Kristi Megan Whitfield

The applicant mother and respondent father separated in 2021 and have two children.

The father subsequently experienced homelessness, mental health struggles, and substance abuse issues.

Following a family law trial where the father was self-represented and failed to file materials, the court granted the mother primary residence and sole decision-making responsibility, with supervised parenting time for the father.

The court declined to impute a higher income to the father due to his personal struggles, ordering child support based on social assistance levels, and requested further submissions regarding the mother's constructive trust claim over the family home.

Mother sought primary residence and final decision-making responsibility for a child enrolled by the father in school in Elliot Lake pursuant to his existing final decision-making authority.

The court found the father acted within the scope of the existing order, having consulted the mother multiple times over a year before enrollment, while the mother was evasive in addressing the schooling issue and failed to pursue mediation or timely court intervention.

The mother's subsequent unilateral actions regarding medical contacts and vaccinations further undermined co-parenting.

The court declined to change the child's primary residence, maintained the father's final decision-making authority with modifications, and structured parenting-time to maximize the mother's contact including weekends, holidays, and virtual access.

The respondent T.A. brought a motion seeking re-introduction and virtual parenting time with the child K.A., whom he had not had contact with for nearly 10 years and who was unaware he was her biological father.

The child's mother, E.L., opposed the motion, citing K.A.'s lack of awareness of T.A.'s paternity and the serious criminal charges T.A. faced involving K.A.'s older siblings.

The court, applying the "best interests of the child" test under the Children's Law Reform Act, dismissed T.A.'s motion for immediate re-introductory parenting time.

Instead, the court ordered that K.A. be informed of T.A.'s biological fatherhood by her mental health worker with the mother's support, emphasizing a cautious approach due to the child's age, lack of prior relationship, and the criminal charges.

T.A. was granted leave to bring a new motion for parenting time after a period of counselling for K.A. and an update on her progress.

The Children's Aid Society of Algoma brought an application regarding the child F.R.D. The respondent father, J.C., brought a motion for access to the child, which was opposed by the Society, the mother (C.D.), and Michipicoten First Nation.

The court dismissed the father's motion for access, finding that his extensive criminal history, including sexual offenses against his own children and the mother, and his lack of insight, meant that granting access was not in the child's best interests, despite the principle of maximum contact.

This endorsement addresses the temporary care and custody of a First Nation child, Z.O., who was removed from M.O.'s care and subsequently placed with his biological father, J.K. The court considered the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017 (CYFSA) and the federal An Act respecting First Nations, Inuit and Metis children, youth and families.

The court emphasized the priority of placement with a biological parent under the federal legislation, finding that Z.O.'s best interests were met by remaining with J.K., given no protection concerns and J.K.'s ability to provide cultural connection.

The "without prejudice" term of a previous interim order placing the child with J.K. was removed.

The Children's Aid Society of Algoma brought a motion under section 98 of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act for a psychosexual assessment of the respondent father, A.L.-S., due to his history of sexual assault convictions and concerns about risk to the child.

The maternal grandmother supported the motion, while the father opposed it, arguing it was unnecessary, invasive, and infringed his Charter rights.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the Society failed to demonstrate the assessment was "necessary" as required by section 98, noting that the father's criminal record was already before the court and his insight could be tested via cross-examination.

The court also expressed uncertainty about the assessment's methodology, particularly the reliance solely on phallometric testing, and its relevance given the existing evidence.

The respondent father brought a motion to change seeking termination of a child support order made on consent on April 23, 2014.

The applicant mother failed to respond and did not appear.

The father alleged that the two children, twin boys born August 16, 1999, were no longer enrolled in full-time education, had withdrawn from parental control, and no longer resided with the mother.

The court considered whether to proceed under the Family Law Rules or the Family Law Act section 44 procedure.

Finding that the prerequisites of section 44 were met (respondent failed to appear, resided more than 150 kilometres away, and issues could be adequately determined), the court proceeded under section 44.

