George Fournier

This decision addresses motions by both the applicant mother and respondent father for temporary orders concerning their child, Jaylan.

The mother sought exclusive decision-making responsibility (DMR) and supervised parenting time, while the father sought week-about parenting time and Office of the Children's Lawyer (OCL) involvement.

The court declined to grant temporary DMR to either parent, finding both immature.

OCL involvement was also declined at this stage due to lack of evidence and potential delay.

The court ordered supervised parenting time for the father, including twice weekly at the Sudbury Supervised Access Centre and once monthly with overnights at the maternal grandmother's home, supervised by the grandmother.

The child's primary residence was ordered to remain with the mother.

The court also highlighted significant procedural irregularities by both parties and their counsel, including improper filing and prohibited disclosure of settlement conference discussions.

This decision addresses two motions: one by counsel to be removed from the record for the respondent mother and father, and another by the Children's Aid Society (CAS) to add the maternal grandmother (M.M.) as a party respondent.

The court granted the counsel's request for removal.

Regarding the CAS's motion, the court found that M.M., having had temporary care and custody of the child for 17 months, qualified as a "parent" under the expansive definitions in the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017 (CYFSA).

This statutory parental status automatically conferred party status upon her, overriding common law criteria for adding parties.

Consequently, M.M. was granted status as a party respondent and directed to file an Answer.

The applicant father brought a motion seeking to vary a temporary without prejudice consent agreement signed by the parties in July 2019.

The father sought to vary provisions regarding access supervision, the presence of the paternal grandmother during access, and child support amounts.

The court dismissed the motion for lack of jurisdiction, finding that the consent agreement had never been incorporated into a formal court order and therefore could not be varied.

The court recommended that the parties bring motions for interim orders within the existing application rather than attempting to vary the unenforced consent.

The applicant sought a bail review after being detained on secondary and tertiary grounds for serious charges including attempted murder and numerous firearm offences.

The applicant argued for release based on an improved bail plan incorporating an ankle bracelet and the health risks posed by the COVID-19 pandemic in custody.

The court found that neither the ankle bracelet nor the general risks of COVID-19 constituted a material change in circumstances sufficient to overcome the significant public safety and confidence in justice concerns, especially given the sureties' prior inability to control the applicant.

The application for bail review was dismissed.

A child protection agency sought summary judgment on a motion to establish that a child was in need of protection and to grant custody to the paternal grandparents.

The respondent mother opposed the custody order but took no position on the identification order.

The respondent father supported the motion.

The court granted summary judgment on custody to the paternal grandparents and supervised access to the father, but declined to grant summary judgment on the mother's access, finding that genuine issues remained regarding the accommodation of the mother's work schedule and exploration of third-party supervisors.

The court ordered a focused one-day hearing on the mother's access issue.

The applicant and respondent each brought motions concerning a temporary custody order, child support, spousal support, and compliance with previous orders and undertakings.

The applicant sought sole custody, increased child support, and section 7 expenses, while the respondent sought to dismiss the applicant's motion, vary custody to his care, and disentitle the applicant due to non-compliance.

The court found jurisdiction to vary the interim custody order, amended the order to reflect the children's primary residence with the applicant, increased child support, and adjourned issues of retroactive child support, section 7 expenses, and spousal support to trial.

The respondent's claims for disentitlement were dismissed.

The applicants, Brandon Dean Brooks and Bryan Frederick Styles, sought a stay of proceedings under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging unreasonable delay in bringing their drug-related charges to trial.

The total delay from charge to anticipated trial completion was approximately 36 months.

The court applied the framework from R. v. Jordan, deducting periods attributable to a discrete event (judge's illness) and defence delay (one applicant's failure to appear).

After deductions, the net delay was 28 months, which did not exceed the 30-month presumptive ceiling for Superior Court matters.

The court also found no proven prejudice under the R. v. Morin principles.

Consequently, the application for a stay of proceedings was dismissed for both applicants.

