Nathalie Gregson

This endorsement addresses costs following a 10-day trial to change a 2015 final order concerning parenting and child support.

Both the applicant father and respondent mother sought costs, each claiming to be the successful party.

The court found mixed success, noting that while the mother had more individual issue wins, the father succeeded on more substantive issues, including maintaining three weekends of access per month and the imputation of his income at $30,000.00.

The court also found both parties had behaved unreasonably and in bad faith over the years, contributing to ongoing conflict.

Considering the father's more favourable Offer to Settle and the principle of proportionality, the court awarded the father reduced costs.

The parties, parents of two children, sought to vary a 2015 final order regarding custody, access, and child support due to ongoing high conflict and differing interpretations of the order.

The court found a material change in circumstances due to worsening conflict and non-compliance.

The decision addressed communication, telephone calls, decision-making, access to information, regular access schedules, summer vacation, Christmas, Mother's/Father's Day, March Break, Thanksgiving, driving for access, police enforcement, child support (imputing income to the father), and Section 7 expenses.

The court aimed to clarify and fine-tune the existing order to minimize conflict and ensure the children's best interests.

This endorsement addresses the issue of costs following a three-day trial concerning child and spousal support.

Both parties sought costs from the other.

The court found mixed success on the substantive issues, including the imputation of income, retroactive and ongoing child support, section 7 expenses, retroactive and ongoing spousal support, and life insurance.

The court also considered the admissibility of settlement offers exchanged during a settlement conference, noting the conflict between Family Law Rules 17(23) and 18(16) regarding confidentiality.

Ultimately, finding no unreasonable behaviour or bad faith by either party and mixed success at trial, the court ordered no costs payable by either party to the other, emphasizing the principles of reasonableness and proportionality.

The Children's Aid Society brought a protection application for B.W.-B., seeking interim society care.

The Society later moved to vary the temporary order to place the child with kin (paternal uncle and partner), which the parents opposed, preferring foster care or return to their care.

The mother cross-moved for the child's return to parental care.

The court found the child would be at risk of harm if returned to the parents and that a supervision order would not adequately protect the child.

While acknowledging the general preference for kin placement, the court dismissed the Society's motion for kin placement due to parental opposition, concerns about the kin's past issues, and particularly, the kin's hostile and vulgar communications regarding the mother, which would undermine reunification efforts.

The mother's cross-motion for parental return was also dismissed.

The temporary order for B.W.-B. to remain in Society care was continued.

The applicant mother sought parental support under section 32 of the Family Law Act from her adult daughter, claiming a need for $3,000 per month.

The applicant alleged she had provided care and support to the respondent from birth until age 16, when the respondent chose to live with her father.

The respondent opposed the claim and sought a restraining order, alleging a history of physical and emotional abuse, alienation from her father, exposure to domestic violence, and ongoing harassment including criminal charges and civil litigation.

The court found the applicant had not established entitlement to parental support on the basis of need, had not provided adequate care or support given the emotional and psychological abuse inflicted on the respondent, and that the applicant's unconscionable conduct constituted an obvious gross repudiation of the mother-daughter relationship.

The court dismissed the parental support claim and granted a restraining order.

The accused was charged with driving with over 80 milligrams of alcohol contrary to the Criminal Code.

The accused brought Charter applications seeking exclusion of breath test evidence on grounds of breaches of sections 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found multiple Charter breaches: (1) a breach of section 10(b) rights due to a 10-minute delay in providing rights to counsel following arrest; (2) a breach of sections 8 and 9 rights due to an 11-minute delay in making the breath demand without reasonable justification; (3) a breach of section 8 rights due to video recording of the accused using the toilet without his knowledge or consent, with his genitals clearly visible on multiple occasions; and (4) a breach of section 10(b) rights due to police questioning the accused about the offence after he indicated he wished to speak to counsel but before he had an opportunity to do so.

The court excluded the breath test evidence pursuant to section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that the cumulative effect of the Charter breaches, combined with the serious invasion of privacy and the lack of justification for the police conduct, outweighed society's interest in adjudication on the merits.

