Christina Sibian

The accused was charged with firearms and drug offences following the execution of a search warrant at a condominium unit where he was present.

The Crown's case for possession of items found in the main bedroom relied entirely on circumstantial evidence, including the presence of the accused's passport and clothing.

The court found that while the evidence created a strong suspicion, it did not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused had knowledge and control of the items, as other individuals had access to the unit and alternative reasonable inferences were available.

The accused was acquitted on all remaining counts.

The offender pleaded guilty to multiple firearms offences, including possession of a loaded prohibited firearm and overcapacity magazines.

The court considered the offender's background, including the impact of anti-Black racism, and the excessively harsh conditions of his presentence custody at the Toronto South Detention Centre.

Applying the Marshall framework, the court reduced the otherwise appropriate global sentence of 7.5 years to 6 years to account for the harsh conditions.

After applying statutory credit for presentence custody, the offender was sentenced to 1 year and 9 months of further incarceration.

The applicant, Melvin Ogbomo, applied to exclude evidence seized during a search of his residence, arguing the search warrant was facially and sub-facially invalid.

He alleged the affiant lacked subjective grounds, made misleading statements, and omitted material facts in the Information to Obtain (ITO).

The court found that while the affiant was careless and lacked training, his conduct was not deliberately misleading or subversive to the authorization process.

After amplifying the record to correct omissions, the court concluded there were still sufficient reasonable grounds to issue the warrant based on the shooting investigation and confidential source information.

The application to exclude evidence was dismissed.

The defendant was convicted of unlawful possession of a loaded prohibited firearm (Glock handgun), two counts of unlawful possession of overcapacity cartridge magazines, and breaches of a weapons prohibition order.

The Crown sought five years imprisonment; the defence sought a conditional sentence and probation.

The court imposed a global sentence of 17 months after accounting for Summers credit, Duncan consideration, Downes credit, and a three-month reduction for Charter breaches.

The sentencing considered the defendant's strong rehabilitative potential, experiences with systemic anti-Black racism, remorse, and family support, balanced against the serious nature of firearm offences and the need for denunciation and deterrence.

The accused was arrested on a Feeney warrant by the Emergency Task Force.

During the dynamic entry, an officer stomped on the accused's head, causing injury.

Police subsequently searched a backpack found in the unit, discovering cocaine and cash, which they used to obtain a search warrant for the unit.

The search yielded a loaded prohibited firearm, ammunition, and large quantities of drugs.

The court found breaches of the accused's s. 7 rights (excessive force) and s. 8 rights (unlawful search of the backpack and unit), but declined to exclude the evidence under s. 24(2) due to the high public interest in adjudicating the serious firearm and drug charges.

At trial, the accused was acquitted of the drug charges due to reasonable doubt about his knowledge and control of the substances, but convicted of the firearm charges based on his admission of ownership.

Paul Molinari appealed his convictions for impaired driving and "over 80" following a collision.

He argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence and made palpable and overriding factual errors regarding his post-collision alcohol consumption, knowledge of police attendance, and the nature of the collision.

The appeal court found no material misapprehension of evidence or palpable and overriding errors, concluding that the trial judge's findings were open to her on the evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for impaired driving, arguing that the trial judge erred in admitting statements made in the breath room, that the trial judge was biased, and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no Charter violation regarding the breath room statements, no evidence of judicial bias, and no ineffective assistance of counsel.

The court preferred the evidence of trial counsel over the appellant regarding the circumstances surrounding the agreed statement of facts and trial strategy.

Following a conviction on one count of sexual assault, the defendant brought an application to re-open the trial and seek a mistrial based on fresh evidence that emerged in the victim's impact statement.

The fresh evidence revealed that the complainant had pre-existing mental health conditions and was taking multiple medications at the time of the alleged assault, information that had not been disclosed during trial.

The defendant's former counsel had relied on a health history form completed by the complainant that failed to disclose these conditions.

The court found that the fresh evidence was material and could have affected the verdict, particularly regarding the complainant's credibility and reliability as a witness.

The court granted the application to re-open and declared a mistrial, finding that the trial judge could not objectively reassess the complainant's credibility without creating an appearance of bias.

The appellant appealed her conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80 mg, arguing the trial judge erred in dismissing her s. 11(b) Charter application for unreasonable delay.

The appeal court upheld the trial judge's calculation of defence delay, noting that defence counsel was unavailable for 17 blocks of trial dates offered by the court.

The net delay fell below the presumptive ceiling, and the appellant failed to demonstrate a sustained effort to expedite the proceedings or that the case took markedly longer than it reasonably should have.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown applied for an order permitting a 12-year-old complainant from British Columbia to testify by video link in a sexual assault and sexual interference trial.

Alternatively, the Crown sought an order permitting testimony via closed-circuit television.

The defendant opposed the video link application but did not oppose the closed-circuit television application, though he sought to cross-examine the witness from within the closed-circuit television room rather than from the courtroom.

