Gavin Magrath

The defendant freight forwarder brought a motion for partial summary judgment on its counterclaim for unpaid invoices.

The plaintiff had contracted the defendant to transport machinery from Brazil to Ontario, which was delayed and invoiced at a significantly higher amount than quoted.

The plaintiff sued for damages and the defendant counterclaimed for the unpaid invoice balance, relying on a clause in its Standard Trading Conditions requiring payment without set-off.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the disputed invoice amounts were deeply connected to the plaintiff's underlying claim and that granting partial summary judgment would not reduce the complexity or duration of the upcoming trial, risking inconsistent findings of fact.

The Plaintiff, a freight forwarder, sought summary judgment for unpaid seafreight invoices and dismissal of the Defendant's counterclaim for a volume incentive rebate.

The Plaintiff also sought punitive damages and solicitor-client costs, including a claim that costs should be paid personally by the Defendant's counsel under Rule 404.

The Federal Court granted summary judgment for the unpaid invoices and dismissed the counterclaim, finding no genuine issue for trial.

The Court awarded the Plaintiff its costs on a solicitor-client basis based on a contractual entitlement but declined to award punitive damages.

The Court dismissed the Rule 404 claim against the Defendant's counsel, finding no basis for the allegations of misconduct, and awarded the Defendant's counsel costs for responding to that claim.

The Attorney General of Ontario appealed a Superior Court decision that declared provisions of Bill 5 (Better Local Government Act, 2018) unconstitutional for violating freedom of expression rights under s. 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

Bill 5 reduced Toronto's municipal wards from 47 to 25 mid-election.

The application judge found that the mid-campaign change substantially interfered with candidates' ability to communicate their political messages and violated voters' right to effective representation.

The Court of Appeal granted a stay of the lower court's order pending appeal, finding a strong likelihood that the application judge erred in law and that the appeal would succeed.

The court held that Bill 5 does not limit or restrict candidates' messages and that the right to effective representation falls under s. 3 (democratic rights), not s. 2(b) (freedom of expression), and s. 3 does not apply to municipal elections.

The province enacted Bill 5, reducing Toronto wards from 47 to 25, mid-municipal election.

Applicants challenged its constitutionality.

The court found Bill 5 violated candidates' and voters' freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter, as it substantially interfered with campaign communication and denied effective representation due to increased ward sizes.

The violation was not justified under s. 1, as the legislative objectives (better decision-making, voter parity) were not pressing and substantial enough to warrant mid-election implementation, nor was minimal impairment demonstrated.

The impugned provisions were declared unconstitutional and set aside, requiring the election to proceed with 47 wards.

The applicant, a retail employee, alleged discrimination, harassment, and reprisal on the basis of disability regarding his employer's scheduling practices and his subsequent termination.

At a summary hearing, the Tribunal dismissed the scheduling allegations, finding no reasonable prospect of success because the applicant failed to provide sufficient medical documentation to trigger the duty to accommodate his restricted availability.

However, the Tribunal allowed the termination allegations to proceed to a merits hearing, as there were significant factual disputes regarding whether the applicant's conduct was disability-related and whether the termination constituted a reprisal.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's order allowing a judgment creditor to garnish funds from an estate that were directed by the testatrix's will to be used to purchase a non-commutable life annuity for the judgment debtor.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on the merits, holding that the legacy vested in the judgment debtor upon the testatrix's death and was therefore subject to garnishment.

However, the Court granted leave to appeal the costs order and directed that the costs of the initial motion be paid out of the estate rather than by the appellant.