Aaron Wine

The court sentenced Idriss Buni for aggravated assault against his intimate partner, Muna Riyaleh, following a knife attack.

The court found the appropriate sentence to be 7.5 years’ imprisonment, less credit for pre-sentence custody and harsh conditions.

The decision discusses the applicable sentencing range for aggravated assault in the context of intimate partner violence, the impact of recent legislative amendments, and the balance of aggravating and mitigating factors.

The court imposed ancillary orders including a lifetime weapons prohibition, a DNA order, and a non-communication order.

The accused, Idriss Buni, was charged with aggravated assault and assault with a weapon against Muna Riyaleh.

The central issue was whether Ms. Riyaleh was the victim of an unprovoked knife attack by Mr. Buni or whether she attacked him and was injured during a struggle.

The court found Ms. Riyaleh to be a credible witness and rejected Mr. Buni’s account as contrived and inconsistent with the evidence.

The court was satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of Mr. Buni’s guilt and found him guilty as charged.

Martha Leibowitz was charged with breaching an undertaking condition that prohibited her from having contact with her condominium's property manager except through email.

The incident occurred on November 3, 2023, when she entered the property manager's office.

The Crown presented video evidence and the property manager's testimony.

Despite the defendant's submission that there was no sound recording and that she had to attend in person due to unanswered emails, the court found the Crown proved the breach beyond a reasonable doubt, leading to a finding of guilt.

The accused, Timothy Cormier, was charged with attempted murder and aggravated assault in relation to the stabbing of his sister.

He pleaded guilty to aggravated assault, and the trial proceeded on the attempted murder count.

The central issue was whether the accused possessed the specific intent to kill.

The court considered evidence of the accused's cognitive deficits, history of epilepsy, brain surgery, and a fixed delusional belief regarding the victim.

Despite these factors, the court found that the accused's actions, including bringing a concealed knife, the nature of the attack (multiple stabs to vital areas), his stated motive (considering abortion to be murder), and his post-offence conduct (disposing of evidence and lying to police/doctors), demonstrated a specific intent to kill.

The court rejected the accused's exculpatory statements as untruthful.

The accused was found guilty of attempted murder.

The defendants were found guilty of exercising control over the movements of a complainant to provide sexual services, receiving a material benefit, and advertising sexual services.

One defendant was also found guilty of trafficking MDMA.

The court found that while the defendants did not coerce the complainant into the sex trade, they exploited her serious drug dependency for financial gain.

The court sentenced A.M. to a global term of 24 months and M.P. to a global term of 18 months, ordered forfeiture of their cellphones as offence-related property, and granted pre-trial custody credit including for house arrest but not for curfews.

On a pre-trial Charter application in a multi-accused organized crime prosecution, the applicants sought to prevent disclosure of residential address information in the common disclosure brief.

The court held that immediate disclosure of one applicant’s home address engaged and would arbitrarily infringe his s. 7 rights because there was credible evidence of a prior attempt on his life, disclosure would materially increase the danger to him and his family, and the record did not establish any real present need for co-accused to know the precise address to make full answer and defence.

The court rejected arguments grounded in Stinchcombe, parity among accused, and avoidance of future disclosure litigation.

Relief was denied respecting the father’s address because the evidence did not establish danger to him or a sufficient causal connection.

The Crown was directed to work with defence counsel on redactions, and interim sealing orders were granted.

The defendants, A.M. and M.P., were charged with ten offences including human trafficking, exercising control or influence over a person, drug trafficking, uttering threats, and advertising sexual services.

The Crown's case relied heavily on the complainant, A.K., whose credibility and reliability were significantly challenged due to inconsistencies between her trial, preliminary inquiry, and police statements, and her admitted attempt to protect the accused.

The court found A.K. to be generally an honest witness but cautioned against relying solely on her testimony.

A.M. was found guilty of advertising sexual services (Count 5), exercising control over movements for sexual services (Count 4), receiving financial benefit from sexual services (Count 3), and trafficking Molly (Count 8).

M.P. was found guilty of advertising sexual services (Count 5), exercising control over movements for sexual services (Count 4), and receiving financial benefit from sexual services (Count 3).

All other charges, including human trafficking (Count 1), receiving financial benefit from human trafficking (Count 2), uttering threats (Count 6), assault (Count 7), and trafficking cocaine and cannabis (Counts 9 and 10), were dismissed for both defendants due to insufficient evidence or credibility concerns.

The accused was charged with injuring an animal contrary to section 445 of the Criminal Code and wilfully causing unnecessary suffering to an animal contrary to section 445.1 of the Criminal Code.

A small dog named Angel was brought to an emergency veterinary clinic with severe injuries including extensive bruising, internal bleeding, and severe head trauma.

