Joseph Selvaratnam

The court sentenced Pritpal Singh for trafficking and possession of heroin for the purpose of trafficking, possession of opium, and possession of proceeds of crime.

The case involved a Garofoli application regarding the excision of unconstitutionally obtained evidence from an Information to Obtain (ITO), which was dismissed.

The court reviewed the applicable sentencing ranges for large-scale heroin trafficking, considered aggravating and mitigating factors, and imposed a global sentence of 13 years, with all sentences to run concurrently.

The accused, Pritpal Singh, was tried for multiple drug trafficking and possession offences alongside a Garofoli application challenging several search warrants.

The court dismissed the majority of the Garofoli application, finding that the accused did not have standing to seek excision of evidence obtained through the breach of a third party's Charter rights, and that the Information to Obtain (ITO) established reasonable grounds for most of the warrants.

Based on an Agreed Statement of Fact, the court found the accused guilty of trafficking heroin, possession of heroin and opium for the purpose of trafficking, and possession of proceeds of crime, relying on circumstantial evidence and the doctrine of constructive possession.

The co-accused daughter was acquitted at the Crown's request.

The applicants, Lakhpreet Brar and Sukhvir Singh, sought a stay of proceedings under section 24(1) of the Charter due to a breach of their section 11(b) right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The court applied the Jordan framework, calculating the total delay for Brar as 22 months and 10 days, and for Singh as 24 months and 8 days, both exceeding the 18-month Provincial Court ceiling.

The court found minimal defence delay (3 days for Brar, 4 days for Singh) and rejected arguments that COVID-19 or the case's complexity constituted exceptional circumstances justifying the delay.

Consequently, the court found a breach of the applicants' Charter rights and ordered a stay of proceedings for both.

Youssef Messoudi was found guilty of importing 754 grams of methoxyacetyl fentanyl, an analogue of fentanyl with an estimated street value of $23-38 million, and occupying a vehicle with a prohibited weapon.

The Crown sought a sentence of 15-20 years, while the defence proposed 8 years.

The court emphasized deterrence and denunciation as paramount for fentanyl offences, acknowledging the drug's extreme danger and societal impact.

While considering the offender's youth (23 years old) and rehabilitative efforts (completing high school), the court found him to be involved beyond a simple street trafficker.

A Charter s. 10(a) breach (failure to promptly inform of arrest reason) was found but did not warrant a sentence reduction due to lack of deliberate police misconduct.

The court imposed a sentence of 12 years for importing fentanyl and 3 years concurrent for the firearms offence, with a credit of 1 year for pre-trial custody and house arrest, resulting in a total sentence of 11 years imprisonment.

The appellant appealed his sentence for possession of fentanyl and cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, possession of property obtained by crime, and conspiracy.

The trial judge had initially imposed a 24-month less one day global term, then reconsidered the availability of a conditional sentence after R. v. Sharma.

The Court of Appeal found no error in principle in the trial judge's analysis, which concluded that a conditional sentence was not fit given the totality of circumstances and sentencing principles of denunciation, deterrence, and proportionality.

The appeal was dismissed.

The defendant, Youssef Messoudi, brought an application to exclude evidence in a criminal prosecution for drug and firearm offences, alleging infringements of his Charter rights under sections 10(a) (right to be promptly informed of reasons for detention) and 10(b) (right to counsel).

The court found a serious breach of section 10(a) because police officers initially detained and handcuffed Messoudi for 15-20 minutes without informing him of the reasons for his detention.

However, the court found no breach of section 10(b), accepting that a subsequent officer informed Messoudi of his right to counsel immediately upon taking custody, and Messoudi chose to wait to speak to his lawyer at the police station.

Applying the section 24(2) Grant analysis, the court determined that the police conduct, while serious, was not deliberate misconduct, and the evidence sought to be excluded (gun, controlled delivery observations) was not directly linked to the section 10(a) breach.

The application to exclude evidence was dismissed, as its admission would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The appellant appealed sentences totaling 32 months and a forfeiture order for possession of methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking, and possession of marijuana and cocaine.

The Court of Appeal found the sentencing judge erred by giving no weight to the guilty plea and the absence of a commercial motive.

The court reduced the sentence for possession for the purpose of trafficking to 28 months, reduced the sentence for possession of marijuana to 10 days concurrent, and set aside the forfeiture order of $320.00 as there was no finding it was drug-related.

On a pre-trial Charter application in a multi-accused organized crime prosecution, the applicants sought to prevent disclosure of residential address information in the common disclosure brief.

The court held that immediate disclosure of one applicant’s home address engaged and would arbitrarily infringe his s. 7 rights because there was credible evidence of a prior attempt on his life, disclosure would materially increase the danger to him and his family, and the record did not establish any real present need for co-accused to know the precise address to make full answer and defence.

The court rejected arguments grounded in Stinchcombe, parity among accused, and avoidance of future disclosure litigation.

Relief was denied respecting the father’s address because the evidence did not establish danger to him or a sufficient causal connection.

The Crown was directed to work with defence counsel on redactions, and interim sealing orders were granted.

The appellant appealed his sentence of three years imprisonment imposed following a guilty plea to possession for the purpose of trafficking of two ounces of methamphetamine.

The Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge erred in principle by failing to give meaningful credit for the early guilty plea, despite acknowledging that substantial credit was warranted.

The court considered the appellant's difficult background, including childhood sexual abuse and early drug addiction, as well as his progress in custody.

The sentence was reduced to two years imprisonment.

The accused was charged with drug trafficking offences.

Police, wishing to protect an ongoing wiretap investigation, directed a traffic officer to conduct a pretext traffic stop of the accused, lie about the reason for the stop, and attempt to obtain consent to search his vehicle.

The accused was not informed of the true reason for his detention or his right to counsel.

