Kathleen M. Healey

The appellant was arrested and charged with possession of cocaine after a police officer peered into a public washroom stall and observed him preparing drugs.

At trial, the judge found a breach of the appellant's s. 8 Charter rights but declined to exclude the evidence under s. 24(2), noting the appellant's reduced privacy interest because he was using the stall solely for illicit purposes.

The appellant appealed, arguing the trial judge erred in considering his unlawful use of the stall in the s. 24(2) analysis.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, holding that while the nature of the activity does not affect the existence of a privacy interest under s. 8, it is highly relevant to assessing the seriousness of the breach under s. 24(2).

Appeal from conviction and sentence.

The appellant challenged alleged breaches of sections 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found that the arrest was lawful and the search incident to arrest was lawful.

However, the court agreed that the appellant's section 10(b) rights were violated: he was not afforded an opportunity to contact counsel until approximately 80 minutes after arrest, and at the station, police failed to inform him that his named lawyer was unavailable or advise him of his right to speak to duty counsel.

Applying the section 24(2) analysis under R. v. Grant, the court found the violations were situation-specific failures rather than systemic or institutional problems.

The negative impact on the appellant's rights was moderate, and the third Grant factor strongly favoured admission of the evidence.

The conviction appeal was dismissed.

The sentence appeal was allowed and the sentence was varied to 12 months.

The accused attacked military personnel at a Canadian Forces Recruiting Centre with a knife.

He was charged with nine counts of committing indictable offences for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a terrorist group under s. 83.2 of the Criminal Code.

The Crown argued that the accused, acting as a 'lone wolf', constituted a terrorist group himself.

The court rejected this interpretation, holding that s. 83.2 requires the terrorist group to have an identity separate from the person committing the offence.

The accused was therefore acquitted of the terrorism charges.

On the included offences of attempted murder, assault causing bodily harm, and weapons offences, the court accepted joint psychiatric evidence that the accused was suffering from schizophrenia and was incapable of knowing his actions were morally wrong.

The accused was found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder.

The appellant appealed her sentence for possession of methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking.

She had been sentenced to 12 months' custody plus 10 months' probation based on the mandatory one-year minimum sentence under section 5(2) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

However, the sentencing judge expressed regret at being required to impose the mandatory minimum.

Subsequently, the Supreme Court of Canada struck down the mandatory minimum as unconstitutional in R. v. Lloyd.

The Crown consented to the appeal, and the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and remitted the case for resentencing.

The accused pleaded guilty to possession of ketamine for the purpose of trafficking arising from Project Ice Castle (York Region charges), production of ketamine arising from Project Apollo (Toronto charges), and failure to comply with recognizance.

The accused was arrested in April 2015 in possession of 60 kilograms of ketamine and subsequently engaged in ketamine production at three clandestine drug laboratories in Toronto while on bail awaiting trial.

The court imposed a global sentence of 15 years and 6 months imprisonment, consisting of 7 years and 6 months for possession for trafficking, 7 years and 6 months for production (consecutive), and 6 months for failure to comply.

The court credited 447 days of pre-trial custody at enhanced rates for lockdown periods and strict bail conditions.

The appellant was convicted of importing 830 grams of cocaine dissolved in two bottles of ginger wine that she carried on a flight from Jamaica to Toronto.

She appealed her conviction, arguing that the trial judge erred in his findings of fact and credibility assessments and gave unsupportable reasons for rejecting her evidence.

The appellant claimed she was an innocent dupe unaware of the cocaine in the bottles.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that the trial judge properly assessed credibility, made reasonable inferences from circumstantial evidence, and that the value and manner of the cocaine smuggling supported an inference that the appellant was a knowing participant rather than a blind courier.

Zhi Xin Lin pleaded guilty to production and possession for trafficking of ketamine.

The court considered aggravating factors including the large-scale commercial operation, the harmful nature of ketamine, and the residential location of the illegal lab.

Mitigating factors included his first offender status, guilty plea, cooperation with police, remorse, and impending deportation.

The court accepted a joint submission for a 10-year sentence, applying credit for pre-sentence custody and minimal credit for time under house arrest due to lack of information on its impact.

A net sentence of 9 years and 4 months was imposed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of crack cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

The sole issue on appeal was whether his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance.

The appellant argued that his counsel was in a conflict of interest by representing both him and a potential third party suspect, the owner of the vehicle in which the drugs were found.

The counsel failed to advance a third party suspect defence and did not disclose the conflict to the appellant.

The Court of Appeal found that an actual conflict of interest existed, that the counsel's representation was materially and adversely affected by the conflict, and that a miscarriage of justice occurred.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction entered by the Ontario Court of Justice on March 8, 2016.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge properly assessed the circumstantial evidence and that no error in law or clear and palpable factual error was demonstrated.

The court held that the failure to articulate alternative factual scenarios in the reasons for judgment does not equate to a failure to consider them.

