Anthony Marrato

The Children's Aid Society of Algoma brought a child protection application and a motion for temporary care and custody of three children, seeking a supervision order for the mother (K.M.).

The father (D.L.) did not appear.

The court addressed procedural fairness, noting the Society's failure to provide adequate notice for both the application (30 days required) and the motion (6 days required), as materials were filed and the first court date set only four days later.

The judge declined to abridge time, finding the Society's procedure unfair and tantamount to ex parte proceedings.

Despite the Society's request for a supervision order under s.94(2)(b) of the CYFSA, the court ordered temporary care and custody to the mother without supervision under s.94(2)(a), emphasizing fairness and the lack of pressing concerns for the children.

This decision addresses two motions: one by counsel to be removed from the record for the respondent mother and father, and another by the Children's Aid Society (CAS) to add the maternal grandmother (M.M.) as a party respondent.

The court granted the counsel's request for removal.

Regarding the CAS's motion, the court found that M.M., having had temporary care and custody of the child for 17 months, qualified as a "parent" under the expansive definitions in the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017 (CYFSA).

This statutory parental status automatically conferred party status upon her, overriding common law criteria for adding parties.

Consequently, M.M. was granted status as a party respondent and directed to file an Answer.

The applicant filed a complaint alleging that the respondent's worker failed to provide an Internal Complaints Review Panel (ICRP) form upon request in December 2018.

Following a pre-hearing, all other issues were dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, leaving this narrow issue for a written hearing.

The Child and Family Services Review Board found insufficient evidence that the applicant had requested the form, noting the applicant's own email indicated he was unaware of the form at the time.

The complaint was dismissed.

Supplementary reasons following a status review application under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act involving three children.

The court determined placement and access for the middle child (J., age 14).

The court ordered that J. be placed in the care and custody of his maternal grandmother, subject to a seven-month supervision order, rather than remaining in foster care or being returned to his mother.

The court found the grandmother was not a source of risk of harm despite the society's objections.

The court also granted J. access to his mother and grandmother as access holder, with specific terms and conditions.

The decision addresses the balance between protection concerns and the statutory purposes of maintaining family relationships and cultural continuity.

Supplementary reasons following a status review application under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act concerning three children in the care of the Children's Aid Society of Algoma.

These reasons address the placement and access determinations for the youngest child, P., who was placed in extended society care.

The court considered statutory provisions governing access for children in extended society care and determined that access orders should be made in the child's best interests, applying a holistic analysis that considers the child's wishes, relationships, and overall circumstances rather than applying a blanket policy approach.

Supplementary reasons following a status review application under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act concerning three children in the care of the Children's Aid Society of Algoma.

These reasons address the placement and access arrangements for the child M., a 16-year-old girl.

The court determined that placement with the maternal grandmother was appropriate, subject to a nine-month supervision order with tailored conditions.

The court rejected the Society's concerns regarding the grandmother's suitability as a caregiver and granted M. access to her mother as the access holder, with conditions permitting both supervised and unsupervised contact.

The decision emphasizes the statutory obligation to consider placement with relatives and the importance of respecting a mature minor's wishes and best interests.

This is a status review application under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017 concerning three sibling children in the care of the Children's Aid Society of Algoma.

The children have been in society care for over five years following apprehension in November 2014 based on allegations of inappropriate discipline.

The court conducted a contested trial to determine whether the children should be returned to their mother, placed with their maternal grandmother, or remain in extended society care.

The judgment addresses complex evidentiary issues regarding hearsay statements of children, the credibility of witnesses, and the application of the best interests test under the CYFSA.

This is a voir dire ruling on the admissibility of hearsay evidence consisting of statements made by a four-year-old child during an interview at an Ontario Provincial Police detachment.

The child's statements concerned alleged discipline practices in the home, including kneeling with nose to wall and siblings having hands tied behind their backs.

The court applied the principled approach to hearsay admissibility, examining both necessity and threshold reliability.

While the court found necessity was established, it concluded that threshold reliability was not met due to multiple concerns including the child's age and distracted state, lack of oath or affirmation, absence of questioning about understanding truth versus lies, destruction of audio and video recordings, incomplete case notes, and contradictions with statements from older siblings.

This ruling addresses the admissibility of child hearsay evidence consisting of statements made by three children to clinical social worker Carrie-Lynn Wilton during a child protection proceeding.

The court conducted three separate voir dires to determine whether statements from each child met the principled approach to hearsay admissibility, requiring both reasonable necessity and threshold reliability.

The court found that the first child's statements did not meet the necessity requirement as the child had already testified at trial.

The second child's statements also failed the necessity test as the court had gathered sufficient additional evidence demonstrating the child could testify.

The third child's statements, however, met both criteria and were admitted as trial evidence, as they were more recent, made at a more mature age, and sufficiently documented.

This is a voir dire ruling on the admissibility of hearsay evidence consisting of statements made by a child to a child services worker.

The child was apprehended from parental care and made statements to the worker about discipline in the home.

The applicant society sought to introduce these statements through the worker's testimony using the principled approach to hearsay admissibility, which requires establishing both necessity and threshold reliability.

The court ruled that the statements did not meet the necessity requirement, as the child was capable of testifying and the court had heard sufficient evidence demonstrating the child's ability to communicate and participate in proceedings.

The court found that direct testimony from the child was preferable, particularly given inconsistencies in the child's various statements to different individuals.

