Patrick J. Boucher

The appellants appealed a peace bond order issued under section 810 of the Criminal Code requiring them to enter into a recognizance.

The respondent had alleged the appellants engaged in various unlawful acts threatening his family's safety and property, including leaving fires unattended, cutting trees, building an illegal dock, burying garbage, setting up a shooting range, and carrying weapons in a threatening manner.

The appellants denied these allegations.

The Superior Court allowed the appeal and quashed the peace bond, finding that the justice of the peace's reasons were insufficient for meaningful appellate review.

The justice of the peace failed to explain why she preferred the respondent's evidence over the appellants' evidence on key disputed points, particularly regarding the nature and dangerousness of the appellants' conduct.

The Crown applied for summary dismissal of the accused's application alleging institutional bias in relation to cannabis-related charges.

The accused alleged that the history of the Jesuits' involvement with Indigenous peoples created a reasonable apprehension of institutional bias, and that a question posed by Crown counsel during cross-examination regarding the Pope crystallized this bias.

The accused sought a traditional Indigenous circle for resolution of the matters.

The court granted the Crown's application for summary dismissal, finding the underlying application manifestly frivolous and that the accused failed to meet the high threshold for establishing institutional bias.

The accused was convicted of second-degree murder for striking and driving over the victim with his vehicle following a confrontation outside an after-hours bar in Toronto on February 5, 2023.

The Crown had alleged planned and deliberate first-degree murder, but the jury rejected this theory.

The court imposed a life sentence with a parole ineligibility period of 11 years.

The decision addresses the sentencing principles applicable to second-degree murder, the consideration of a sentencing circle request (which was dismissed), aggravating factors including the use of a vehicle as a weapon in a public space, and mitigating factors including the accused's Indigenous background, youth, lack of criminal record, and the jury's unanimous recommendation for the minimum 10-year ineligibility period.

The defendant Danark moved to dismiss the action for delay under Rule 24.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the court's inherent jurisdiction, or alternatively for a timetable.

The plaintiff opposed the motion.

The action was commenced in February 2017 to perfect a lien registered in January 2017.

Discoveries were completed in August 2019, with undertakings answered by June 2020.

Significant delay occurred thereafter, attributed by the plaintiff to COVID-19 pandemic impacts on its business, loss of a major client in 2021, and difficulties in retaining new counsel due to a solicitor's lien on its file.

The court found the delay was not inexcusable and that the plaintiff had rebutted the presumption of inherent prejudice.

The trial record had been passed and the action was trial-ready.

The motion was dismissed, and the parties were ordered to schedule a judicial pre-trial.

The bankrupt applied for an absolute discharge from bankruptcy following a motor vehicle accident in which he was an uninsured driver.

The Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Fund, which paid a $130,000 judgment against the bankrupt, opposed the discharge, arguing the bankrupt should be required to repay the debt.

The court found this was essentially a single-creditor bankruptcy filed to avoid the judgment debt.

While the bankrupt had cooperated with the trustee and his circumstances had improved, the court determined that the integrity of the bankruptcy process required some repayment.

The court granted a conditional discharge requiring repayment of 25% of the debt.

The defendants moved to strike the plaintiff's statement of claim without leave to amend, arguing the court lacked jurisdiction over matters arising from the plaintiff's employment governed by a collective agreement.

The plaintiff, a former educational assistant, challenged her termination and the arbitrator's dismissal of her grievance, as well as alleged misconduct by her union and employer.

The court found that all claims either fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Ontario Labour Relations Board or disclosed no reasonable cause of action.

The motion was granted and the claim was struck without leave to amend.

A family law trial addressing decision-making responsibility, parenting time, child support, and spousal support following the separation of parties married for approximately ten years with two children.

The applicant sought joint decision-making and increased parenting time with both children, as well as spousal support.

The respondent sought sole decision-making regarding one child and shared parenting time.

The court ordered shared decision-making with tie-breaking authority allocated differently for each child based on their circumstances and preferences.

Parenting time arrangements were maintained as established.

Child support was set at a nominal amount reflecting shared custody of one child and sole custody of the other with the respondent.

Spousal support was awarded on a time-limited basis to recognize the applicant's economic disadvantage from having left the workforce to care for the children.

The Chalmers defendants moved for a declaration that A3 Construction Inc.'s construction lien had expired and for an order vacating the lien and certificate of action from title.

A3 opposed and cross-moved for a declaration that its action was set down for trial before the expiry of the limitation period.

The court found that A3 took sufficient steps to set the action down for trial within the required time by submitting the trial record through the Civil Submissions Online Portal before the deadline, even though the record was initially rejected for procedural deficiencies.

The court dismissed the Chalmers' motion and granted A3's cross-motion, declaring the action set down for trial as of June 6, 2023.

The court considered motions by the respondent, Mohammad Rahbar, to have the appellant, Nasya Peters, declared a vexatious litigant and for security for costs in relation to her appeal.

The court found that Ms. Peters had engaged in persistent, vexatious, and abusive litigation conduct, both in court and through communications with the respondent and his counsel.

The court declared Ms. Peters a vexatious litigant and ordered her to pay $10,000 into court as security for costs before she could continue her appeal.

The respondent, Serafim Beites, moved for an order granting him exclusive possession of real property jointly owned with the applicant, Kimberly Ann Beites, in Texas, and for an order restraining the applicant from attending that property.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that a preservation or restraining order under section 12 of the Family Law Act was not necessary to protect an equalization payment, and that the value of the Texas property was insignificant compared to the parties' other assets.

