challenged on grounds of voluntariness and breaches of Charter rights (ss. 7, 10(a), 10(b)), alleging he was a suspect and detained without proper caution or counsel notification.

The second statement was challenged on voluntariness and as tainted by the first.

The court found the Crown failed to prove the voluntariness of the first statement beyond a reasonable doubt.

Alternatively, the court found Gough was psychologically detained by police without being informed of his Charter rights, leading to breaches of ss. 7, 10(a), and 10(b).

Consequently, both statements were ruled inadmissible at trial.

This costs endorsement followed a motion for security for costs where the defendants were partially successful, obtaining an order for $18,000 in security despite requesting $55,000.

The court determined that the defendants, as the successful parties on the underlying motion, were entitled to costs, though less than complete partial indemnity due to their partial success.

Costs were fixed at $6,000 all-inclusive, payable by the plaintiffs to the defendants within 30 days.

The accused, charged with first-degree murder, brought a pre-trial motion concerning the admissibility of and testimony about two police-prepared PowerPoint presentations containing video clips of a vehicle and an unidentified male.

The court ruled the presentations admissible for efficiency and organization, but restricted the police officer's testimony regarding lay opinion evidence on vehicle identification.

The officer could testify to factual observations and reasons for selection, but not offer an opinion on whether vehicles matched or were the same.

Video clips of the unidentified male were deemed relevant circumstantial evidence and admissible.

The court also allowed the use of annotations in the presentations and directed mid-trial instructions to the jury.

The Crown brought a pre-trial motion to determine the admissibility of ante mortem statements made by the deceased, Jessica Scanlon, to her sister, friend, and boyfriend, in a first-degree murder trial against Jeremy Gough.

The statements concerned the nature of Scanlon's relationship with Gough, their separation, and Gough's reaction.

The court found the statements relevant and material to Gough's state of mind, Scanlon's state of mind, and motive.

Applying the principled exception to the hearsay rule, the court found the statements met the necessity and threshold reliability criteria, noting that most were recorded text messages and corroborated by multiple recipients available for cross-examination.

The court also determined that the probative value of the statements outweighed their minimal prejudicial effect, making them admissible.

The defendants moved for security for costs against the corporate plaintiffs under Rule 56.01(1)(d), alleging insufficient assets in Ontario.

The plaintiffs claimed impecuniosity caused by the defendants' conduct and a meritorious claim.

The court found the defendants met the initial onus regarding insufficient assets.

However, the plaintiffs failed to provide robust financial disclosure, including that of their shareholders, to prove impecuniosity.

The court also found the plaintiffs' impecuniosity was not caused by the defendants' conduct and that their claim, while not devoid of merit, did not meet the higher standard of having a good chance of success.

Consequently, the motion for security for costs was granted, ordering the plaintiffs to pay $20,340 into court.

The accused pleaded guilty to five offences involving the sexual abuse of a four-year-old child: sexual interference, invitation to touch for a sexual purpose, making child pornography through text communications, possessing child pornography, and agreeing with the child's mother to commit sexual interference.

The offences occurred over a three-day period in January 2016.

The accused was 27 years old at the time and had no prior criminal record.

The sentencing hearing required the court to balance aggravating factors including the extreme vulnerability of the victim, the planned and deliberate nature of the offences, and the depravity of the text messages, against mitigating factors including guilty pleas, cooperation with authorities, expressions of remorse, and family support.

The court imposed a total sentence of six years less pre-sentence custody credit.

The appellant appealed his conviction for a drug offence, arguing the trial judge misapprehended evidence and made inconsistent findings of fact regarding his head injury when assessing his credibility.

The central issue at trial was whether the appellant knew a package he received contained cocaine.

The Court of Appeal found no material misapprehension of evidence and no inconsistency between the trial judge's reasons for judgment and reasons for sentence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed convictions for sexual offences against two child complainants and sought leave to appeal a ten-year concurrent sentence.

The court upheld the admission of extrinsic similar fact evidence from two other witnesses, finding the trial judge properly applied the governing framework and reasonably concluded the evidence's probative value outweighed its prejudicial effect on the issue of actus reus and the credibility of a blanket denial.

The court also held that allegedly improper bad character evidence caused no prejudice because the trial judge effectively disregarded it.

Although the sentencing judge erred by treating extrinsic misconduct as aggravating without the required findings, the sentence remained fit and was upheld.

The accused pleaded guilty to breaking and entering a dwelling house and committing the indictable offence of sexual interference against an eight-year-old child.

The Crown sought imprisonment for four to five years with ancillary orders including a section 161 order, DNA order, SOIRA compliance, and firearms prohibition.

Defence counsel sought imprisonment for two years less one day followed by probation.

The court imposed a sentence of four years imprisonment (46 months plus two months pre-sentence custody credit) with ancillary orders including a 20-year section 161 order, lifetime SOIRA compliance, and a 10-year firearms prohibition.

The court balanced the extremely serious nature of the offence, including the home invasion and sexual assault of a young child, against the accused's youth, first-offender status, genuine remorse, guilty plea, and rehabilitation potential.

The appellant subcontractor registered a construction lien after not being paid.

The respondent mortgagee posted security to vacate the liens.

The property was sold, but proceeds were insufficient to pay the mortgages.

The appellant argued the posted security should cover the full amount owed by the owner to the general contractor, while the respondent argued it was limited to the 10 percent statutory holdback.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that under section 78(2) of the Construction Lien Act, the mortgagee has priority over all but the basic holdback, and section 44(6) prevents the notice holdback from extending to the posted security.

The accused was convicted by a jury of multiple historical and recent sexual offences against four minor victims, including his biological daughter and step-daughter.

The court applied the Kienapple principle to stay two sexual assault charges.

In determining the sentence, the court analyzed the retroactivity of the Truth in Sentencing Act, concluding it did not apply to offences committed before it came into force.

The court awarded 1.5 to 1 credit for pre-sentence custody due to loss of parole eligibility and conditions.

The accused was sentenced to a total of 54 months, reduced by 42 months of pre-sentence credit, resulting in 12 months of further custody and three years of probation.

The offenders were sentenced for their roles in a conspiracy to import large quantities of cocaine using a Medivac plane, as well as related trafficking and proceeds of crime offences.

The court weighed the gravity of the offences, the offenders' respective roles, and the principles of totality and parity.

After applying a 1.5 to 1 credit for two years of pre-trial custody due to harsh conditions, the court sentenced the first offender to an effective term of 6 years and the second offender to an effective term of 2 years less a day.