Tyler MacDonald

Following the accused's conviction for manslaughter, the Crown applied for a section 752.1 assessment to determine whether the accused might be declared a Dangerous Offender or Long-term Offender.

The court granted the application, finding reasonable grounds to believe the accused could be found to be a Dangerous Offender based on the brutality of the killing.

The court rejected the defence argument that the accused's ability to control his mental illness while in custody and his response to provocation negated the assessment order.

The accused, Rico Harvey, was charged with second-degree murder.

The Crown sought to admit two statements made by the accused to the police.

Defence counsel argued that the statements were not voluntary and that the accused's s. 10(b) Charter rights were violated.

The court found that the police violated the accused's s. 10(b) Charter rights by continuing the first interview despite his expressed dissatisfaction with legal advice and his vulnerable mental state.

The second statement was found to be tainted by the first due to temporal, contextual, and causal connections, including lack of food and sleep.

Applying the Grant factors, the court excluded both statements under s. 24(2) of the Charter, finding the impact on the accused's rights serious and society's interest in adjudication on the merits favoring exclusion given the reliability of other evidence.

The court also found a reasonable doubt regarding the voluntariness of both statements due to oppressive circumstances.

The accused, an immigration consultant and his IT company, were charged with misrepresentation and counselling misrepresentation under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act relating to Syrian refugee sponsorship applications.

At the close of the Crown's case, the accused brought a motion for a directed verdict, arguing there was insufficient evidence.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the motion, finding that the Crown had presented circumstantial evidence reasonably capable of supporting inferences of guilt regarding the source of settlement funds and the collection of fees, which must be left to the jury to weigh.

Paul Molinari appealed his convictions for impaired driving and "over 80" following a collision.

He argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence and made palpable and overriding factual errors regarding his post-collision alcohol consumption, knowledge of police attendance, and the nature of the collision.

The appeal court found no material misapprehension of evidence or palpable and overriding errors, concluding that the trial judge's findings were open to her on the evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The young person, convicted of second-degree murder and sentenced to seven years (four in secure custody, three under conditional supervision), appeared for a mandatory annual review of his sentence under s. 94(1) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The young person sought early release to conditional supervision in the community, citing his progress in custody.

The court acknowledged the young person's academic and behavioural improvements but found that he remained in the early stages of therapeutic gain and that his progress was insufficient to justify a change in sentence.

Balancing the needs of the young person with the interests of society, the court confirmed the original sentence, emphasizing the need for continued rehabilitation and accountability for the serious nature of the offence.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for driving with a blood-alcohol level over 80 mgs.

The trial judge found a breach of the appellant's right to counsel under s. 10(b) of the Charter but admitted the Intoxilyzer results under s. 24(2).

On appeal, the court found the trial judge erred in his s. 24(2) analysis by treating the appellant's acquittal on the companion impaired driving charge as an alternative remedy.

Conducting a fresh s. 24(2) analysis, the appeal court concluded the s. 10(b) breach was minor and had minimal impact on the appellant's Charter-protected interests.

Given the high reliability and importance of the breath samples, the evidence was admissible.

The appeal was dismissed.

A youth, T.J.T., convicted of second-degree murder, faced a Crown application for an adult sentence under the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The court assessed the presumption of diminished moral blameworthiness and the sufficiency of a youth sentence for accountability.

Considering T.J.T.'s difficult upbringing, immaturity at the time of the offence, and significant rehabilitative progress in custody, the court found the presumption of diminished moral blameworthiness was not rebutted.

Consequently, a youth sentence was imposed, consisting of the maximum four years in custody followed by three years of conditional supervision, with no credit for pre-sentence custody to ensure sufficient accountability and rehabilitation.

The accused was charged with care or control of a vehicle while impaired by alcohol and with a blood alcohol content exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres.

Police responded to a report of an impaired driver asleep in a running vehicle in an apartment parking lot.

The accused was detained and questioned for approximately four to five minutes before being advised of his right to counsel.

The court found a violation of section 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms but determined that the breath readings should not be excluded under section 24(2).

However, the court acquitted the accused on the impaired count due to credibility findings regarding the officer's evidence, while convicting on the over 80 count based on the breath test results.

During a trial for first-degree murder, the Crown applied to admit a photograph of the deceased victim in the vehicle.

The defence objected on the basis that the photograph was inflammatory and lacked probative value.

The court ruled the photograph was of little to no probative value and excluded it, instead permitting the Crown to use leading questions to establish the non-contentious facts regarding the victim's position and gunshot wounds.

The applicants, charged with first-degree murder and attempted murder in a drive-by shooting, sought to limit the proposed testimony of the lead police investigator regarding video surveillance.

The Crown intended to have the officer testify that he identified the suspect vehicle following the victims' vehicle on the video.

Applying the principles from Walizadah, the court ruled that the officer could not testify that the vehicles on the video were similar or consistent with the vehicles involved in the shooting.

The officer was permitted only to place the videos in context regarding time and location and direct the jury's attention to specific times and vehicles, leaving the ultimate finding of fact to the jury.

The accused pleaded guilty to three counts of trafficking heroin in a commercial dial-a-dope operation.

