Julie Annette Battersby

The accused, G.S., brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging a violation of his right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b).

The total delay from charge to anticipated end of trial was 635 days, exceeding the 18-month (547-day) presumptive ceiling for provincial courts.

The court deducted 14 days conceded by the defence and a further 72 days for defence-requested adjournments for resolution discussions post-Judicial Pre-Trial (JPT), finding this delay directly attributable to the defence.

The court also recognized the COVID-19 pandemic as an exceptional circumstance, deducting 20 days for administrative scheduling policy changes and an additional 90 days for the systemic backlog's impact on court resources in Scarborough.

After these deductions, the net delay was calculated at 439 days, falling below the presumptive ceiling.

The court found that the Crown had taken reasonable steps to mitigate delay and that the defence had not demonstrated sustained efforts to expedite proceedings.

Consequently, the application for a stay of proceedings was dismissed.

The accused, IA, was charged with multiple sexual offences against the complainant, KH.

The case centered on credibility, with conflicting accounts of the sexual encounter.

The court, applying principles from R. v. W.(D.) and R. v. Ewanchuk, found IA's evidence credible and reliable.

The Crown failed to disprove consent beyond a reasonable doubt, leading to IA's acquittal on all counts.

The accused was charged with being an accessory after the fact to attempted murder, obstructing justice, and breaching a recognizance.

The Crown's case relied heavily on statements made by the accused to Detective Constable Pyke immediately following his arrest.

The trial judge found that the accused's Charter rights under s. 10(b) were violated when the officer elicited statements from him after he had invoked his right to counsel but before he had an opportunity to speak with counsel.

The statements were excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

Additionally, the trial judge found insufficient evidence of the accused's knowledge of the specific offence for which the other person was wanted.

On the breach of recognizance charge, the trial judge found that the pellet gun found in the accused's residence did not meet the definition of a firearm or weapon as defined in the Criminal Code, and therefore did not constitute a breach of the recognizance as worded.

The accused was acquitted on all counts.

The Crown applied to have Ali Butt declared a Dangerous Offender following his guilty pleas to two charges of criminal harassment and two charges of threatening death.

Butt opposed the Dangerous Offender designation but conceded that the criteria for a Long Term Offender were met.

The court found that a pattern of violent conduct had been established, meeting the requirements of ss. 753(1)(a)(i) and (ii) of the Criminal Code, and that there was a high likelihood of harmful recidivism.

However, the court was not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that Butt's conduct was intractable, considering his treatment prospects, willingness to engage in therapy, and developing insight.

Consequently, the Dangerous Offender designation was denied.

Butt was declared a Long Term Offender and sentenced to two years' imprisonment for criminal harassment and threatening death, along with an eight-year Long Term Supervision Order.

Simeon Harty was found guilty by a jury of second-degree murder and discharging a firearm with intent.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the use of a firearm, the offender's criminal record, and being on judicial interim release in violation of conditions.

Mitigating factors included his youth, pro-social behavior, community contributions, positive conduct in detention, and rehabilitation prospects.

The jury recommended 10 years parole ineligibility.

The court, comparing the case to R. v. Grant, imposed a life sentence with 14 years of parole ineligibility for murder and a concurrent 10-year sentence (7 years 7 months after pre-sentence custody credit) for discharging a firearm with intent.

Ancillary orders for DNA, weapons prohibition, and no-contact were also made.

The Crown applied for an order to permit two police officers to give non-expert opinion evidence identifying the accused from surveillance video in a first-degree murder and attempted murder trial.

The defence resisted the application.

The court found that both officers met the threshold for giving such evidence, having prior acquaintance with the accused and being in a better position than the jury to make the identification due to changes in the accused's appearance and their close interactions.

The court acknowledged potential issues regarding the weight of the evidence and prejudice from prior police contact but ruled the evidence admissible, inviting counsel to minimize the prejudicial risk.

The accused, Khalife Bartholomew, was found guilty by a jury of multiple firearm-related offences, including break and enter and theft of a firearm, conspiracy, possession of firearms in a vehicle, possession of firearms without a license, possession of firearms obtained by crime, and possession of property obtained by crime.

This decision outlines the sentencing, considering aggravating factors such as the involvement of firearms and mitigating factors including the accused's youth, lack of prior criminal record, family ties, and participation as an aider rather than instigator.

The court applied sentencing principles of deterrence, denunciation, proportionality, and restraint, ultimately imposing a global sentence of two years less a day, with credit for pre-trial custody, resulting in 18 months in custody, followed by three years of probation, a 10-year weapons prohibition, and a DNA order.