When the accused tossed a bag to his wife, multiple officers rushed him, resulting in a physical altercation and broken ribs.

The court found egregious breaches of sections 7, 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b) of the Charter.

Applying the Grant and Regan frameworks, the court concluded that the deliberate police planning to bypass Charter protections constituted an abuse of process.

A stay of proceedings was ordered for all counts.

During a trial for conspiracy to traffic in controlled substances, the Crown sought to introduce ten recorded conversations obtained via a room probe.

The accused opposed the admission of the evidence, arguing the audio quality was too poor to be reliable.

Following a voir dire, the court found that eight of the recordings were largely inaudible and lacked sufficient context to permit a fair and reliable assessment of their substance.

Portions of two recordings were found to be sufficiently clear to meet the threshold test for admissibility, subject to the Crown satisfying the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule at trial.

The applicant brought a Garofoli application seeking exclusion under s. 24(2) of the Charter of evidence obtained under a judicial wiretap authorization.

The court reviewed whether the supporting affidavit disclosed reasonable and probable grounds, provided sufficient particulars of the offences under s. 185(1)(c) of the Criminal Code, and established investigative necessity under s. 186(1)(b).

The court held that some methamphetamine-related grounds were insufficient, but the affidavit still provided ample grounds for the cocaine importation, trafficking, possession for the purpose of trafficking, and conspiracy investigation, and there were adequate grounds to name the applicant because interception of his communications might assist that investigation.

The court further held that investigative necessity was established given the nature of the alleged high-level drug operation and the limited utility of alternative techniques.

The application to exclude the intercepted communications evidence was dismissed.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their application for certiorari, which sought to quash their committal for trial.

The Court of Appeal upheld the certiorari judge's finding that the preliminary inquiry judge reasonably inferred from circumstantial evidence that the appellants had constructive possession of the entire contents of a stash house.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sought to introduce fresh evidence.

The Crown conceded that if the fresh evidence was accepted, the appeal should be allowed.

The Court of Appeal found that the fresh evidence met the Palmer criteria, allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction, and ordered a new trial.

The applicants sought certiorari to quash their committal for trial following a preliminary inquiry involving alleged drug trafficking and firearms offences connected to a stash house.

They argued the preliminary inquiry justice exceeded jurisdiction by relying on speculative inferences to find some evidence of knowledge and control over the contraband necessary to establish constructive possession.

The reviewing court held that the preliminary inquiry justice properly considered the totality and context of the circumstantial evidence, including intercepted communications, surveillance, and the conduct of alleged co-conspirators.

The inferences of knowledge and control supporting constructive possession and conspiracy were reasonably available on the record.

As a result, no jurisdictional error was established and the committal decision stood.

The applicants sought revocation of two restraint orders issued under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act and return of property proceeds held by the Seized Property Management Directorate Branch.

The Crown had previously dismissed its forfeiture application after over 35 days of hearings, finding no evidence of complicity or collusion on the part of the applicants.

The court granted the application, ordering revocation of the restraint orders and distribution of the remaining proceeds pursuant to a consent order among the interested parties.

The court rejected the Crown's request for a 90-day adjournment to allow the Civil Remedies Office to investigate whether to commence separate proceedings, finding such a referral constituted an abuse of process and an attempt to relitigate issues already determined.

Sentencing of three defendants involved in a drug project investigation.

Quan Chan Lao pleaded guilty to multiple counts of trafficking and conspiracy to traffic cocaine and methamphetamine, receiving a net global sentence of 5 years and 11 months after pre-trial custody credit.

Joseph Nestorovski was found guilty of conspiracy to traffic 1 kilogram of cocaine and sentenced to 6 years imprisonment.

Khuan Minh Mac was found guilty of conspiracy to traffic 2 kilograms of methamphetamine and sentenced to 7 years imprisonment.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence for serious drug offences.

The Crown sought forfeiture of two properties under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act following the discovery of sophisticated marijuana grow operations.

The first property, a former Molson Brewery plant in Barrie, contained two large indoor grow operations operated by individuals convicted of production and trafficking offences.

The second property was a residential dwelling in Phelpston owned by a company controlled by the respondent's brother.

The Crown alleged that the property owners and their corporations were complicit in or colluded with the drug offences.

The respondents argued they were innocent third parties unaware of the illegal activities occurring on their properties.

The defendants applied for leave to cross-examine the affiant and sub-affiant on an application for authorization to intercept private communications, in the context of a Garofoli challenge.

They argued that investigative necessity had not been established and that police prematurely resorted to wiretap authorizations instead of pursuing conventional investigative techniques such as surveillance, informant development, and tracking orders.

The Crown opposed the request, submitting that the authorization materials fully described the investigative steps taken and that cross-examination was unnecessary.

The court held that there was no basis to permit cross-examination, noting there was no suggestion the affiant misled the authorizing judge and that the Garofoli review would proceed based on the existing materials.

The application for cross-examination was dismissed.

The accused brought an application seeking a stay of proceedings for unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter after approximately 34.5 months in custody awaiting trial on multiple drug and firearm trafficking charges arising from a large multi‑accused investigation.

Applying the framework from R. v. Morin and R. v. Askov, the court examined the allocation of delay between inherent time, defence actions, Crown conduct, and institutional delay.

The court found the prosecution involved complex multi‑accused proceedings, extensive disclosure, a preliminary inquiry including a Dawson application challenging wiretap authorizations, and multiple defence‑initiated adjournments and counsel changes.

Institutional delay was determined to be within acceptable limits and much of the elapsed time was attributable to inherent or defence‑related factors.

The applicant failed to establish significant prejudice beyond the normal hardships of pre‑trial custody.

The application for a stay of proceedings was therefore dismissed.