The court also questioned its jurisdiction to grant exclusive possession of foreign-owned real property and declined to exercise exceptional in personam jurisdiction in the circumstances.

The court considered motions regarding contempt of a prior order and the setting aside of an interim injunction in a dispute over residential construction and compliance with the Building Code Act.

The respondent was found in contempt for limited conduct but had made significant efforts to purge the contempt.

The court set aside the interim injunction, ordered the respondent to maintain engineering oversight and pay for inspections, and imposed a $7,500 fine for contempt.

The appellant, Joshua S. Westwell, appealed a decision of a reference judge who ordered the Chief Firearms Officer (CFO) to issue him a non-restricted firearms licence, but left the question of a restricted licence to the CFO.

Westwell sought both non-restricted and restricted licences.

The Superior Court found that the reference judge erred by distinguishing between types of licences, as the Firearms Act only permits the issuance of a single licence.

However, the court held it had no statutory authority to grant the relief Westwell sought, as the Attorney General had not appealed the order.

The appeal was dismissed.

This decision addresses the costs arising from a successful motion by Lucien Cammaert to transfer proceedings from Toronto to Sudbury.

Lucien sought substantial indemnity costs, while Rosemary Maki, the unsuccessful party, argued for no costs or costs in the cause, asserting her initial choice of venue was reasonable and that she was seeking an accounting of assets.

The court found Lucien presumptively entitled to costs, rejecting Rosemary's arguments that her positions were unreasonable enough to warrant substantial indemnity, but also that costs should be in the cause.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs to Lucien, emphasizing that the unsuccessful party's conduct did not warrant elevated costs, but also did not justify deviating from the general rule that costs follow the event.

This decision addresses competing applications for a change of venue in a first-degree murder trial.

The Crown sought to transfer the trial from Gore Bay to Sudbury, while the accused sought a transfer to Toronto, or alternatively, North Bay.

The court determined that a change of venue from Gore Bay was expedient due to the lengthy trial, daily travel for the in-custody accused, and winter travel conditions.

The court granted the Crown's application, ordering the trial to proceed in Sudbury, finding it to be the most appropriate venue given its proximity to the original community, adjacent jail facilities, and available courtroom.

The accused's arguments regarding jail conditions and proximity to counsel and family were not sufficiently supported by evidence or did not outweigh the principle of local trials.

The applicant, Rosemary Maki, initiated an application in Toronto seeking a declaration of her father's incapacity, the setting aside of his Powers of Attorney, and her appointment as guardian.

The respondent, Lucien Cammaert, brought a motion to transfer the application to Sudbury.

The court, applying Rule 13.02(2)(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, considered factors such as where the events occurred, where the subject matter was located, and the convenience of parties and witnesses.

Given that the Powers of Attorney were executed in Espanola (Sudbury District), the property is located there, and most parties and witnesses reside in the Sudbury District, the court found that Sudbury was a "significantly better" venue.

The motion to transfer the proceedings to Sudbury was granted.

The garnishee, Vale Canada Limited, brought a motion to dismiss garnishment proceedings initiated by the plaintiffs on a "with prejudice" basis.

The plaintiffs consented to a "without prejudice" dismissal.

The court found that the garnishment proceedings had been ongoing for approximately 23 years, during which the plaintiffs consistently failed to comply with court orders, including disclosure orders, an order for security for costs ($85,000), and a previous costs order ($6,653.65).

Citing the plaintiffs' significant and unexplained delays, their flouting of court orders, and the abuse of process, the court granted Vale's motion, dismissing the garnishment proceedings with prejudice.

In matrimonial proceedings, the court held a focused hearing to determine the beneficial ownership of a property gratuitously transferred by the respondent to himself and his adult son as joint tenants.

The applicant argued for a resulting trust, while the respondent contended it was a gift.

The court found that the respondent failed to provide clear, convincing, and cogent evidence to rebut the presumption of resulting trust, concluding that the respondent remained the beneficial owner of his son's one-half interest in the property.

The applicant moved to set aside an order abandoning her spousal support claim, which was made during a settlement conference.

She alleged that her former counsel pressured her due to his unpreparedness and that her anxiety disorder impacted her decision.

The respondent opposed, arguing the applicant failed to establish grounds to set aside the order.

The court dismissed the motion, finding no evidence of fraud by counsel and that the applicant did not meet the preconditions under Family Law Rules 25(19) or the residual power test from Mountain View Farms.

The court emphasized the importance of finality in consent orders and the integrity of the administration of justice.

The plaintiff moved for leave to strike the jury notice, to amend her claim to bring it within the simplified procedure, and to have the action tried pursuant to the simplified procedure.

The defendant opposed the relief.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's motion, finding that the grounds for the request pre-existed the filing of the trial record, meaning there was no substantial or unexpected change in circumstances to warrant granting leave.

Furthermore, the court held that striking the jury notice would deprive the defendant of a substantive statutory right without providing a significant benefit to the plaintiff, as trial delays would likely occur regardless of the trial format.

The applicant, Fay Smith, moved to set aside minutes of settlement and a full and final release, alleging she was coerced under duress by her former counsel and Crown counsel.

The court applied the two-part test for duress from *Kawartha Capital Corp. v. 1723766 Ontario Limited*, requiring proof of pressure leaving no choice and illegitimate pressure.

The court found that the applicant received extensive and thoughtful independent legal advice throughout the litigation and mediation process.

The pressure experienced was deemed typical of litigation and did not meet the threshold for economic duress.

The court also found no evidence of collusion between counsel to cover up alleged Ministry malfeasance.

The applicant's motions were dismissed.