This is a voir dire ruling on the admissibility of child hearsay evidence consisting of statements made by two children during an access visit supervised by a Children's Aid Society worker.

The court applied the principled approach to hearsay admissibility, requiring both necessity and threshold reliability.

The court found that the society failed to establish necessity for admitting the children's hearsay statements, as both children were capable of testifying viva voce at trial.

The court also addressed state of mind statements and found that only one statement by one child met the criteria for admission under the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule.

This is a ruling on a voir dire regarding the admissibility of child hearsay evidence consisting of statements made by an eight-year-old child to his foster mother regarding being locked in his bedroom and having the light bulb removed.

The Children's Aid Society sought to introduce these statements through the foster mother's testimony under the principled approach to hearsay admissibility.

The court rejected the application, finding that the society failed to establish sufficient necessity for the hearsay evidence, as the child was capable of testifying viva voce at age twelve.

The court noted that while threshold reliability was satisfied, the necessity requirement was not met, particularly given that the statements were made to a foster mother rather than to investigators or police, and were explanatory rather than responsive to interrogation.

This is a voir dire ruling on the admissibility of hearsay evidence consisting of statements made by a child during a police interview.

The child's statements were recorded by a society worker and sought to be introduced at trial through that worker's testimony.

The court ruled that while the statements were hearsay, they met the twin requirements of necessity and threshold reliability under the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

The court admitted the evidence as trial evidence, noting that the child could not be expected to recall events from years prior and that the handwritten notes and their verbatim transfer to case notes provided sufficient reliability.

This is a voir dire ruling on the admissibility of hearsay evidence consisting of statements made by a child during a school interview by child protection workers.

The court considered whether the statements met the twin requirements of necessity and threshold reliability under the principled approach to hearsay admissibility.

The court found that threshold reliability had not been met due to multiple weaknesses in the interview process, including lack of recording, absence of specific questions, unclear temporal information, and the child's behavioral difficulties.

The hearsay statements were excluded from trial evidence.

This is a ruling on two voir dires concerning the admissibility of hearsay evidence consisting of statements made by a child (M.) during interviews conducted on November 28, 2014.

The child was interviewed first at her school by child protection workers, and subsequently at the Ontario Provincial Police station by a constable.

The Children's Aid Society sought to introduce these statements through the testimony of a society worker to establish the truth of their contents.

The court applied the principled approach to child hearsay admissibility, requiring both necessity and threshold reliability.

The court found that neither requirement was satisfied and ruled the hearsay statements inadmissible.

This is a ruling on a voir dire concerning the admissibility of hearsay evidence consisting of statements made by a child during a school interview by child protection workers.

The court applied the principled exception to the hearsay rule, examining whether the evidence met the twin requirements of necessity and threshold reliability.

The court found that the statements were admissible as trial evidence, noting that the dangers associated with hearsay could be attenuated and that admission would permit valuable comparisons between accounts from multiple interviewers and interviews.

The applicant society sought a finding that the child was in need of protection and a disposition placing the child with the maternal grandparents subject to a supervision order.

The mother opposed the finding and sought the child's return.

The court found the child in need of protection due to a risk of physical harm resulting from the mother's pattern of neglect, specifically her history of substance abuse and relationships involving domestic violence.

Applying the best interests test, the court granted a deemed custody order to the maternal grandparents, with whom the child had been residing and wished to remain.

Access to the mother was ordered to be at the child's discretion, and no access was ordered for the mother's partner.

A child protection proceeding under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017 involving a child apprehended at age nine from her mother's care.

The court found the child in need of protection under sections 74(2)(b)(i) and 74(2)(b)(ii) of the CYFSA based on risk of physical harm resulting from the mother's failure to adequately care for, provide for, supervise or protect the child, and a pattern of neglect.

The risk arose from the mother's substance abuse, involvement in domestic violence relationships, and poor choices in male partners.

The court rejected the society's other grounds for finding (actual physical harm, emotional harm, and risk of emotional harm).

For disposition, the court made a deemed custody order under section 102(1) of the CYFSA in favour of the maternal grandparents, with whom the child had been residing.

The court made an access order permitting the child to initiate contact with her mother, with the child controlling the terms and conditions of visits.

No access order was made for the stepfather.

The Children's Aid Society of Algoma appealed a decision of the Ontario Court of Justice that dismissed its application for summary judgment seeking Crown wardship of three children.

The lower court judge found a genuine issue requiring a trial, considering the children's desire to return to their mother, the mother's improved lifestyle, and the maternal aunt's position.

The Superior Court of Justice, on appeal, applied a palpable and overriding error standard of review and found no basis to interfere with the lower court's conclusion that a genuine issue for trial existed.

The appeal was dismissed, and the matter was directed to proceed to trial.

In a child protection status review proceeding, the court determined whether a four-year-old child should be placed in temporary care and custody with a non-parent third party (the father's ex-girlfriend) or with the Children's Aid Society in foster care.

The father had breached multiple conditions of a supervision order, including being intoxicated while caring for the child.

The court rejected placement with the paternal grandmother due to jurisdictional concerns (she resided in Michigan), rejected placement with the mother due to her unsuitability as a caregiver, and ultimately ordered placement with the ex-girlfriend subject to a supervision order by the society.

The court emphasized the statutory preference for kinship placements over society care and the importance of maintaining the child's connections with significant persons in his life.