Nancy Ann Flynn

The court determined a breach allegation under s. 742.6 of the Criminal Code in relation to a conditional sentence order containing no-contact conditions with persons under 16 years of age.

On admitted facts, the court found multiple wilful and flagrant breaches without reasonable excuse and held the offender failed to rebut the presumption that the remainder of the sentence should be served in custody.

The court rejected submissions that supervision exceptions, health concerns, or delay during suspension justified continuation of the conditional sentence or credit under s. 742.6(16).

Applying the governing authorities, the court terminated the conditional sentence and ordered the unexpired portion served in jail.

A custodial no-contact order was also imposed.

The applicant, Kenneth Bettes, brought a pre-trial application under s. 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging a violation of his s. 11(b) right to trial within a reasonable time.

The total delay was 1447 days (47.5 months), exceeding the 30-month presumptive ceiling for Superior Courts set by R. v. Jordan.

The court analyzed the delay, deducting periods attributable to defence conduct (illegitimate actions of first counsel, new counsel's failure to schedule, illegitimate scheduling of a voir dire, and a speculative s. 278 application) and discrete events (COVID-19 court closure, late disclosure by complainant).

The court found the net delay to be 774 days (25.46 months), well below the Jordan ceiling.

Consequently, the defence failed to establish that the delay was unreasonable, and the application to stay proceedings was dismissed.

The accused, S.S., was charged with sexual assault, sexual interference, and inviting a sexual touch involving the complainant, E.M., who was eight at the time of the alleged incident in March 2015.

The defense argued that the Crown's case failed on all three prongs of the R. v. W.(D.) analysis, asserting S.S.'s denial should be accepted or at least not rejected, and E.M.'s evidence was unreliable.

The Crown contended S.S.'s evidence was implausible and evasive, and E.M.'s testimony was credible despite minor inconsistencies.

The court found S.S.'s evidence reasonable and did not reject his denial, concluding that the Crown failed to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt due to the unreliability and improbability of the complainant's account regarding material details and the mechanics of the alleged events.

The accused was charged with manslaughter in connection with the death of Edward Cieslik, who died from heroin overdose.

The Crown alleged that the accused unlawfully procured heroin for the deceased, divided it into doses, and injected him with one dose, causing his death.

The trial examined whether the accused's actions constituted unlawful act manslaughter or criminal negligence.

The court found that while the accused did traffic in heroin and inject the deceased once, the deceased's voluntary self-administration of a fatal second dose constituted an intervening act that severed the causal chain between the accused's conduct and the death.

The court applied the principle from R. v. Kennedy, finding that the autonomous decision of an informed adult to self-inject a lethal dose breaks legal causation.

The accused was acquitted of manslaughter.