S. A. McCartan

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with over 80 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of blood.

Following a domestic incident call and traffic stop, police conducted a roadside approved screening device test which resulted in a fail.

The accused was arrested and provided two breath samples at the detachment with readings of 100 mg and 90 mg.

The defence challenged the admission of the certificate of analysis on multiple Charter and non-Charter grounds, including the timing of the roadside demand, the legality of the warrantless search and seizure, the proper operation of the intoxilyzer, and the availability of remedies under sections 24(1) and 24(2) of the Charter.

The court found no Charter violations and admitted the evidence, finding the accused guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was charged with assaulting his young daughter, causing her bodily harm, and breaching a probation order.

The Crown's case was circumstantial, relying on evidence that the child was uninjured when placed in her crib but bore significant bruising when arriving at hospital approximately three hours later.

The Crown argued the accused was the only person with opportunity to cause the injuries.

The defence argued the Crown had not proven guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

The court found significant credibility issues with both the Crown's primary witness and the accused's testimony, and admitted hearsay evidence from the accused's older son suggesting the mother may have caused the injuries.

The court concluded that while the mother's involvement could not be eliminated as a possibility, and a remote possibility of self-injury existed, the Crown had not proven the accused's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

The accused was acquitted on both charges.

The accused was charged with driving with over 80 milligrams of alcohol contrary to the Criminal Code.

The accused brought Charter applications seeking exclusion of breath test evidence on grounds of breaches of sections 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found multiple Charter breaches: (1) a breach of section 10(b) rights due to a 10-minute delay in providing rights to counsel following arrest; (2) a breach of sections 8 and 9 rights due to an 11-minute delay in making the breath demand without reasonable justification; (3) a breach of section 8 rights due to video recording of the accused using the toilet without his knowledge or consent, with his genitals clearly visible on multiple occasions; and (4) a breach of section 10(b) rights due to police questioning the accused about the offence after he indicated he wished to speak to counsel but before he had an opportunity to do so.

The court excluded the breath test evidence pursuant to section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that the cumulative effect of the Charter breaches, combined with the serious invasion of privacy and the lack of justification for the police conduct, outweighed society's interest in adjudication on the merits.

The accused pleaded guilty to dangerous driving and assaulting a police sergeant with intent to resist arrest.

The Crown proceeded summarily and sought 90 days imprisonment served intermittently, while defence counsel sought a conditional discharge.

The court rejected the conditional discharge as inappropriate and contrary to the public interest, finding that the accused's conduct—fleeing from police at speeds exceeding 120 km/h and resisting arrest—posed serious risks to public safety.

Instead, the court imposed a conditional sentence of 90 days to be served in the community, followed by two years probation, with strict conditions including house arrest, a driving prohibition, community service, and a DNA order.

The Crown appealed a sentencing decision where the trial judge rejected a joint submission for 30 days imprisonment on two counts of driving while suspended contrary to section 53(1) of the Highway Traffic Act, instead imposing 18 months probation.

The appellate court found that the trial judge applied an incorrect standard by finding the proposed sentence "excessive" rather than determining whether it was contrary to the public interest and would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The court held that the 30-day sentence was within the reasonable range and that the trial judge erred in undercutting the joint submission.

The appeals were dismissed as the accused had completed the probation period.

Appellant appealed his conviction for driving while suspended contrary to the Highway Traffic Act.

The trial Justice of the Peace found that the appellant failed to establish due diligence on a balance of probabilities.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred in finding that he had not proven a postal strike occurred and that he had failed to establish due diligence.

The appeal court upheld the conviction, finding that driving while suspended is a strict liability offence, and once the Crown proves the actus reus, the burden shifts to the defendant to prove due diligence.

The court found the appellant's evidence regarding the postal strike was vague and insufficient, and his failure to follow up on an unpaid ticket demonstrated a lack of due diligence.

The accused was charged with one count of sexual assault following an incident in which the complainant alleged she was forced to perform fellatio on the accused while in his taxi.

The accused's defence was that the complainant had voluntarily offered to perform the act as payment for her cab fare.

The court rejected the accused's testimony as incredible and unbelievable, finding it inconsistent with reason and common sense.

Despite various credibility challenges to the complainant's evidence, the court found her testimony credible on the essential issue of lack of consent and convicted the accused of sexual assault.

The Crown appealed a sentence imposed by a Justice of the Peace on the respondent for multiple driving-related offences, including six counts of driving while suspended, driving without a valid permit, and failure to surrender insurance.

The Justice of the Peace imposed intermittent sentences totalling approximately 25 days, concurrent probation with a 45-day house arrest condition.

The Crown argued that the house arrest provision constituted an impermissible conditional sentence under the Provincial Offences Act.

The appellate court found that conditional sentences are not available under provincial legislation and that the Justice of the Peace erred in imposing house arrest as a sentencing option.

However, the Crown sought only a declaration on the legal issue and did not seek re-sentencing, as the respondent had substantially completed the sentence.

The appeal was dismissed without re-sentencing.