The accused, H.B., aged 80, pleaded guilty to three counts of sexual offences against his daughter, D.B., committed between 1964 and 1980, starting when she was four years old.

The offences included indecent assault, gross indecency, and incest (sexual intercourse).

The defence sought a conditional sentence or a short period of incarceration due to the dated nature of the offences, the accused's age, severe medical conditions (including early onset dementia and PTSD from childhood sexual abuse), lack of prior record, and role as caregiver for his wife with Alzheimer's.

The Crown sought a five-year term of incarceration, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence for child sexual abuse, the breach of trust, the young age of the victim, the lengthy period of abuse, and the accused's lack of insight and remorse.

The court rejected a conditional sentence, finding the accused's actions egregious and that denunciation and deterrence required a custodial sentence.

The court sentenced H.B. to five years imprisonment for incest, with two years concurrent for indecent assault and gross indecency, along with a DNA order, SOIRA registration for life, and a 10-year weapons prohibition.

The accused, H.B., brought an application to withdraw his guilty pleas to charges of indecent assault, gross indecency, and sexual intercourse with his daughter, which stemmed from incidents between 1964 and 1980.

H.B. contended that his pleas were not voluntary, informed, or unequivocal due to his health issues, stressors, and financial situation, and that he did not understand the proceedings.

The court considered the evidence of H.B., his physician (Dr. Jacques), and his former counsel (Mr. Beckett).

The court found that H.B.'s plea was voluntary, informed, and unequivocal, noting his active involvement in plea negotiations and his understanding of potential penalties, despite his claims of memory loss and confusion.

The application to withdraw the pleas was dismissed.

In a family law proceeding, the respondent sought an adjournment of what had been scheduled as an uncontested hearing and requested permission to participate despite failing to deliver pleadings and comply with prior disclosure orders.

The court considered the respondent’s delayed disclosure, the prior orders requiring financial disclosure, and the procedural history including a contempt motion and the death of the respondent’s former counsel.

The court found that the respondent had significantly delayed compliance with his disclosure obligations without adequate explanation.

While permitting the respondent to participate and deliver pleadings, the court imposed significant costs consequences for delay.

The respondent was ordered to pay $8,000 plus HST in costs and comply with disclosure obligations within specified timelines.

The Children's Aid Society brought a summary judgment motion seeking crown wardship without access to two children.

The parents conceded the issue of finding and crown wardship but sought access, which the Society opposed.

The court applied the two-pronged test under section 59 of the Child and Family Services Act, requiring that the relationship between parent and child be beneficial and meaningful, and that access not impair future adoption opportunities.

The court found no material facts requiring trial and concluded that the parents' relationship with the children was not significantly advantageous.

The parents demonstrated inconsistent and erratic access patterns, cognitive deficiencies affecting parenting capacity, and an indifferent attitude toward the relationship.

The court granted crown wardship with no access.

The accused was convicted of assault causing bodily harm (as an included offence to the original charge of aggravated assault) against a newborn child within the first 30 days of life.

The child sustained serious injuries including metaphyseal fractures to both femurs, fractures to the tibia, and multiple rib fractures requiring tremendous force to inflict.

The court imposed a sentence of 12 months custody followed by 2 years probation, with conditions including anger management counselling, parenting programs, and restrictions on contact with the victim's mother.

The court balanced serious aggravating factors (abuse of a child and position of trust, severity of injuries) against mitigating factors (no criminal record, employment, positive support network, participation in rehabilitation programs).

The accused was charged with aggravated assault causing maiming to a one-month-old infant.

The child sustained multiple serious injuries including rib fractures, metaphyseal fractures to the legs, a torn frenulum, and bruising to the cheek within the first 30 days of life.

Medical evidence established that these injuries required significant force and could not have been self-inflicted or caused by accidental means.

The accused was the primary caregiver during the relevant period.

The court found the accused guilty of the included offence of assault causing bodily harm, rejecting the aggravated assault charge as the evidence did not establish maiming.