Joseph Selvaratnam

The applicant mortgagee brought a motion to vary a restraint order under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act to permit the sale of the subject property under power of sale.

The Crown consented to the sale, but the respondent owner opposed it, arguing the property had increased in value and disputing the mortgagee's claimed costs.

The court granted the motion to permit the sale, directing that the net proceeds be paid to the Crown.

The court declined to approve the mortgagee's claimed costs of over $388,000, directing that those funds be held by the Crown pending an assessment under Rule 58 and the final determination of the forfeiture proceedings.

A financial institution applied to vary a restraint order made under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act to permit a power of sale of property and payment of its mortgage debt from the proceeds before remitting the balance to the Crown.

The Attorney General opposed the variation, arguing that the mortgagee must first establish lack of complicity or collusion in the underlying drug activity.

The court held that the restraint order permitted sale by the mortgagee but required that all net proceeds, subject only to ordinary costs of sale, be remitted to the Crown unless and until the mortgagee established its entitlement through statutory restoration proceedings.

The court declined to determine the mortgagee’s innocence on the limited record and directed that such issues be addressed in the pending forfeiture proceedings.

The requested variation was therefore refused.

The applicants sought an order in the nature of certiorari to quash their committal to stand trial on a charge of production of Ephedrine.

They argued the preliminary hearing judge exceeded his jurisdiction by finding the added count arose from the same transaction as the original charges and by finding sufficient evidence for committal.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, holding that the preliminary hearing judge correctly applied the 'same transaction' rule under s. 548(1)(a) of the Criminal Code and properly assessed the circumstantial evidence in determining there was sufficient evidence to commit the applicants to trial.

The applicant corporation brought an application concerning a restraint order affecting property.

It was uncontested that neither the corporation nor its sole shareholder, officer, and director had been charged with any criminal offence related to the restraint order or the property.

The respondent did not dispute these facts and there was no cross‑examination on the supporting affidavit.

The court issued a supplementary endorsement confirming that these uncontested facts informed the earlier decision dismissing the application.

The applicant sought to vary an ex parte restraint order under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act to allow the sale of a property that had been used as a commercial marijuana grow operation.

The applicant wanted to use the sale proceeds to pay out a first mortgage held by a credit union before remitting the balance to the Attorney General.

The Attorney General opposed the payout, arguing that the mortgagee's innocence had not been established and should be determined at a forfeiture hearing.

The court dismissed the application, finding that it would be premature to allow the payout before a full hearing under s. 20 of the CDSA.

The appellant appealed her conviction and five-year sentence for possession of a substantial amount of methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking.

She argued the conviction was unreasonable and that the trial judge reversed the burden of proof.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge's factual and credibility findings supported a reasonable verdict.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as five years for drugs with a street value of approximately $200,000 was not unreasonable.

The appellant appealed her convictions on the basis that there was no evidence identifying her as the perpetrator of the alleged offences.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding no evidence linking the appellant to the co-accused, the mortgage applications, or the bank accounts.

The Court rejected the Crown's argument that the date of birth on the indictment could be used as evidence of identity.

The appeal was allowed, convictions set aside, and acquittals entered.