Aghi Balachandran

The applicant sought a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter due to unreasonable delay.

The court applied the *Jordan* framework, noting it was a transitional case.

The total delay, calculated from the date the information was sworn to the anticipated end of trial, was 28 months and 12 days, which was below the 30-month presumptive ceiling for Superior Court cases.

The defence conceded 14 days of delay.

The court rejected the defence's argument to include pre-charge delay in the s. 11(b) calculation and found no actual prejudice to the right to a fair trial under ss. 7 and 11(d) due to pre-charge delay or missing evidence.

The court found the defence took meaningful steps to expedite, but the proceedings did not markedly exceed reasonable time requirements.

The application for a stay was dismissed.

The Crown sought an assessment order under s. 752.1 of the Criminal Code for an offender who pleaded guilty to three counts of assault, one count of assault with a weapon, and two counts of failing to comply with a recognizance.

The Crown indicated its intention to seek either a dangerous offender or long-term offender designation.

The offender had no prior criminal record but exhibited a pattern of repetitive, bizarre stalking and assault behaviour targeting women in apartment building lobbies and elevators over a three-week period in 2016, followed by a breach of bail conditions and a subsequent assault with a pellet gun.

The offender had a documented history of mental illness including schizoaffective disorder, paranoid delusions, and violent ideation.

The defence argued that the offender's conduct was not serious enough to warrant an assessment.

The court found that reasonable grounds existed to believe the offender might be found to be either a dangerous or long-term offender and ordered an assessment.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for impaired care or control of a motor vehicle following a single-car accident.

He argued the trial judge erred in applying the statutory presumption of care or control and in her interpretation of the 'risk of danger' element from Boudreault.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge correctly concluded the appellant had not rebutted the presumption of care or control, as he was found in the driver's seat with the engine running and failed to prove a change in his intention to drive.

The court also affirmed that the Boudreault risk of danger analysis is subsumed when the Crown successfully relies on the statutory presumption.

The applicant was charged with impaired driving and over 80 following a single-vehicle collision.

The applicant brought a Garofoli application to exclude blood sample evidence obtained by search warrant, alleging that the Information to Obtain was legally deficient and violated Charter section 8 rights against unreasonable search and seizure.

The applicant challenged three areas: the characterization of the odour of alcohol, the stated reasons for inability to provide a breath sample, and the adequacy of the police investigation into the collision circumstances.

The court found that while certain statements in the affidavit were erroneous or omitted, after excision and proper amplification, reasonable and probable grounds remained for the warrant's issuance.

The application was dismissed.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while over 80 and impaired operation following a single-vehicle collision.

Police found the accused trapped in the driver's seat of a heavily damaged vehicle at 4:00 a.m.

Blood samples taken at 6:30 a.m. showed a BAC of 167 mgs per 100 mls, with expert evidence establishing the BAC at the time of collision would have been 172-222 mgs per 100 mls.

The Crown failed to establish the specific time of driving.

The court dismissed the operation charges but convicted on the included offence of care or control, finding the statutory presumption applied and was not rebutted.

The court also found a realistic risk of danger existed.

Appellant appealed his conviction for driving while suspended contrary to the Highway Traffic Act.

The trial Justice of the Peace found that the appellant failed to establish due diligence on a balance of probabilities.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred in finding that he had not proven a postal strike occurred and that he had failed to establish due diligence.

The appeal court upheld the conviction, finding that driving while suspended is a strict liability offence, and once the Crown proves the actus reus, the burden shifts to the defendant to prove due diligence.

The court found the appellant's evidence regarding the postal strike was vague and insufficient, and his failure to follow up on an unpaid ticket demonstrated a lack of due diligence.