Selwyn A. Pieters

The appellant sought to compel the respondent bank to reinstate a chequing account that had been closed.

The appellant argued that section 627.17(1) of the Bank Act required the bank to maintain the account once opened.

The application judge rejected this argument, holding that section 627.17 pertains only to the opening of accounts, not their closure.

The Court of Appeal affirmed, finding no reviewable error and agreeing that the word "open" means to start something, not to continue it indefinitely.

The appeal was dismissed with costs of $15,000 payable to the respondent.

The offender pleaded guilty to second degree murder of his former domestic partner.

The victim was killed in her home in a brutal attack involving multiple stab wounds and near-decapitation.

The offender had a documented history of violence and threats toward the victim, breached court-ordered no-contact conditions, and committed the murder while the victim's young child was present in the home.

The court imposed a life sentence with parole ineligibility of 18 years, reduced from 20 years due to Charter violations arising from the offender's mistreatment during an Institutional Crisis Intervention Team deployment at Maplehurst Correctional Centre.

This endorsement addresses a media request for the release of exhibits from the sentencing hearing in R. v. Ritchie.

The court permitted the release of all exhibits to the media, subject to privacy protections for inmates and the victim’s child, and restrictions on the publication of certain sensitive materials, including medical and psychiatric reports.

The order was made with the consent of all parties involved.

The defendant brought an application for a stay of proceedings under section 11(b) of the Charter due to unreasonable delay.

The total delay from the information being sworn (October 10, 2021) to the anticipated end of trial (April 18, 2024) was 922 days.

The court deducted 43 days for defence delay in scheduling a JPT and 14 days as an exceptional circumstance for trial scheduling due to the pandemic.

The court found no further defence delay for failing to proactively assert s. 11(b) rights, as the Crown had twice declined to prioritize the case.

Despite potential Covid-19 deductions, the net delay of 807 days (26.5 months) remained well above the 18-month Jordan ceiling for the Ontario Court of Justice.

A stay of proceedings was granted.

Dwayne Thomas, a correctional officer, was charged with sexual assault and breach of trust involving an inmate, J.S., at the Vanier Centre for Women.

J.S. alleged non-consensual vaginal intercourse in a shower area, providing pants with the accused's semen as evidence.

Thomas claimed the encounter was consensual and initiated by J.S., involving manual masturbation, not intercourse.

The court found J.S. to be a credible witness and Thomas's testimony unbelievable and evasive.

The court concluded that J.S. did not consent to the sexual contact, and Thomas's actions constituted a serious breach of his public trust as a correctional officer.

Thomas was found guilty on both counts.

Vaughan Roberts pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a loaded restricted firearm.

The sentencing hearing considered the objective seriousness of the offence (possession linked to drug trafficking, flight from police) alongside significant mitigating factors, including the offender's youth, lack of prior record, guilty plea, and difficult pre-trial custody.

Crucially, the court treated a prior racist armed robbery attempt against the offender, where he acted in self-defence and was subsequently charged with murder (later dropped), as a significant attenuating circumstance.

The court also considered the impact of systemic anti-Black racism on the offender's life, which influenced the blending of sentencing objectives towards rehabilitation.

Despite the Crown seeking actual incarceration, the court imposed a conditional sentence of 538 days (approx. 18 months) after credit for pre-trial custody, followed by 18 months probation, a DNA order, and a 10-year firearms prohibition.

The offender, Connor Madison, was found guilty of second-degree murder for the fatal stabbing of Stephon Knight-Roberts.

The court was tasked with determining the period of parole ineligibility, which is statutorily set at a minimum of 10 years for second-degree murder.

Considering the brutal and prolonged nature of the offence, the offender's armed presence despite recognizances, and the devastating impact on the victim's family, balanced against the offender's Indigenous background, difficult upbringing, mental health issues, and genuine remorse, the court fixed the parole ineligibility period at 13 years.

This ruling provides the judge's reasons for not allowing the defence of self-defence to be put to the jury in a second-degree murder trial.

The accused, Connor Madison, was found guilty by a jury.

The court concluded that the defence of self-defence lacked an "air of reality" because the evidence indicated the accused's actions were an act of revenge for a prior robbery, rather than a response to an ongoing threat.

The victim was unarmed and no longer posing a threat when the fatal stabbings occurred, and the accused's conduct was deemed unreasonable in the circumstances.

This ruling concerns the admissibility of a post-arrest statement made by the accused, charged with second-degree murder, to the police.

The Crown sought to admit the statement for cross-examination, while the accused sought to exclude it, alleging violations of his s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel and that the statement was involuntary due to a lack of operating mind and an oppressive atmosphere (including the absence of face masks during the COVID-19 pandemic).

The court found no Charter violation, determining that delays in providing counsel were justified by safety and practical considerations, and that the accused's repeated requests for counsel during the interview did not trigger a right to a second consultation under the *Sinclair* framework.

The court also concluded that the accused possessed an operating mind and that the interview conditions, including the lack of masks, did not create an oppressive atmosphere given the prevailing public health understanding at the time.

The statement was deemed voluntary and admissible for cross-examination, though specific portions where the accused asserted his right to silence or requested counsel were deemed inadmissible for direct cross-examination.

This ruling addresses three pre-trial applications by the Crown regarding the admissibility of evidence in a second-degree murder trial.

The Crown sought to introduce evidence of the accused's prior discreditable conduct (possession of a knife two hours before the stabbing), contemporaneous discreditable conduct (robbery of a gun from the accused by the deceased), and after-the-fact conduct (failure to assist the victim, calm departure, disposal of evidence, and flight).

The accused conceded the admissibility of the gun robbery evidence but opposed the others, arguing lack of probative value or undue prejudice.