The court made an interim suspension order effective May 31, 2018, and a provisional termination order effective August 16, 2017, pending confirmation by another court.

The applicant mother sought sole custody and supervised access for the respondent father in an uncontested trial.

The parties separated after a long relationship, and the respondent had not seen the children since separation.

The applicant raised concerns about the respondent's mental health, anger management, and abusive behaviour, noting he was subject to a recognizance prohibiting contact with her and their eldest child.

The court granted the applicant sole custody and ordered that any access by the respondent be supervised at a supervised access facility.

No child support was ordered as the respondent's income was below the threshold, but he was ordered to provide notice of any employment changes.

This is a child protection proceeding under the Child and Family Services Act involving five children from blended family situations.

The court addressed temporary care and custody motions brought by the Children's Aid Society and the father pursuant to section 51(2) of the CFSA.

The court found reasonable grounds to believe the children were at risk of harm based on evidence of physical abuse, inadequate supervision, poor home conditions, and substance use.

The court made mixed determinations regarding temporary placements: one child remained with maternal grandparents despite an unfavourable kin assessment; one child remained with paternal grandparents; one child remained with biological father; and two children were placed with their biological mother.

The court emphasized that consent orders cannot be rubber-stamped without proper legal foundation and that the most vulnerable child required protection despite parental completion of some programming.

The Children's Aid Society brought two motions: (1) to remove R.J.H. as a party to child protection proceedings and terminate outstanding orders in his favor, and (2) to add D.N. as a party after DNA testing established he was the biological father of the child.

The court dismissed the motion to remove R.J.H., finding that despite not being the biological father, he qualified as a parent under section 37(1)(d) of the Child and Family Services Act by demonstrating a settled intention to treat the child as his own over many years.

The court granted the motion to add D.N. as a party, finding him to be the biological father and therefore a parent under the statutory definition, while reserving the question of whether he should be granted access or custody.

This is a child protection matter involving a temporary care and custody determination.

The Children's Aid Society sought to place a child in its care following an apprehension from the mother.

The court examined the legality of the warrantless apprehension and found it did not meet the statutory requirements under section 40(7) of the Child and Family Services Act.

The court also addressed party status issues, determining that the alleged father should be removed as a party after DNA testing excluded him as the biological parent.

Ultimately, the court ordered temporary care and custody to remain with the mother subject to supervision and conditions, including a restraining order under section 80 of the Act prohibiting contact between the child and the non-biological father figure.

The Children's Aid Society of Algoma brought a motion for summary judgment seeking a finding that two children were in need of protection under section 37(2)(b)(i) and (ii) of the Child and Family Services Act, and an order that no further child protection orders be made.

The mother opposed the finding, contending the Society should never have been involved.

The court found that while the children were at risk of physical harm due to a culmination of factors including the mother's physical health issues, mental health decline, and custody and access conflicts between the parents, there was no pattern of neglect.

The court granted the motion, finding the children in need of protection under section 37(2)(b)(i) only, and ordered that no further child protection orders be necessary.

The Children's Aid Society of Algoma brought a motion for summary judgment in a status review proceeding under the Child and Family Services Act, seeking an order for crown wardship of a two-year-old child with no parental access.

The child had previously been made a temporary ward of the society for six months.

The parents opposed the motion but failed to provide substantive evidence in response.

The court found that no genuine issue requiring a trial existed and granted the society's motion for crown wardship with no access to either parent.

The court noted that the parents had failed to comply with the Plan of Care expectations, their relationship remained dysfunctional, and the protection concerns had not been addressed or had been exacerbated.

A motion brought by the maternal grandfather of a child in a child protection proceeding seeking to be added as a party respondent.

The grandfather claimed statutory party status under the Child and Family Services Act based on a written custody agreement signed by both parents.

The court found that the grandfather qualified as a "parent" under section 37(1) of the CFSA and was therefore a statutory party who should have been named as a respondent by the society.

The court granted the motion and ordered the grandfather be added as a party respondent with thirty days to file an Answer and Plan of Care.