3 total
The court dismissed the applicant's interim motion to alter a long-standing shared parenting arrangement.
The applicant sought an interim order for sole decision-making, reduced parenting time for the respondent, and child support.
The respondent opposed the changes, arguing the existing 2-2-3 shared parenting schedule, in place for three years, was in the children's best interests.
The court dismissed the applicant's motion, finding that the long-standing status quo was working well for the children, who were thriving academically and showed no negative impact from past parental conflicts.
The court also dismissed the child support claim without prejudice, noting insufficient submissions on the increased costs of shared parenting under the Federal Child Support Guidelines.
The court dismissed a child protection agency's motion for society wardship, returning the child to her father due to the agency's reliance on uncorroborated hearsay.
A motion by the Children's Aid Society to vary a temporary care and custody order and place the child in society wardship was dismissed.
The court found that the society's evidence, consisting primarily of multiple layers of hearsay regarding allegations of sexual impropriety by the father, was insufficient to meet the statutory test under section 51(3) of the Child and Family Services Act.
The child consistently denied any inappropriate conduct by her father, and all criminal charges against the father had been withdrawn.
The court ordered the child returned to the temporary care and custody of her father, subject to society supervision and specified conditions, finding that the best interests of the child and the paramount purposes of the statute favored reunification.
Adult child no longer qualified as a child of the marriage.
On a motion to change that proceeded to trial, the applicant sought termination of child support for an adult daughter with a chronic illness.
The court held that, despite uncertainty about the daughter's future and her medical condition, the evidence showed she was presently able to withdraw from parental charge and obtain the necessities of life, including through ODSP and her living arrangements.
Applying the Divorce Act definition of “child of the marriage”, the court found she no longer met that status at present.
The prior support order was terminated, with no costs awarded.