Dhiren Rajesh Chohan

The plaintiffs purchased an HVAC business from the defendants and subsequently sued for breach of contract, alleging the defendants failed to operate the business in the ordinary course prior to closing.

The plaintiffs claimed the defendants failed to disclose slumping sales, employee layoffs, and deteriorating customer relationships.

The court dismissed the plaintiffs' claim, finding they failed to prove the changes were outside the ordinary course of business or not the result of a general deterioration in the HVAC market.

The court further held that even if a breach occurred, the plaintiffs were entirely responsible for their damages because they failed to exercise their contractual right to investigate the company's financial affairs before closing.

The defendants' counterclaim for the balance owing on a promissory note was allowed.

The applicant sought an order for production of financial disclosure from third parties (the respondent's father, family corporations, and a family trust) pursuant to the Family Law Rules and Rules of Civil Procedure.

The applicant and respondent are involved in family proceedings concerning child support, spousal support, and equalization of net family property.

The applicant sought to set aside a domestic contract and alleged the respondent's reported income had declined significantly post-separation despite evidence of substantially higher cash flow during the marriage.

The third parties opposed production, arguing the motion was premature and that the domestic contract must first be set aside.

The court found the motion was not premature, that the applicant had met her onus, and that disclosure was necessary to fairly determine the respondent's true income and net family property.

The court ordered production of financial statements and corporate tax returns from the companies and details of non-arm's length expenses from all third parties, subject to confidentiality terms.

A family law trial addressing decision-making responsibility, parenting time, child support, and spousal support following the separation of parties married for approximately ten years with two children.

The applicant sought joint decision-making and increased parenting time with both children, as well as spousal support.

The respondent sought sole decision-making regarding one child and shared parenting time.

The court ordered shared decision-making with tie-breaking authority allocated differently for each child based on their circumstances and preferences.

Parenting time arrangements were maintained as established.

Child support was set at a nominal amount reflecting shared custody of one child and sole custody of the other with the respondent.

Spousal support was awarded on a time-limited basis to recognize the applicant's economic disadvantage from having left the workforce to care for the children.

The respondent brought a motion for a temporary order for primary residence of the children and weekend parenting time for the applicant.

The applicant cross-moved for the children to attend a different school on Bear Island and for primary residence with her.

The court found that the applicant had been removing the children from their current school in North Bay, Vincent Massey, despite a previous order.

The court dismissed the applicant's motion, finding her reasons for relocation and school change unconvincing and her actions detrimental to the children's best interests.

The respondent's motion was allowed, granting him primary residence and establishing a new parenting schedule for the applicant, with the children to remain at Vincent Massey.

Costs were awarded to the respondent due to the applicant's inappropriate conduct.

The appellants challenged the constitutional validity of the Tamil Genocide Education Week Act, 2021, arguing it was ultra vires Ontario and infringed their rights to free expression and equality under the Charter.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Act, finding its dominant purpose was to affirm and commemorate the Tamil-Ontarian community's experience, which falls within Ontario's power over local matters under s. 92(16) of the Constitution Act, 1867.

The Court also dismissed the Charter claims, concluding the Act does not suppress expression or draw a discriminatory distinction against Sinhala-Buddhists.

In a family law trial concerning parenting and relocation, the court determined the child's best interests under s. 16 of the Divorce Act and the relocation provisions in ss. 16.9, 16.92 and 16.93.

The court found that, although both parents loved the child, the mother's alcohol use, instability, threatening communications, and repeated exposure of the child to traumatic conflict created meaningful risks to the child's emotional and psychological well-being.

The father's plan in Hornepayne was found to offer greater stability, family support, and cultural connection, despite concerns about his communication and mental health management.

The child's primary residence was therefore ordered to be with the father in Hornepayne, with extensive parenting time to the mother, while child and spousal support were deferred.