The reasons were found to be adequate as the judge reviewed the evidence and made the basis for his finding clear.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for a drug offence, arguing the trial judge misapprehended evidence and made inconsistent findings of fact regarding his head injury when assessing his credibility.

The central issue at trial was whether the appellant knew a package he received contained cocaine.

The Court of Appeal found no material misapprehension of evidence and no inconsistency between the trial judge's reasons for judgment and reasons for sentence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant operated a garden supply business and sold legal products to customers who used them in marijuana grow operations.

He was convicted of conspiracy to produce and traffic marijuana, as well as the substantive offences of production and possession for the purpose of trafficking.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal quashed the conspiracy convictions, holding that selling legal goods with knowledge of their intended illegal use does not make one a party to a conspiracy without a shared mutual objective.

However, the court upheld the substantive convictions on the basis that the appellant actually aided and abetted specific grow operations.

The Crown's appeal against the appellant's acquittal for money laundering was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of a controlled substance for the purpose of trafficking and possession of property obtained by crime.

He was arrested during the execution of a search warrant in an apartment, holding cash and a knife, moments after being seen on a balcony where drugs were later found.

The Court of Appeal held that the drug convictions were unreasonable because the circumstantial evidence did not support guilt as the only reasonable inference.

However, the court upheld the proceeds of crime conviction, finding no other reasonable explanation for the cash.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of heroin for the purposes of trafficking and breaking and entering.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal regarding the drug conviction, finding the trial judge reasonably concluded the large quantity of heroin and other indicia supported trafficking.

However, the Court allowed the appeal regarding the break and enter conviction, finding the trial judge's one-sentence reasons insufficient and failing to address the frailties of the eyewitness identification evidence.

A new trial was ordered for the break and enter count.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of heroin for the purpose of trafficking, arguing the trial judge erred in finding police had objectively reasonable grounds for his arrest and in failing to exclude evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The police had received a tip and observed the appellant making a series of short stops over two days.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the pattern of conduct, combined with the tip, removed the possibility of innocent coincidence and provided a credibly based probability of drug trafficking.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown sought forfeiture of two properties under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act following the discovery of sophisticated marijuana grow operations.

The first property, a former Molson Brewery plant in Barrie, contained two large indoor grow operations operated by individuals convicted of production and trafficking offences.

The second property was a residential dwelling in Phelpston owned by a company controlled by the respondent's brother.

The Crown alleged that the property owners and their corporations were complicit in or colluded with the drug offences.

The respondents argued they were innocent third parties unaware of the illegal activities occurring on their properties.

The applicant mortgagee brought a motion to vary a restraint order under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act to permit the sale of the subject property under power of sale.

The Crown consented to the sale, but the respondent owner opposed it, arguing the property had increased in value and disputing the mortgagee's claimed costs.

The court granted the motion to permit the sale, directing that the net proceeds be paid to the Crown.

The court declined to approve the mortgagee's claimed costs of over $388,000, directing that those funds be held by the Crown pending an assessment under Rule 58 and the final determination of the forfeiture proceedings.

A financial institution applied to vary a restraint order made under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act to permit a power of sale of property and payment of its mortgage debt from the proceeds before remitting the balance to the Crown.

The Attorney General opposed the variation, arguing that the mortgagee must first establish lack of complicity or collusion in the underlying drug activity.

The court held that the restraint order permitted sale by the mortgagee but required that all net proceeds, subject only to ordinary costs of sale, be remitted to the Crown unless and until the mortgagee established its entitlement through statutory restoration proceedings.

The court declined to determine the mortgagee’s innocence on the limited record and directed that such issues be addressed in the pending forfeiture proceedings.

The requested variation was therefore refused.

The applicant corporation brought an application concerning a restraint order affecting property.

It was uncontested that neither the corporation nor its sole shareholder, officer, and director had been charged with any criminal offence related to the restraint order or the property.

The respondent did not dispute these facts and there was no cross‑examination on the supporting affidavit.

The court issued a supplementary endorsement confirming that these uncontested facts informed the earlier decision dismissing the application.

The applicant sought to vary an ex parte restraint order under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act to allow the sale of a property that had been used as a commercial marijuana grow operation.

The applicant wanted to use the sale proceeds to pay out a first mortgage held by a credit union before remitting the balance to the Attorney General.

The Attorney General opposed the payout, arguing that the mortgagee's innocence had not been established and should be determined at a forfeiture hearing.

The court dismissed the application, finding that it would be premature to allow the payout before a full hearing under s. 20 of the CDSA.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first degree murder, arguing that the trial judge erred in his charge to the jury on reasonable doubt.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, agreeing with the dissenting judge in the Court of Appeal that the charge, read as a whole, gave rise to a reasonable likelihood that the jury misapprehended the correct standard of proof.

A new trial was ordered.