Selwyn A. Pieters

The applicants sought judicial review of administrative decisions dismissing disciplinary charges against two police officers for lack of jurisdiction.

The hearing officers and the Ontario Civilian Police Commission found that the six-month statutory deadline under s. 83(17) of the Police Services Act for serving a notice of hearing had expired.

The applicants argued that the deadline should be paused during a review by the Complaints Director.

The Divisional Court dismissed the applications, holding that the administrative decision-makers reasonably interpreted the plain wording of the statute, which contained no exception for a Director's review.

The appellant sought to compel the respondent bank to reinstate a chequing account that had been closed.

The appellant argued that section 627.17(1) of the Bank Act required the bank to maintain the account once opened.

The application judge rejected this argument, holding that section 627.17 pertains only to the opening of accounts, not their closure.

The Court of Appeal affirmed, finding no reviewable error and agreeing that the word "open" means to start something, not to continue it indefinitely.

The appeal was dismissed with costs of $15,000 payable to the respondent.

The offender pleaded guilty to second degree murder of his former domestic partner.

The victim was killed in her home in a brutal attack involving multiple stab wounds and near-decapitation.

The offender had a documented history of violence and threats toward the victim, breached court-ordered no-contact conditions, and committed the murder while the victim's young child was present in the home.

The court imposed a life sentence with parole ineligibility of 18 years, reduced from 20 years due to Charter violations arising from the offender's mistreatment during an Institutional Crisis Intervention Team deployment at Maplehurst Correctional Centre.

This endorsement addresses a media request for the release of exhibits from the sentencing hearing in R. v. Ritchie.

The court permitted the release of all exhibits to the media, subject to privacy protections for inmates and the victim’s child, and restrictions on the publication of certain sensitive materials, including medical and psychiatric reports.

The order was made with the consent of all parties involved.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder after stabbing the deceased, who had previously robbed him of a firearm.

On appeal, the appellant argued that administrative errors in compiling the 2022 jury roll violated his Charter rights to a representative jury and caused a miscarriage of justice.

He also challenged the trial judge's refusal to leave self-defence with the jury, the admission of prior discreditable conduct evidence, the voluntariness of his police statement, and the fitness of his 13-year parole ineligibility period.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction and sentence appeals, finding no appearance of unfairness in the jury roll process, no air of reality to self-defence, and no errors in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings or sentencing.

The appellant filed a public complaint regarding a police officer's conduct during a traffic stop.

After the Chief of Police concluded the misconduct was not serious enough to warrant a hearing, the appellant requested a review by the Independent Police Review Director under section 71 of the Police Services Act.

The Director directed the Chief to serve a Notice of Hearing but explicitly instructed the Chief not to apply to the Board for a finding that the delay was reasonable under section 83(17), despite more than six months having passed.

The Hearing Officer dismissed the charges for noncompliance with section 83(17).

On appeal, the Ontario Civilian Police Commission upheld the dismissal, finding that section 83(17) applies to the pre-charge period including a section 71 review, and failure to obtain the Board's opinion on the reasonableness of the delay resulted in a loss of jurisdiction.

The public complainant sought leave to appeal a Hearing Officer's decision dismissing misconduct charges against a police officer due to noncompliance with the six-month delay provision in s. 83(17) of the Police Services Act.

The respondent officer objected to the Independent Police Review Director participating in the leave application.

The Commission held that the Director has standing to participate in pre-hearing steps, including leave applications.

The Commission granted leave to appeal, finding that the interplay between the Director's oversight powers and the Police Services Board's obligations regarding delay raises issues of significant importance to the policing profession and the community.

The defendant brought an application for a stay of proceedings under section 11(b) of the Charter due to unreasonable delay.

The total delay from the information being sworn (October 10, 2021) to the anticipated end of trial (April 18, 2024) was 922 days.

The court deducted 43 days for defence delay in scheduling a JPT and 14 days as an exceptional circumstance for trial scheduling due to the pandemic.

The court found no further defence delay for failing to proactively assert s. 11(b) rights, as the Crown had twice declined to prioritize the case.

Despite potential Covid-19 deductions, the net delay of 807 days (26.5 months) remained well above the 18-month Jordan ceiling for the Ontario Court of Justice.

A stay of proceedings was granted.

Dwayne Thomas, a correctional officer, was charged with sexual assault and breach of trust involving an inmate, J.S., at the Vanier Centre for Women.

J.S. alleged non-consensual vaginal intercourse in a shower area, providing pants with the accused's semen as evidence.

Thomas claimed the encounter was consensual and initiated by J.S., involving manual masturbation, not intercourse.

The court found J.S. to be a credible witness and Thomas's testimony unbelievable and evasive.

The court concluded that J.S. did not consent to the sexual contact, and Thomas's actions constituted a serious breach of his public trust as a correctional officer.

Thomas was found guilty on both counts.

Vaughan Roberts pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a loaded restricted firearm.

The sentencing hearing considered the objective seriousness of the offence (possession linked to drug trafficking, flight from police) alongside significant mitigating factors, including the offender's youth, lack of prior record, guilty plea, and difficult pre-trial custody.

Crucially, the court treated a prior racist armed robbery attempt against the offender, where he acted in self-defence and was subsequently charged with murder (later dropped), as a significant attenuating circumstance.

The court also considered the impact of systemic anti-Black racism on the offender's life, which influenced the blending of sentencing objectives towards rehabilitation.