The applicant moved for a parenting time order, a refraining order against the Family Responsibility Office (FRO) regarding driver's license suspension, and a retroactive variation of child support.

The motion was opposed by the respondent and FRO.

The court dismissed the motion, finding no authority to remove FRO, that the applicant failed to meet procedural conditions for a refraining order (e.g., filing a sworn financial statement, bringing a proper Motion to Change), and failed to demonstrate a material change in circumstances or "clean hands" for the support variation.

The parenting time request was dismissed without prejudice, allowing the applicant to provide further evidence of required counselling.

The respondent, L.R., brought a motion to admit fresh evidence at trial and to suspend the applicant, P.G.'s, parenting time, following P.G.'s breach of a consent order by removing a child from L.R.'s care.

The court granted the motion to admit fresh evidence, applying the four-part test from R. v. Palmer.

Despite finding P.G. in breach of the order, the court declined to suspend P.G.'s parenting time, reasoning that there was no immediate threat to the child's well-being, the summer parenting schedule would soon commence, and a final decision on parenting time was imminent at trial.

The court ordered P.G. to return the child to L.R.'s care by a specific date and for parenting time to resume according to the existing summer schedule, emphasizing parental encouragement for parenting time.

This was a temporary order pending final trial submissions.

This case concerns a dispute over decision-making responsibility, primary residence, and parenting time for two young children.

The applicant mother sought sole decision-making and primary residence, proposing reduced parenting time for the respondent father and a change in the children's school and daycare for her convenience.

The respondent father initially sought to maintain joint decision-making and equal parenting time, later seeking sole decision-making and primary residence due to the applicant's unilateral actions.

The court found the applicant's actions, including unilaterally changing the child's school and daycare and misrepresenting an expired court order, demonstrated a lack of cooperation and disregard for the children's best interests.

The court also noted the applicant's history of domestic violence against the respondent.

The respondent's efforts to address past substance abuse were acknowledged.

The court ultimately granted sole decision-making responsibility to the respondent father and ordered the continuation of equal, week-about parenting time, with the children remaining at their current school and daycare in the respondent's community.

The applicant, Mr. G., brought motions to vary child and spousal support orders, change a parenting schedule, and prevent the Family Responsibility Office (FRO) from suspending his driver's license.

The respondent, Ms. R., brought a cross-motion to strike Mr. G.'s pleadings for his failure to comply with previous support orders and to obtain costs.

The court dismissed Mr. G.'s motions regarding child support, parenting time, and the refraining order, finding his disability claim unsubstantiated and his actions aimed at avoiding support obligations.

The motion to vary spousal support was adjourned for three months, conditional on Mr. G. significantly reducing child support arrears, failing which his pleadings would be struck and the matter would proceed without his full participation.

This appeal concerned the jurisdiction of an Ontario court to make a child support order under the Interjurisdictional Support Orders Act, 2002 (ISO Act) when a foreign support order from Finland already existed, but its registration in Ontario had been set aside due to the payor's fraudulent misrepresentations.

The Superior Court had quashed the Ontario Court of Justice's order for lack of jurisdiction, arguing that two valid support orders could not coexist.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that section 21 of the ISO Act explicitly grants Ontario courts jurisdiction to hear a new support application in such circumstances, especially given the payor's deceptive conduct.

The court emphasized the ISO Act's purpose of facilitating support enforcement and dismissed concerns about potential double recovery.

The mother brought an urgent motion for the return of the children, interim spousal support, and an increase in child support.

The father brought a cross-motion to change the parenting time set out in an existing interim order.

The court found a material change in circumstances based on the children's desire to spend more time with the father, but maintained the mother's decision-making responsibility and primary residence due to the high conflict between the parents.

The father's parenting time was slightly increased.

The court also ordered increased child support based on the father's higher income and awarded interim spousal support to the mother.

The appellant father appealed an Ontario Court of Justice order requiring him to pay ongoing child support and arrears.

