Daniel Sheppard

This appeal concerned whether public school teachers are protected from unreasonable search and seizure by section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms when the search is performed in the workplace by their employers.

The case involved a school principal reading and taking screenshots of a private, password-protected log maintained by two teachers on their personal Google account, accessed via a workplace laptop, which was then used by the school board for disciplinary action.

The Court of Appeal found that the labour relations arbitrator and the Divisional Court erred in their interpretation and application of section 8, concluding that the teachers had a reasonable expectation of privacy in their log, which was violated by the principal's actions.

The appeal was allowed, and the arbitrator's award was quashed.

This endorsement addresses the costs arising from a second Charter challenge to Ontario's election advertising spending restrictions (Bill 307), which the Attorney General successfully defended.

The Attorney General sought $580,652.54 in costs.

The Applicants argued against a costs award, citing the public importance of constitutional litigation and access to justice, and challenged the quantum of costs.

The court rejected the Applicants' access to justice argument, noting their financial capacity, and found the Attorney General's choice of external counsel and the work performed to be reasonable.

The court awarded the Attorney General $500,000 in all-inclusive costs, apportioned among the Applicant groups.

The applicants challenged the constitutionality of amendments to the Election Finances Act that imposed a 12-month pre-writ restricted spending period for third-party political advertising.

The government had previously enacted similar amendments that were struck down under section 2(b) of the Charter, but re-enacted them using the section 33 notwithstanding clause.

The applicants argued the amendments violated the right to vote under section 3 of the Charter, which is not subject to the notwithstanding clause.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the spending limits were carefully tailored to the egalitarian model of elections and did not infringe the right to meaningful participation in the electoral process.

The applicants challenged the constitutionality of amendments to the Election Finances Act that extended the pre-election restricted spending period for third-party political advertising from six to twelve months.

The court found that the 12-month restriction infringed freedom of expression under section 2(b) of the Charter.

Applying the Oakes test, the court held that while the objective of fostering fair elections was pressing and substantial, the 12-month period failed the minimal impairment test because the government's own experts indicated a six-month period was effective.

The impugned provisions were declared of no force or effect.

The applicants in a constitutional application requested leave to file factums exceeding the 30-page limit prescribed by the Practice Direction.

The Attorney General opposed the request.

The court denied the request, emphasizing that the 30-page limit is a serious policy intended to focus counsel on the issues, and that leave is exceptional and granted sparingly.

The court noted that since there was still a week before the factums were due, counsel had sufficient time to produce shorter, more focused versions.

Following an order to merge two local unions into a larger local, the former locals attempted to amend their trust and building corporation documents to distribute assets pro rata to their members rather than transferring them to the merged local.

The court found these actions were taken without authorization, violated the union's constitution, and constituted a breach of fiduciary duty by the trustees and directors.

The court declared the amendments null and void, imposed a constructive trust, and ordered the assets transferred to the merged local.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision dismissing his action in the Ontario Superior Court on the basis that the Canada Industrial Relations Board has exclusive jurisdiction over his claim.

The appellant sought redress for union disciplinary actions taken against him following his allegations of financial and procedural improprieties within the union.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that the essential character of the claim fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Canada Industrial Relations Board under the Canada Labour Code.

The Attorney General of Ontario appealed a Superior Court decision that declared provisions of Bill 5 (Better Local Government Act, 2018) unconstitutional for violating freedom of expression rights under s. 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

Bill 5 reduced Toronto's municipal wards from 47 to 25 mid-election.

The application judge found that the mid-campaign change substantially interfered with candidates' ability to communicate their political messages and violated voters' right to effective representation.

The Court of Appeal granted a stay of the lower court's order pending appeal, finding a strong likelihood that the application judge erred in law and that the appeal would succeed.

The court held that Bill 5 does not limit or restrict candidates' messages and that the right to effective representation falls under s. 3 (democratic rights), not s. 2(b) (freedom of expression), and s. 3 does not apply to municipal elections.

An appeal concerning when an international commercial arbitration award becomes "binding" on the parties for purposes of judicial recognition and enforcement under the UNCITRAL Model Law.