The veterinarians concluded the injuries were consistent with multiple repeated blunt force trauma and could not have been caused by a cat attack as the accused claimed.

The accused had exclusive care of the dog while the owner was away.

The court found the accused guilty on both counts based on circumstantial evidence including his opportunity, his demonstrated frustration with the dog, his false explanation of the injuries, and his failure to seek veterinary care.

The defendants, charged with human trafficking and related offences, brought a pre-trial application under s. 276 of the Criminal Code to cross-examine the complainant on her history in the sex trade.

The Crown alleged the defendants used drugs to coerce the complainant into sex work.

The court applied the two-stage s. 276 framework, ruling that evidence of the complainant's prior sex work and subsequent sex work was inadmissible as it engaged the twin myths.

However, the court permitted cross-examination regarding the complainant's initial meeting with a third party and her independent sex work during the time of the allegations, finding this evidence relevant to the issue of coercion and not barred by s. 276.

The applicant, facing charges related to a serious motor vehicle collision, brought a pre-trial Charter application alleging his s. 8 rights were violated when a police officer smelled his breath while he was receiving medical treatment in a hospital.

He sought to excise this observation and his admission of 'drinking' from the Information to Obtain (ITO) the search warrant for his blood samples, and to exclude the blood evidence under s. 24(2).

The court dismissed the application, finding no s. 8 breach occurred in the hospital setting.

Furthermore, the court held that even if the impugned evidence were excised, the remaining facts in the ITO—including excessive speed, the nature of the collision, and the presence of intoxicants at the scene—provided ample grounds to issue the warrant.

The accused were charged with firearms offences after a gun was seized during a traffic stop.

They brought Charter applications to exclude the gun evidence under s. 24(2), alleging violations of their s. 8 (unreasonable search and seizure) and s. 9 (arbitrary detention) rights.

The court found that while the initial traffic stop was lawful, the police unlawfully detained the passenger, requested his identification without justification, and conducted an unlawful search of the vehicle based on a hunch, not reasonable grounds for a CDSA arrest.

Consequently, the court excluded the gun evidence against both accused, leading to their acquittal.

The accused was charged with Public Mischief for falsely accusing the complainant of assault following a night of drinking and intimacy.

The Crown presented evidence from the complainant, his mother, and a police officer.

The court found that the accused's allegations were intentionally false based on video surveillance evidence that contradicted her account, the complainant's credible testimony, and the accused's inconsistent statements to police.

The court found the accused guilty of Public Mischief.

The Crown applied without notice to adjourn a trial scheduled for the date of the hearing.

The accused was charged with Assault, Forcible Confinement, Failing to Comply with a Recognizance, and Mischief arising from an alleged altercation with his wife.

The Crown's primary reason for the adjournment was the lack of an available courtroom.

The complainant did not attend on the first day and was unable to remain on the second day due to childcare constraints.

The defence opposed the adjournment, citing restrictive bail conditions on the accused.

The court granted the adjournment, noting the systemic overbooking of trials in the jurisdiction and the practical impossibility of proceeding.

The court agreed to narrow the trial to one day instead of two and encouraged the Crown to consider amending restrictive bail conditions on consent.

The appellant appealed a conviction for dangerous driving arising from a rear-end collision allegedly caused by deliberate braking after an aggressive pass.

He argued the verdict was unreasonable, the trial judge applied uneven scrutiny to defence and Crown evidence, and the reasons disclosed bias.

The court held there was evidence on which the trial judge could reasonably convict, including accepted evidence that the appellant passed too closely and deliberately braked in anger.

The court further held the credibility analysis disclosed no reversible uneven scrutiny and no reasonable apprehension of bias.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sought to introduce fresh evidence.

The Crown conceded that if the fresh evidence was accepted, the appeal should be allowed.

The Court of Appeal found that the fresh evidence met the Palmer criteria, allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction, and ordered a new trial.

The accused was charged with failing to provide a suitable sample of breath into an approved screening device on December 12, 2010.

The Crown's case relied on two police officers with significantly divergent observations regarding the accused's sobriety and the sobriety of a female passenger.

The trial judge found material inconsistencies between the officers' evidence, particularly regarding whether alcohol was detected on the accused's breath and whether the female passenger was impaired.

These inconsistencies created reasonable doubt regarding the reliability of the investigation.

The accused was acquitted.

The appellants appealed their convictions for fraud and their sentences.

The Court of Appeal found the fraud convictions unreasonable because there was no admissible expert evidence explaining how the seized equipment operated to capture financial data.

The police officer who testified was not qualified to give such evidence.

The appeal was allowed, the fraud convictions were quashed, and acquittals were entered.

Consequently, the sentence for driving while disqualified was varied to time served.