The court weighed aggravating factors, including the nature of the drug and the commercial enterprise, against mitigating factors such as the accused's lack of a relevant criminal record, remorse, and community support.

The court imposed a sentence of 3.5 years, reduced to 2.5 years after granting 1 year of credit for time spent on strict house arrest bail.

The accused sought a bail review after a justice of the peace ordered detention on the secondary and tertiary grounds in relation to multiple alleged sexual assaults and robberies against sex workers.

The applicant argued that the justice of the peace erred by undermining the presumption of innocence and misapplying the tertiary ground, and that new evidence regarding GPS or RF ankle monitoring constituted a material change in circumstances.

The court held that the justice of the peace properly applied the presumption of innocence and was entitled to comment on the strength of the Crown’s case.

Applying the principles from St-Cloud, the court found no error in the tertiary ground analysis and concluded that the proposed electronic monitoring did not constitute a material change affecting the detention decision.

The bail review was dismissed.

During a trial for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, the Crown sought to introduce a videotaped statement made by the accused to police.

A voir dire was held to determine the voluntariness of the statement and to hear a defence application alleging a breach of section 10(b) of the Charter.

The court ruled the statement inadmissible, finding a reasonable doubt as to its voluntariness due to an unexplained gap in the evidence regarding a significant conversation between the accused and unidentified officers prior to the interview.

Furthermore, the court found that the police breached the accused's right to counsel by failing to ensure he understood he was speaking to a lawyer, and that the statement would have been excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter in any event.

The accused was charged with possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime.

At the close of the Crown's case, the accused brought an application for a directed verdict of acquittal on the proceeds of crime charge, arguing the evidence was entirely circumstantial and insufficient to support a conviction.

The court applied the test for a directed verdict, engaging in a limited weighing of the circumstantial evidence.

The court found that the large quantity of drugs and cash found on the accused could reasonably support an inference that he had been trafficking prior to his arrest.

The application for a directed verdict was dismissed.

The accused brought a Corbett application to exclude his prior criminal record from cross-examination if he chose to testify.

The Crown conceded that a prior drug possession conviction would not be used, but sought to cross-examine the accused on three 1998 convictions for failing to comply with a recognizance.

The accused argued the convictions were too remote and not relevant to credibility as they were not crimes of dishonesty.

The court dismissed the application, finding that failure to comply with a recognizance involves a breach of trust relevant to credibility, and that despite their age, the probative value of the convictions outweighed the minimal potential for prejudice.

The appellant appealed summary conviction findings of guilt for impaired operation, driving with excess blood alcohol, dangerous operation, and failing to remain at the scene of an accident.

The appellant argued that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence regarding the route taken by the fleeing driver compared to the police canine tracking route, and failed to properly consider discrepancies between witness descriptions and the appellant’s appearance.

The appellant further submitted that the trial judge failed to properly account for the frailties of eyewitness identification evidence.

The court held that the trial judge was aware of and considered the alleged inconsistencies and identification frailties, and that any discrepancies were not material misapprehensions affecting the verdict.

The court concluded that the trial judge’s findings were open on the evidence and disclosed no reversible error.

The two accused, both young first offenders, were convicted by a jury for their roles in a robbery and aggravated assault.

The female accused lured the victim to a parking lot where he was attacked by the male accused and an unknown third party wielding a metal baton.

The female accused was convicted of robbery as an aider but acquitted of aggravated assault.

The male accused was convicted of both offences.

The court weighed the serious nature of the offences against the offenders' strong rehabilitative prospects and strict bail conditions.

The female accused was sentenced to 45 days intermittent imprisonment and the male accused to 90 days intermittent imprisonment (after pre-sentence credit), both followed by two years of probation.

The accused brought an application to exclude evidence of drugs found during a vehicle search, arguing his arrest was arbitrary and the search violated his s. 8 Charter rights.

The police had intercepted communications and conducted surveillance indicating the accused was transporting drugs.

The court found the police had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the accused based on this evidence.

The subsequent search of the vehicle was a valid search incident to arrest, and as a passenger, the accused had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle.

The application to exclude evidence was dismissed.

The accused brought a motion to sever multiple drug trafficking and possession for the purpose of trafficking counts so that each would be tried separately before a jury.

The defence argued that the accused intended to testify on some counts but not others and that a joint trial would undermine the right to remain silent by exposing the accused to cross‑examination on all counts.

Applying the interests of justice framework from R. v. Last, the court considered both the accused’s fair trial rights and society’s interest in efficient proceedings.

The court concluded that trying the possession counts together with the earlier trafficking counts could create unfairness if the accused chose to testify on some counts but not others.

Counts 3 and 4 were severed from counts 1 and 2, while counts 1 and 2 remained joined for trial.

The accused was charged with identity theft and immigration fraud under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.

He brought a pre-trial application seeking a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, arguing that the 32-month delay from his arrest to the scheduled trial date was unreasonable.

The court found that the delay significantly exceeded the Morin guidelines and that the Crown failed to provide a reasonable justification, particularly regarding the lengthy preliminary inquiry and late disclosure.

Finding both presumed and actual prejudice due to restrictive bail conditions, the court granted the application and stayed the proceedings.