The appellants obtained an arbitration award from a rabbinical court in New York for significantly less than sought.

After unsuccessfully applying to set aside the award, they sought recognition and enforcement.

The respondents opposed on the ground that the award had not yet become binding because they intended to pursue further issues before the arbitral tribunal.

The application judge dismissed the recognition application.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the award was binding and should be recognized and enforced.

The court clarified that the potential jurisdiction of the arbitrator to entertain new issues about post-award events does not affect the binding nature of the award.

The applicants sought an order recognizing and enforcing an arbitral award of $400,000 made by a religious arbitral tribunal (Beth Din).

The respondents opposed, arguing the award was not yet binding as the tribunal had indicated a willingness to consider additional issues regarding costs and damages.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the arbitration process was not yet complete and the tribunal was not functus officio, applying the competence-competence principle to defer to the tribunal's jurisdiction.

The offender pleaded guilty to attempted possession of child pornography.

He was a 57-year-old single parent of a 12-year-old adopted son with special needs, employed as a chartered accountant in the Ontario Public Service for 24 years.

At his workplace in May 2014, cyber security detected attempts to access pornographic websites, including some with references to minors.

A search of his home revealed chat logs of online conversations with sexual content involving children.

The Crown sought six months custody; the defence sought 30 days served intermittently.

The court imposed 37 days intermittent custody followed by three years probation with extensive conditions, considering the offender's lack of criminal record, genuine remorse, low risk assessment, and the impact on his dependent son.

The two accused were charged with drugging and sexually assaulting two different complainants.

The first complainant alleged she was drugged and assaulted by one of the accused in 2003, but the court found reasonable doubt due to inconsistencies in the timeline and lack of corroborating evidence.

The second complainant alleged she was drugged and assaulted by both accused in 2011 after a night of heavy drinking.

The court found reasonable doubt that she was drugged, noting her ability to walk and send text messages during the alleged timeframe.

The court also found reasonable doubt regarding her lack of consent, or alternatively, that the accused had an honest but mistaken belief in her consent.

Both accused were found not guilty on all charges.

The Crown sought to introduce similar fact evidence between two separate sexual assault allegations involving different complainants.

The Crown argued that similarities between the incidents demonstrated that the accused administered a drug to each complainant to facilitate sexual assault and supported credibility findings.

The court reviewed the governing test for similar fact evidence, including the requirement that its probative value outweigh its prejudicial effect and that the similarities render coincidence objectively improbable.

Despite some overlapping circumstances, the court found significant differences between the incidents, including the nature of the relationships, the circumstances of the encounters, the symptoms described, and an eight‑year gap between the events.

The court concluded the similarities were not sufficiently distinctive to overcome the highly prejudicial effect of the proposed evidence.

Current and former sex workers challenged three Criminal Code provisions prohibiting bawdy-houses, living on avails, and public communication for prostitution purposes.

The Court held the provisions deprived security of the person by materially increasing risks of violence and preventing safety-enhancing measures, and that the deprivations were not in accordance with fundamental justice due to gross disproportionality and overbreadth.

The Court affirmed that lower courts may revisit precedent when a new legal issue or significant evidentiary change is shown, and confirmed deference to trial findings on social and legislative facts absent palpable and overriding error.

Section 210 (as related to prostitution), section 212(1)(j), and section 213(1)(c) were declared unconstitutional.

Invalidity was suspended for one year to permit legislative response.

This appeal and cross-appeal addressed whether Ontario’s SIU framework permits police officers involved in fatal incidents to consult counsel before completing duty notes.

The majority held the regulatory scheme does not permit consultation with counsel at the note-making stage, emphasizing transparency, public confidence, legislative history, and the duty to prepare independent, complete notes.

It rejected even limited pre-note legal consultation as inconsistent with the scheme’s objectives, while confirming officers may consult counsel after filing notes.

The cross-appeal was allowed, overturning the Court of Appeal’s allowance of basic legal advice prior to notes.

Dissenting reasons on cross-appeal would have preserved a narrow right to basic legal advice that excluded drafting assistance.