The parties were divorced in Finland, where a valid child support order was previously made.

The father had abducted the children to Morocco but they were later returned to Finland.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal and quashed the Ontario child support order, finding that under the Cheng v. Liu framework, the Finnish court had exclusive jurisdiction over child support because it granted the divorce and issued the initial support order.

The court noted the father's history of misleading authorities but held that the Ontario court lacked jurisdiction to create a competing child support order.

The applicant sought statutory accident benefits following a motor vehicle accident, claiming a full-thickness shoulder tear warranted removal from the Minor Injury Guideline (MIG).

The respondent denied the claim, arguing the injuries were minor and the shoulder tear was not accident-related.

The Tribunal found the applicant failed to prove causation, noting a lack of contemporaneous complaints, a subsequent snow-shoveling injury, and a two-and-a-half-year delay before the ultrasound.

The application was dismissed, and the disputed treatment plan was denied.

The moving party, a mortgagor in default, brought a motion to set aside a default judgment obtained by the mortgagee.

The mortgagee had obtained an order for substituted service while the mortgagor was overseas and subsequently secured default judgment and a writ of possession.

Applying the five-factor test under Rule 19.08, the court found that while the motion was brought promptly and the delay was explained, the mortgagor failed to demonstrate an arguable defence on the merits.

The court also found real potential prejudice to the mortgagee given the amounts owed and the modest value of the property.

The motion was dismissed.

The defendant brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's tort action arising from a motor vehicle collision.

The defendant argued that the plaintiff was an excluded driver under an OPCF 28A endorsement, and therefore, pursuant to s. 267.6 of the Insurance Act, was precluded from recovering damages.

The plaintiff claimed an honest but mistaken belief that the exclusion applied only to a specific vehicle and not the newly acquired vehicle involved in the accident.

The court found the excluded driver endorsement to be clear and unambiguous, applying to "ALL VEHICLES INSURED UNDER THIS WAWANESA CERTIFICATE," and deemed the plaintiff's explanations implausible.

Concluding there was no genuine issue requiring a trial, the court granted summary judgment, dismissing the plaintiff's action.

The appellants sought to review an order dismissing their motion to set aside a default judgment.

The original action arose from a purchase of equipment in November 2007, with default judgment obtained in March 2011.

The appellants delayed over three years before bringing a motion to set aside the default judgment, which was dismissed by the motion judge.

The appellants then appealed but failed to perfect their appeal, resulting in dismissal for delay in April 2015.

After over three years of inaction, they brought a motion to review the dismissal order.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding the delay extraordinary and the equities of the situation favored dismissal despite the appellants' arguable defences on the merits.

The applicant sought an order setting aside a decision by Doherty J.A. dismissing his motion for leave to intervene as an added party in an appeal.

The applicant claimed to be the effective alter ego of the appellants and sought to adduce evidence he characterized as important and not previously presented.

The court found that the applicant had not satisfied the threshold criteria under Rule 13.03(1) for intervention as an added party, noting that the arguments he sought to make were more properly made by the appellants through their counsel.

The motion was dismissed.

The plaintiff contractor brought an action under the Construction Lien Act for unpaid invoices totaling $229,289.73 against the defendant property owner.

The plaintiff also sought a declaration that its lien had priority over a mortgage registered by Canada Capital Corporation Inc. At the undefended trial, the court granted judgment in favour of the plaintiff for the unpaid amount, confirmed the lien's priority over the mortgage pursuant to section 78(1) of the Act, and awarded costs and pre-judgment interest.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiffs' action regarding the ownership of a rural property, the court determined the costs payable to the successful defendants.

The defendants had made an offer to settle that was more favourable than the trial outcome, entitling them to partial indemnity costs up to the date of the offer and substantial indemnity costs thereafter.

Applying the factors under Rule 57 and the principle of proportionality, the court awarded the defendants costs fixed at $35,000 inclusive of fees, disbursements, and HST.