Despite the Crown seeking actual incarceration, the court imposed a conditional sentence of 538 days (approx. 18 months) after credit for pre-trial custody, followed by 18 months probation, a DNA order, and a 10-year firearms prohibition.

The complainant, a sergeant at a detention centre, filed a complaint alleging discrimination based on family status, race, and other grounds after her requests for childcare accommodation and remote work were denied.

The employer raised a preliminary objection that the complaint was filed out of time under the Public Service of Ontario Act and its Regulations.

The complainant argued that the statutory time limits should not apply because her claim involved Charter rights, relying on the Prete decision.

The Public Service Grievance Board sustained the employer's preliminary objection, finding that the complaint was filed months after the mandatory 14-day time limit and that the Board lacked jurisdiction to waive the time limits, even for Charter claims.

The offender, Connor Madison, was found guilty of second-degree murder for the fatal stabbing of Stephon Knight-Roberts.

The court was tasked with determining the period of parole ineligibility, which is statutorily set at a minimum of 10 years for second-degree murder.

Considering the brutal and prolonged nature of the offence, the offender's armed presence despite recognizances, and the devastating impact on the victim's family, balanced against the offender's Indigenous background, difficult upbringing, mental health issues, and genuine remorse, the court fixed the parole ineligibility period at 13 years.

This ruling provides the judge's reasons for not allowing the defence of self-defence to be put to the jury in a second-degree murder trial.

The accused, Connor Madison, was found guilty by a jury.

The court concluded that the defence of self-defence lacked an "air of reality" because the evidence indicated the accused's actions were an act of revenge for a prior robbery, rather than a response to an ongoing threat.

The victim was unarmed and no longer posing a threat when the fatal stabbings occurred, and the accused's conduct was deemed unreasonable in the circumstances.

This ruling concerns the admissibility of a post-arrest statement made by the accused, charged with second-degree murder, to the police.

The Crown sought to admit the statement for cross-examination, while the accused sought to exclude it, alleging violations of his s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel and that the statement was involuntary due to a lack of operating mind and an oppressive atmosphere (including the absence of face masks during the COVID-19 pandemic).

The court found no Charter violation, determining that delays in providing counsel were justified by safety and practical considerations, and that the accused's repeated requests for counsel during the interview did not trigger a right to a second consultation under the *Sinclair* framework.

The court also concluded that the accused possessed an operating mind and that the interview conditions, including the lack of masks, did not create an oppressive atmosphere given the prevailing public health understanding at the time.

The statement was deemed voluntary and admissible for cross-examination, though specific portions where the accused asserted his right to silence or requested counsel were deemed inadmissible for direct cross-examination.

This ruling addresses three pre-trial applications by the Crown regarding the admissibility of evidence in a second-degree murder trial.

The Crown sought to introduce evidence of the accused's prior discreditable conduct (possession of a knife two hours before the stabbing), contemporaneous discreditable conduct (robbery of a gun from the accused by the deceased), and after-the-fact conduct (failure to assist the victim, calm departure, disposal of evidence, and flight).

The accused conceded the admissibility of the gun robbery evidence but opposed the others, arguing lack of probative value or undue prejudice.

The court granted all three applications, finding the evidence relevant to material issues such as intent, self-defence, and the overall narrative, with probative value outweighing any prejudicial effect.

The applicant, charged with second-degree murder and attempted murder, sought release on bail pending trial.

The Crown alleged the applicant shot and killed one victim and attempted to shoot another.

The applicant argued self-defence, presenting evidence that he was the target of a racially motivated robbery conspiracy by the deceased.

The court found the applicant met his onus on the primary, secondary, and tertiary grounds, noting weaknesses in the Crown's case, the racial context of the incident, the strength of the proposed release plan, and the risks posed by a Covid-19 outbreak at the detention centre.

Bail was granted with strict conditions, including GPS monitoring and house arrest.

The plaintiffs sought an interlocutory injunction to prevent their neighbours, the defendants, from parking their vehicles on the city boulevard in a manner that allegedly narrowed the access to the plaintiffs' shared driveway.

The plaintiffs argued this constituted a nuisance and infringed their property rights, seeking to apply a modified injunction test requiring only a strong prima facie case.

The court rejected the modified test, finding no substantial interference with property rights.

Applying the traditional RJR McDonald test, the court found a serious issue to be tried but concluded the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate irreparable harm.

The motion for an injunction was dismissed, though the defendants were ordered to remove a parking curb from the boulevard.

The Crown sought a discretionary publication ban under section 517 of the Criminal Code during a bail hearing.

The accused opposed the request.

The court denied the application, finding that the Crown's concerns regarding the tainting of prospective jurors and witnesses were speculative and not grounded in the evidence.

The court noted that the trial was likely at least a year away and public knowledge of such matters is fleeting.

The Black Action Defence Committee applied for leave to intervene in a subpoena motion and procedendo application related to an ongoing criminal trial.

The accused, charged with human trafficking, alleged racial profiling and subpoenaed a police officer to testify.

The officer applied to quash the subpoena.

The proposed intervenor sought to make submissions on racial profiling.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, finding that interventions in criminal proceedings are rare and the proposed intervenor would not offer a contribution beyond what the accused could already provide.

The plaintiff brought an ex parte motion for an order validating and substituting service on the defendants, Guyana National Newspapers Limited (GNNL) and Mark Anthony Devonish, due to the impracticality of personal service amidst the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court granted the order, dispensing with service of the motion itself and ordering substituted service by email for all future pleadings and documents.

No costs were ordered.