The court granted the video link application, permitting the complainant to testify remotely from British Columbia, and addressed the placement of defence counsel during examination.

The Crown charged the defendant with impaired driving and driving with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The defendant was found slumped over the steering wheel of a running vehicle in a parking lot.

The Crown established that the defendant occupied the driver's seat of a running motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit.

The defendant's evidence that he did not intend to drive and was merely waiting for a ride was rejected as not credible.

The court found the defendant guilty of impaired driving and stayed the over 80 charge pursuant to R. v. Kienapple.

The accused, a massage therapist, was charged with two counts of sexual assault involving two different clients.

The court first ruled that the accused's videotaped statement to police upon arrest was admissible to show his reaction and state of mind, but not for the truth of its contents.

Applying the W.(D.) framework to assess credibility, the court found both complainants credible and noted striking similarities in their accounts.

However, the court was left with a reasonable doubt regarding the first complainant's allegation due to frailties in her evidence and general corroboration from the accused's police statement.

The court found the accused guilty of sexually assaulting the second complainant, rejecting his general denial and finding her evidence compelling and reliable.

The Crown brought an application to admit similar fact evidence across two counts of sexual assault alleged by two separate complainants against a massage therapist.

The accused opposed the application, arguing that the second complainant's evidence was unintentionally tainted by media reports of the first complaint, and that the accounts were too dissimilar.

The court found no evidence of actual or unintentional collusion.

Applying the test for similar fact evidence, the court held that the two accounts shared significant similarities, including the specific nature of the inappropriate touching during the massages.

The court concluded that the probative value of the evidence in assessing credibility and rebutting defences outweighed any potential prejudice, and granted the application.

The accused was convicted by a jury of aggravated assault.

During deliberations, the jury inquired whether misidentification of the victim relieved the accused of intent.

The court ruled that the doctrine of transferred intent applied, meaning the accused's potential misidentification of the victim did not negate the intent to apply force, as the intention was transferred from the intended victim to the actual victim.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault against a 17-year-old complainant.

On appeal, the court found that the trial judge committed several errors, primarily misapprehending the complainant's evidence regarding her prior inconsistent statements and deliberate falsehoods to the police.

The trial judge failed to adequately scrutinize the complainant's explanations for these inconsistencies and omissions, which were central to her credibility.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction was quashed, and a new trial was ordered.

The defendant brought a motion to sever two counts of sexual assault involving two separate complainants, seeking to have two separate trials during a scheduled four-day trial period.

The Crown opposed the application, intending to bring a similar fact application between the counts.

The court applied the "interests of justice" test under section 591(3) of the Criminal Code, considering factors including general prejudice, legal and factual nexus, testimonial intention, avoidance of multiplicity of proceedings, and the viability of a similar fact application.

The court found that while some factors favoured severance, the viability of the similar fact application and the truth-seeking function of the trial weighed significantly against severance.

The application was dismissed.

The accused, Peter Korgbor, was charged with aggravated assault and assault with a weapon.

During a pre-charge conference, the court considered whether the defence of self-defence should be put to the jury.

The court applied the "air of reality" test, reviewing the evidence from Crown witnesses regarding the altercation where the accused stabbed one individual and assaulted another with a knife.

The court found no direct or circumstantial evidence to support a reasonable belief that force was being used or threatened against the accused, nor that his actions were for defensive purposes or objectively reasonable in the circumstances.

Consequently, the court declined to leave the defence of self-defence with the jury, concluding that doing so would invite speculation.

The appellant, Fawzi Kamakh, appealed his conviction for criminal harassment under s. 264(2) of the Criminal Code.

The appeal was based on three grounds: ineffective assistance of trial counsel, the trial judge's refusal to allow further cross-examination of the complainant after a Browne v. Dunn issue arose, and insufficient evidence to support a finding of guilt.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding no miscarriage of justice due to counsel's conduct given the overwhelming evidence, deeming the cross-examination issue moot as the Crown did not rely on the reply evidence, and affirming that the mens rea elements for criminal harassment were met, as the appellant knew or was wilfully blind to the complainant's harassment and fear for her safety.

The appellant appealed his conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80 mg.

He argued that the arresting officer lacked reasonable grounds for the breath demand, that his identity as the driver was not proven, and that the breath tests were not administered 'as soon as practicable'.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge made no errors in concluding that reasonable grounds existed, that the appellant was the driver, and that the breath tests were administered within a reasonably prompt time following the collision.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and operating with excess blood alcohol following an erratic driving report.

A Charter application was brought to exclude evidence obtained following an alleged violation of the right to counsel under section 10(b).

The court found that police delayed providing the right to counsel for 26 minutes after arrest, constituting a breach.

Under section 24(2) analysis, the court excluded the breath sample evidence as the breach was serious and the impact on the accused's Charter rights was significant.

However, the court found the accused guilty of the included offence of care or control while impaired, as the Crown established the accused was in the driver's seat with keys in possession and was heavily intoxicated, presenting a realistic risk of danger.