The applicant sought a reference hearing under section 74 of the Firearms Act to challenge the Chief Firearms Officer's refusal to issue him a firearms licence.

The refusal was based on the applicant's membership in the Hells Angels Motorcycle Club, deemed a criminal organization.

The applicant had no criminal record, no mental health issues, and no history of violence.

The court upheld the refusal, finding that membership in a criminal organization constitutes a legitimate public safety concern under section 5(1) of the Firearms Act, even absent specific enumeration in section 5(2).

The accused was charged with "over 80" contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code following a domestic dispute call.

Police officers attended the residence, detected alcohol on the accused's breath while he was operating a snow plow on his private property, but delayed making an approved screening device demand by approximately 12 minutes.

The court found breaches of sections 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Charter due to the failure to make the breath demand "forthwith" as required by section 254(2) of the Criminal Code.

Additionally, the Crown failed to establish that the breath tests were administered "as soon as practicable" as required by section 258(1)(c).

The accused was acquitted.

The applicants sought child support from the respondent parents for E.G., who was 18 years old at the time of trial and had been living with Janet McGonegal since March 2011 when she was 16.

The applicants sought retroactive child support from April 1, 2011, ongoing child support, and coverage of extraordinary expenses for E.G.'s continued education.

The respondents argued that E.G. had voluntarily withdrawn from their parental control at age 16 and therefore were not obligated to provide support under section 31(2) of the Family Law Act.

The court found that E.G. had withdrawn from parental control voluntarily and that the withdrawal was not involuntary.

The application was dismissed in its entirety.

The applicant mother sought sole custody of the child Parker, born January 27, 2011, to the parties who separated in May 2011.

The respondent father sought joint custody with the mother as primary caregiver and regular access.

The parties reached an impasse regarding access: the mother insisted on supervised access while the father demanded unsupervised access.

After 11 months without contact, the mother sought to terminate the father's access rights entirely.

The court determined that it was in the child's best interests to establish a relationship with his father through a gradual, supervised reintroduction process.

The mother brought a motion seeking recusal of the trial judge on grounds of perceived bias.

The judge had previously presided over a summary judgment motion where she determined the children were in need of protection and could not be placed in the mother's full-time care and custody.

The mother argued that the judge's prior findings and exposure to inadmissible evidence would cloud her judgment on the remaining issue of access.

The court dismissed the motion, finding no cogent evidence of actual bias or reasonable apprehension of bias.

The judge emphasized that findings regarding full-time parenting capacity were distinct from determinations regarding access rights.

The applicant father sought joint custody and unsupervised access to his child born in 2005.

The respondent mother opposed the claim and sought sole custody.

Following allegations of sexual abuse made by the child in August 2010 (which were not substantiated by police or Children's Aid Society), the mother sought to restrict access to supervised visits.

The court found that the allegations did not meet the threshold of reliability and that the father's credibility was compromised by inconsistent contact with the child, minimization of serious family issues, and involvement with the Children's Aid Society regarding physical discipline concerns.

The court ordered continued supervised access rather than the unsupervised access sought by the father.

The Children's Aid Society of Algoma brought a motion for summary judgment seeking a finding that two children were in need of protection under section 37(2)(b)(i) and (ii) of the Child and Family Services Act, and an order that no further child protection orders be made.

The mother opposed the finding, contending the Society should never have been involved.

The court found that while the children were at risk of physical harm due to a culmination of factors including the mother's physical health issues, mental health decline, and custody and access conflicts between the parents, there was no pattern of neglect.

The court granted the motion, finding the children in need of protection under section 37(2)(b)(i) only, and ordered that no further child protection orders be necessary.

The Children's Aid Society of Algoma brought a motion for summary judgment seeking a finding that four children were in need of protection and that their mother was not an appropriate caregiver.

The mother had an extensive history with the Society spanning decades, including her own childhood as a Crown Ward, and demonstrated persistent inability to provide adequate supervision, maintain stable housing, manage substance abuse and mental health issues, and exercise appropriate parenting judgment.

The court found that the children were in need of protection under the Child and Family Services Act and that the mother could not be placed in full-time care of the children, though supervised access would continue.