The court granted all three applications, finding the evidence relevant to material issues such as intent, self-defence, and the overall narrative, with probative value outweighing any prejudicial effect.

The applicant, charged with second-degree murder and attempted murder, sought release on bail pending trial.

The Crown alleged the applicant shot and killed one victim and attempted to shoot another.

The applicant argued self-defence, presenting evidence that he was the target of a racially motivated robbery conspiracy by the deceased.

The court found the applicant met his onus on the primary, secondary, and tertiary grounds, noting weaknesses in the Crown's case, the racial context of the incident, the strength of the proposed release plan, and the risks posed by a Covid-19 outbreak at the detention centre.

Bail was granted with strict conditions, including GPS monitoring and house arrest.

The plaintiff brought an ex parte motion for an order validating and substituting service on the defendants, Guyana National Newspapers Limited (GNNL) and Mark Anthony Devonish, due to the impracticality of personal service amidst the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court granted the order, dispensing with service of the motion itself and ordering substituted service by email for all future pleadings and documents.

No costs were ordered.

The Office of the Independent Police Review Director (OIPRD) appealed a Divisional Court decision that quashed its second finding (unsubstantiated) regarding a police misconduct complaint by the Stanleys and ordered a third investigation.

The Court of Appeal upheld the quashing of the OIPRD's second decision, but on the ground that the OIPRD was functus officio and lacked statutory or common law authority to reconsider its initial substantiated finding.

The Court set aside the Divisional Court's order for a third investigation, restoring the OIPRD's original decision to refer the matter for a disciplinary hearing, while noting that the OIPRD could now apply its newly amended rules for reconsideration.

An appeal concerning the constitutionality of security screening measures implemented at police headquarters.

The chief of police instituted a security protocol requiring all persons entering the building to pass through metal detection and bag screening.

A resident who regularly attended public meetings of the police services board refused to submit to screening and was denied entry.

The application judge found the security protocol violated freedom of expression rights and was not prescribed by law.

The appellate court reversed, holding that while the protocol limited freedom of expression, it was prescribed by law through the occupier's common law powers and the statutory duty to ensure safety under the Occupiers' Liability Act, and was justified as a reasonable limit under the Charter.

This is a costs endorsement following the Court of Appeal's decision allowing an appeal from a summary judgment that had dismissed the appellant's action against the respondent University.

The motion judge had granted summary judgment in favor of the University but declined to award costs.

Following the successful appeal, the appellant sought costs of the summary judgment motion on a partial indemnity scale.

The Court of Appeal awarded costs to the appellant in the amount of $22,500 inclusive of disbursements and HST, a middle ground between the appellant's claim of $40,669.71 and the University's submission of $15,480.45.

A doctoral student appealed a summary judgment dismissing his action against a university for breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty.

The student alleged that his supervisory committee pressured him to transfer out of his Ph.D. program because members lacked expertise in his specialized research area and were unwilling to acquire it, and that they misled him about funding availability.

The motion judge found genuine issues of fact but dismissed the action as a matter of law, holding that academic matters should be resolved through the university's internal complaint process.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that courts have jurisdiction to entertain claims by students against universities for damages based on tort or breach of contract, even where the dispute arises from academic matters.

The remedy sought—damages—is indicative of jurisdiction, not whether the dispute is academic in nature.

The Attorney General of Ontario appealed a Superior Court decision that declared provisions of Bill 5 (Better Local Government Act, 2018) unconstitutional for violating freedom of expression rights under s. 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

Bill 5 reduced Toronto's municipal wards from 47 to 25 mid-election.

The application judge found that the mid-campaign change substantially interfered with candidates' ability to communicate their political messages and violated voters' right to effective representation.

The Court of Appeal granted a stay of the lower court's order pending appeal, finding a strong likelihood that the application judge erred in law and that the appeal would succeed.

The court held that Bill 5 does not limit or restrict candidates' messages and that the right to effective representation falls under s. 3 (democratic rights), not s. 2(b) (freedom of expression), and s. 3 does not apply to municipal elections.

The province enacted Bill 5, reducing Toronto wards from 47 to 25, mid-municipal election.

Applicants challenged its constitutionality.

The court found Bill 5 violated candidates' and voters' freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter, as it substantially interfered with campaign communication and denied effective representation due to increased ward sizes.

The violation was not justified under s. 1, as the legislative objectives (better decision-making, voter parity) were not pressing and substantial enough to warrant mid-election implementation, nor was minimal impairment demonstrated.

The impugned provisions were declared unconstitutional and set aside, requiring the election to proceed with 47 wards.

The defendant, the University of Western Ontario, brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's claim.

The plaintiff, a former Ph.D. student, alleged breach of contract and fiduciary duty due to inadequate supervision and misleading information about funding after his thesis supervisor died.

The court granted summary judgment, dismissing the action, on the basis that the plaintiff's complaints were academic issues that should have been resolved through the university's internal processes, subject to judicial review, rather than a civil action.

The court emphasized the university's expertise, the policy of judicial deference to academic decisions, and the more effective remedies available through internal university mechanisms.

The defendant university brought a motion to strike the plaintiff’s Fresh As Amended Statement of Claim alleging breach of fiduciary duty and breach of contract arising from a dispute over graduate program funding and supervision.

The court held that the pleading improperly contained extensive evidence rather than concise material facts and failed to adequately plead the essential elements of either fiduciary duty or contract.

The allegations did not establish the existence of a trust or any undertaking by the university to prefer the student’s interests, nor did they sufficiently identify the contractual terms allegedly breached.

The court also noted that disputes rooted in academic decision-making may fall outside the court’s jurisdiction and be more appropriately addressed through judicial review.

The motion to strike was granted, but the plaintiff was granted leave to amend the claim again.