The Crown sought an assessment order under s. 752.1 of the Criminal Code for an offender who pleaded guilty to three counts of assault, one count of assault with a weapon, and two counts of failing to comply with a recognizance.

The Crown indicated its intention to seek either a dangerous offender or long-term offender designation.

The offender had no prior criminal record but exhibited a pattern of repetitive, bizarre stalking and assault behaviour targeting women in apartment building lobbies and elevators over a three-week period in 2016, followed by a breach of bail conditions and a subsequent assault with a pellet gun.

The offender had a documented history of mental illness including schizoaffective disorder, paranoid delusions, and violent ideation.

The defence argued that the offender's conduct was not serious enough to warrant an assessment.

The court found that reasonable grounds existed to believe the offender might be found to be either a dangerous or long-term offender and ordered an assessment.

The accused was convicted after trial of assault with a weapon and assault causing bodily harm following a stabbing incident at a bar.

The Crown sought 15-18 months imprisonment, while the defence sought a suspended sentence with probation.

The court imposed a 90-day intermittent sentence for assault with a weapon and a 15-month conditional sentence for assault causing bodily harm, to be served consecutively, along with a one-year probation term.

A weapons prohibition and DNA order were also imposed.

The conviction for possession of a weapon for a purpose dangerous to the public peace was stayed.

The accused was charged with assault with a weapon, assault causing bodily harm, and possession of a weapon dangerous to the public peace following an altercation at a bar.

The accused admitted to stabbing the complainant with a knife but claimed self-defense.

The court found that while force was being used against the accused and the stabbing may have been intended for self-defense, the stabbing was not reasonable in the circumstances.

The accused was the aggressor, initiated physical contact, was the first to draw and unsheathe his knife, and had multiple opportunities to de-escalate the conflict.

The court convicted on all three counts.

The accused was charged with obstructing a police officer by misidentifying himself.

The Crown's case relied on identification evidence from two officers: PC Perilli, who arrested the accused at a motel and later identified him in a YouTube video, and PC Gorski, who provided recognition evidence based on prior dealings with the accused.

The central issue was whether the Crown proved the accused's identity beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court found significant flaws in the identification procedure, including the absence of a critical cell phone photo used for comparison, inconsistencies between officer accounts, and the poor quality of surveillance video.

The court concluded that while individual officers expressed certainty, the reliability of the identification process was compromised, leaving reasonable doubt as to identity.

The accused, J.A., facing charges of first-degree murder and attempt murder, applied to be permitted to sit at counsel table during his jury trial instead of the prisoner's dock.

The application was based on concerns about potential unfair adverse inferences by the jury, the absence of security concerns, and the desire for more meaningful participation in the trial.

The court reviewed the principles governing a trial judge's discretion in seating the accused, noting that the customary position is the dock and that this does not inherently violate Charter rights unless it manifestly precludes the accused from making full answer and defence.

Expert testimony from a criminologist regarding mock trial studies suggesting juror prejudice was considered but ultimately dismissed due to methodological limitations and the inability to replicate a real trial's solemnity and dynamics.

The court emphasized the importance of trusting jurors to follow instructions on the presumption of innocence and the burden of proof.

The application was denied.

The accused sought release on bail following charges including forcible entry, carrying a concealed weapon, possession of prohibited weapons, pointing a firearm, assault with a weapon, aggravated assault, and forcible confinement.

The Crown alleged the accused was the main perpetrator in a violent home invasion and assault that resulted in serious injuries to the victim.

The accused testified in his own defence, claiming limited involvement and self-defence.

The court found the Crown's case reasonably strong but granted bail with stringent conditions, including residence outside Toronto with a substantial surety and monitoring requirements.

The accused was convicted of two counts of criminal harassment and two counts of failure to comply with probation.

While on probation for prior criminal harassment of another woman, he repeatedly contacted the complainant via Facebook despite police caution and her non-response.

The accused exhibited signs of erotomania and a delusional disorder, believing the complainant reciprocated his affections despite clear evidence to the contrary.

The court imposed a global sentence of 15 months imprisonment with 3 years probation, including strict no-contact conditions and mandatory mental health treatment.

At a preliminary inquiry, the Crown presented evidence regarding Marlon Marshall's alleged involvement in four counts each of robbery, wear disguise, use of an imitation firearm, and one count of possession of property obtained by crime.

The Crown discharged Marshall on four counts of robbery with a firearm.

The court examined whether sufficient evidence existed to commit Marshall for trial on the remaining charges.

The court found overwhelming evidence on the January 10 robbery charge and committed Marshall for trial on all remaining counts, including the December 16, November 24, and December 8 robberies, based on circumstantial evidence of identity including similar modus operandi, physical descriptions, apparel, weaponry, and cumulative similarities across the offences.