Selwyn A. Pieters

The applicants, homeless individuals living in encampments in City of Toronto parks, brought a motion for an interlocutory injunction to prevent the City from enforcing its by-law prohibiting camping in parks during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The applicants argued that enforcement violated their rights under sections 7, 12, and 15 of the Charter.

The City moved to exclude the applicants' expert medical evidence on the basis of bias, which the court dismissed, finding the evidence relevant and necessary.

On the injunction test, the court found the applicants raised a serious issue to be tried and established irreparable harm.

However, the balance of convenience favoured the City, as the City had taken significant steps to provide safe shelter spaces with physical distancing, and the public interest in maintaining parks for everyone's use outweighed the applicants' interest in a sweeping suspension of the by-law.

The motion was dismissed.

The Office of the Independent Police Review Director (OIPRD) appealed a Divisional Court decision that quashed its second finding (unsubstantiated) regarding a police misconduct complaint by the Stanleys and ordered a third investigation.

The Court of Appeal upheld the quashing of the OIPRD's second decision, but on the ground that the OIPRD was functus officio and lacked statutory or common law authority to reconsider its initial substantiated finding.

The Court set aside the Divisional Court's order for a third investigation, restoring the OIPRD's original decision to refer the matter for a disciplinary hearing, while noting that the OIPRD could now apply its newly amended rules for reconsideration.

An appeal concerning the constitutionality of security screening measures implemented at police headquarters.

The chief of police instituted a security protocol requiring all persons entering the building to pass through metal detection and bag screening.

A resident who regularly attended public meetings of the police services board refused to submit to screening and was denied entry.

The application judge found the security protocol violated freedom of expression rights and was not prescribed by law.

The appellate court reversed, holding that while the protocol limited freedom of expression, it was prescribed by law through the occupier's common law powers and the statutory duty to ensure safety under the Occupiers' Liability Act, and was justified as a reasonable limit under the Charter.

This is a costs endorsement following the Court of Appeal's decision allowing an appeal from a summary judgment that had dismissed the appellant's action against the respondent University.

The motion judge had granted summary judgment in favor of the University but declined to award costs.

Following the successful appeal, the appellant sought costs of the summary judgment motion on a partial indemnity scale.

The Court of Appeal awarded costs to the appellant in the amount of $22,500 inclusive of disbursements and HST, a middle ground between the appellant's claim of $40,669.71 and the University's submission of $15,480.45.

The appellant, a children's residence operator, appealed a proposal to revoke its licence and brought a motion for confidentiality orders and a timeline order.

The Licence Appeal Tribunal applied the openness principle from Toronto Star v. AG Ontario, balancing it against the privacy interests of children.

The Tribunal granted orders protecting the identities of children and temporarily sealing Children's Aid Society records, but refused to anonymize the appellant's name, finding no significant privacy interest outweighed the openness principle for a regulated corporate entity.

The request for a 90-day timeline order was dismissed as a consent timetable was already in place.

A doctoral student appealed a summary judgment dismissing his action against a university for breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty.

The student alleged that his supervisory committee pressured him to transfer out of his Ph.D. program because members lacked expertise in his specialized research area and were unwilling to acquire it, and that they misled him about funding availability.

The motion judge found genuine issues of fact but dismissed the action as a matter of law, holding that academic matters should be resolved through the university's internal complaint process.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that courts have jurisdiction to entertain claims by students against universities for damages based on tort or breach of contract, even where the dispute arises from academic matters.

The remedy sought—damages—is indicative of jurisdiction, not whether the dispute is academic in nature.

The applicants sought judicial review of a decision by the Director of the Office of the Independent Police Review Director (OIPRD) which found their complaints against a police officer unsubstantiated.

The Director had initially found evidence of misconduct and referred the matter for adjudication, but later reopened the investigation and reversed his decision after undisclosed communications with the police service.

The Divisional Court found that these undisclosed communications compromised the independence of the Director and breached procedural fairness.

The court quashed the Director's decision and remitted the matter for a fresh investigation by a different investigator.

The Attorney General of Ontario appealed a Superior Court decision that declared provisions of Bill 5 (Better Local Government Act, 2018) unconstitutional for violating freedom of expression rights under s. 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

Bill 5 reduced Toronto's municipal wards from 47 to 25 mid-election.

The application judge found that the mid-campaign change substantially interfered with candidates' ability to communicate their political messages and violated voters' right to effective representation.

The Court of Appeal granted a stay of the lower court's order pending appeal, finding a strong likelihood that the application judge erred in law and that the appeal would succeed.

The court held that Bill 5 does not limit or restrict candidates' messages and that the right to effective representation falls under s. 3 (democratic rights), not s. 2(b) (freedom of expression), and s. 3 does not apply to municipal elections.

The province enacted Bill 5, reducing Toronto wards from 47 to 25, mid-municipal election.

Applicants challenged its constitutionality.

The court found Bill 5 violated candidates' and voters' freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter, as it substantially interfered with campaign communication and denied effective representation due to increased ward sizes.

The violation was not justified under s. 1, as the legislative objectives (better decision-making, voter parity) were not pressing and substantial enough to warrant mid-election implementation, nor was minimal impairment demonstrated.

The impugned provisions were declared unconstitutional and set aside, requiring the election to proceed with 47 wards.

The defendant, the University of Western Ontario, brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's claim.

