Christine Davies

The appellant sought to uphold a provincial spending limit restricting third party political advertising to $600,000 in the year before a fixed-date election, while political parties faced no limits in the first six months of that period.

The majority held that the spending limit infringes s. 3 of the Charter by creating an absolute disproportionality in the political discourse, allowing political parties to drown out third party voices during a critical democratic period.

The majority further held the limit could not be saved under s. 1 as it failed the minimal impairment stage.

Two sets of dissenting judges would have allowed the appeal, finding the limit did not infringe s. 3 of the Charter on the evidentiary record, with the dissenters disagreeing on whether an expressive component exists within s. 3.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued supplementary reasons regarding the remedy and costs following its prior decision (2023 ONCA 139) which declared s. 37.10.1(2) of the Election Finances Act unconstitutional.

The appellants sought to invalidate additional provisions, including the definition of "political advertising," s. 37.0.1, s. 37.10.1(3)-(3.1), and s. 37.10.2.

The court declined this request, finding these provisions were not inextricably linked to the previously invalidated section and were not independently shown to infringe section 3 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court also noted that the election period spending limits (s. 37.10.1(1)) were not challenged and remain in force.

No disposition was made as to costs, as the parties had reached an agreement.

This appeal concerned the constitutional validity of Ontario's third-party election spending limits, specifically the extension of the pre-writ restricted period from 6 to 12 months without increasing the spending cap.

The appellants argued this infringed the informational component of the right to vote under s. 3 of the Charter, which is not subject to the notwithstanding clause (s. 33).

The Court of Appeal found that while s. 33 was properly invoked, the extended spending restrictions were not "carefully tailored" and did not permit a "modest informational campaign," thereby infringing the s. 3 right to meaningful participation in the electoral process.

The infringement was not justified under s. 1 of the Charter.

The court declared the impugned provision invalid and suspended the declaration for 12 months.

This endorsement addresses the costs arising from a second Charter challenge to Ontario's election advertising spending restrictions (Bill 307), which the Attorney General successfully defended.

The Attorney General sought $580,652.54 in costs.

The Applicants argued against a costs award, citing the public importance of constitutional litigation and access to justice, and challenged the quantum of costs.

The court rejected the Applicants' access to justice argument, noting their financial capacity, and found the Attorney General's choice of external counsel and the work performed to be reasonable.

The court awarded the Attorney General $500,000 in all-inclusive costs, apportioned among the Applicant groups.

The applicants challenged the constitutionality of amendments to the Election Finances Act that imposed a 12-month pre-writ restricted spending period for third-party political advertising.

The government had previously enacted similar amendments that were struck down under section 2(b) of the Charter, but re-enacted them using the section 33 notwithstanding clause.

The applicants argued the amendments violated the right to vote under section 3 of the Charter, which is not subject to the notwithstanding clause.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the spending limits were carefully tailored to the egalitarian model of elections and did not infringe the right to meaningful participation in the electoral process.

The applicants challenged the constitutionality of amendments to the Election Finances Act that extended the pre-election restricted spending period for third-party political advertising from six to twelve months.

The court found that the 12-month restriction infringed freedom of expression under section 2(b) of the Charter.

Applying the Oakes test, the court held that while the objective of fostering fair elections was pressing and substantial, the 12-month period failed the minimal impairment test because the government's own experts indicated a six-month period was effective.

The impugned provisions were declared of no force or effect.

The applicants in a constitutional application requested leave to file factums exceeding the 30-page limit prescribed by the Practice Direction.

The Attorney General opposed the request.

The court denied the request, emphasizing that the 30-page limit is a serious policy intended to focus counsel on the issues, and that leave is exceptional and granted sparingly.

The court noted that since there was still a week before the factums were due, counsel had sufficient time to produce shorter, more focused versions.

The province enacted Bill 5, reducing Toronto wards from 47 to 25, mid-municipal election.

Applicants challenged its constitutionality.

The court found Bill 5 violated candidates' and voters' freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter, as it substantially interfered with campaign communication and denied effective representation due to increased ward sizes.

The violation was not justified under s. 1, as the legislative objectives (better decision-making, voter parity) were not pressing and substantial enough to warrant mid-election implementation, nor was minimal impairment demonstrated.

The impugned provisions were declared unconstitutional and set aside, requiring the election to proceed with 47 wards.

The plaintiff, a 26-year employee, sued his former employer for constructive dismissal after he was removed from his long-standing position as a dock supervisor and offered a newly created, lesser role as a freight analyst.

The employer alleged performance issues, which the court found were unsubstantiated and part of a targeted effort to find fault.

The court held that the unilateral change in duties constituted a fundamental breach of the employment contract, amounting to constructive dismissal.

The court further found that the plaintiff was not required to mitigate his damages by accepting the demeaning new position in a toxic work environment.

The plaintiff was awarded 18 months' reasonable notice, but his claim for moral damages was dismissed.

The plaintiff brought a motion for certification of a class action and approval of a settlement agreement regarding the defendant's sale of daily deal vouchers with allegedly illegal expiration dates.

The court found that the certification criteria under the Class Proceedings Act were met and that the settlement, which established a $535,000 fund, was fair and reasonable.

The court also approved class counsel fees of $235,000, noting that while pre-allocated fees require strict scrutiny, the amount was justified given the significant non-monetary value of the settlement to the class.

The plaintiff class, comprising salaried and executive retirees of General Motors of Canada Limited (GMCL), brought a class action alleging that GMCL breached its contracts by reducing post-retirement health care and life insurance benefits.

On motions for partial summary judgment, the court held that the reservation of rights clauses in the benefit documents for salaried employees were ambiguous and did not clearly permit GMCL to reduce benefits after the employees had retired.

Applying principles of contractual interpretation, including contra proferentem and the duty of good faith, the court found GMCL breached its contracts with the salaried retirees, including new hires and early retirees.

However, the court found that the reservation of rights clause for executive retirees was clear and unambiguous, allowing GMCL to reduce their benefits.

The defendant employer appealed an order of a Master requiring production of internal corporate documents and refusing to strike certain documents from the plaintiff’s summary judgment motion record in a certified class action concerning post‑retirement employee benefits.

The court interpreted the certification order and settlement agreement governing the litigation, which restricted discovery and admissible documents to “common documents” shared with class members or historical versions of benefits plan documents.

The Master erred by applying a general relevance test rather than the contractual limitations agreed upon by the parties.

Internal board minutes, memoranda, and corporate financial statements were not “common documents” or historical plan documents because they were not shared with employees as part of the benefits package.

The appeal was allowed, the production order was set aside, and the impugned materials were struck from the motion record.