The plaintiff, a former Ph.D. student, alleged breach of contract and fiduciary duty due to inadequate supervision and misleading information about funding after his thesis supervisor died.

The court granted summary judgment, dismissing the action, on the basis that the plaintiff's complaints were academic issues that should have been resolved through the university's internal processes, subject to judicial review, rather than a civil action.

The court emphasized the university's expertise, the policy of judicial deference to academic decisions, and the more effective remedies available through internal university mechanisms.

The applicant sought judicial review of two decisions of the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario dismissing his discrimination complaint.

He argued the Tribunal unfairly refused to hear three allegations, improperly conducted the hearing by teleconference, and reached an unreasonable decision.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Tribunal reasonably declined to re-litigate allegations already decided in another complainant's hearing, the applicant had agreed to the teleconference format, and the Tribunal's decision was defensible on the facts.

The applicant alleged racial discrimination by the Toronto Police Service.

In this interim decision, the Tribunal addressed three requests for orders: the respondents' request to bifurcate the hearing, the applicant's request for CCTV footage from the Toronto Community Housing Corporation, and the OHRC's request for production of various police records.

The Tribunal granted the bifurcation request, ordering the hearing to proceed in three stages.

The applicant's request for CCTV footage was dismissed because the footage no longer existed.

The OHRC's requests for production were partially granted; however, the Tribunal found that section 95 of the Police Services Act prevented the disclosure of complaints made under Part V of that Act.

The Member pleaded guilty to professional misconduct for teaching a long-term occasional assignment while his teaching certificate was suspended by a previous order of the Discipline Committee.

The Member failed to notify his employer of the suspension.

The Discipline Committee accepted a joint submission on penalty, ordering a reprimand, a five-month suspension of the Member's certificate, and publication of the decision with the Member's name.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination on the basis of disability and marital status, as well as reprisal for a previous application.

The respondents requested that the application be dismissed at a summary hearing for having no reasonable prospect of success, and alternatively, that the individual respondents be removed.

The Tribunal found that, accepting the applicant's allegations as true, there was a reasonable prospect of success, as the applicant could point to evidence supporting his claims of discrimination and reprisal regarding his sick leave and rumours of an extra-marital affair.

The Tribunal also declined to remove the individual respondents at this stage, as their conduct was central to the reprisal allegations.

The request to dismiss the application was denied.

The applicant sought reconsideration of a Final Decision dismissing his human rights application alleging discrimination and reprisal.

He argued that the hearing process was unfair, particularly the use of a teleconference, and disputed the Tribunal's findings on timeliness and the employer's investigation.

The Tribunal denied the request, finding that the applicant failed to meet the criteria for reconsideration under Rule 26.5.

The Tribunal noted that the parties had consented to the teleconference hearing and that the applicant was given a full opportunity to present his case.

The defendant university brought a motion to strike the plaintiff’s Fresh As Amended Statement of Claim alleging breach of fiduciary duty and breach of contract arising from a dispute over graduate program funding and supervision.

The court held that the pleading improperly contained extensive evidence rather than concise material facts and failed to adequately plead the essential elements of either fiduciary duty or contract.

The allegations did not establish the existence of a trust or any undertaking by the university to prefer the student’s interests, nor did they sufficiently identify the contractual terms allegedly breached.

The court also noted that disputes rooted in academic decision-making may fall outside the court’s jurisdiction and be more appropriately addressed through judicial review.

The motion to strike was granted, but the plaintiff was granted leave to amend the claim again.

The appellant was convicted of possessing a loaded, prohibited firearm found under his passenger seat during a traffic stop.

He appealed, arguing the search violated his s. 8 Charter rights, was racially motivated, and that the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the appellant lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle, the trial judge reasonably concluded there was no racial bias, and the verdict was supported by the evidence.

The defendants moved to strike a graduate student's Statement of Claim arising from allegations that university officials pressured him to switch from a PhD program to a Master's program and interfered with funding.

The court found the pleading prolix, deficient in material particulars, and inadequate to support pleaded causes of action for breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, negligent misrepresentation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress in its current form.

However, it was not plain and obvious that the claims were incapable of amendment, particularly regarding alleged contractual rights to funding and limits on university discretion.

The claims against the individual defendants, and the claims for conspiracy and fraudulent misrepresentation, were withdrawn on consent.

The impugned remaining claims were struck with leave to amend, and no costs were ordered.

Permanent resident applicants challenged the citizenship oath requirement to swear allegiance to the Queen, alleging infringements of freedom of expression, freedom of conscience and religion, and equality rights under the Charter.

The court held that, purposively interpreted, the oath is not allegiance to the Queen in her personal capacity but a symbolic commitment to Canada's form of government and the unwritten constitutional principle of democracy.

Applying the Irwin Toy framework, the court concluded there was no infringement of s. 2(b), and in the alternative any infringement would be justified under s. 1.

The court also held that the oath is secular and does not violate s. 2(a), and that the equality claim failed because it was premised on a mistaken understanding of the oath's meaning.

Appeal dismissed and cross-appeal allowed.

The applicant sought to amend his human rights application to add several allegations of discrimination and reprisal against the respondents.

The Tribunal granted the request in part, allowing the applicant to add allegations of harassment and reprisal that occurred within one year of the application and were related to the original complaint.

The Tribunal denied the request to add older allegations relating to a previous supervisor, finding them out of time and distinct from the original application, with no good faith explanation for the delay.