Tina T.H. Kim

The offender pleaded guilty to second degree murder of his former domestic partner.

The victim was killed in her home in a brutal attack involving multiple stab wounds and near-decapitation.

The offender had a documented history of violence and threats toward the victim, breached court-ordered no-contact conditions, and committed the murder while the victim's young child was present in the home.

The court imposed a life sentence with parole ineligibility of 18 years, reduced from 20 years due to Charter violations arising from the offender's mistreatment during an Institutional Crisis Intervention Team deployment at Maplehurst Correctional Centre.

This endorsement addresses a media request for the release of exhibits from the sentencing hearing in R. v. Ritchie.

The court permitted the release of all exhibits to the media, subject to privacy protections for inmates and the victim’s child, and restrictions on the publication of certain sensitive materials, including medical and psychiatric reports.

The order was made with the consent of all parties involved.

The court sentenced David Morias for offences including possession of a loaded restricted firearm, possession of a prohibited device, and possession of fentanyl and cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

The decision reviews the aggravating and mitigating factors, the impact of systemic anti-Black racism, and the appropriate sentencing range for mid-level fentanyl traffickers.

The court imposed a global sentence of 90 ⅔ months after credits for pre-trial custody and restrictive bail conditions, with ancillary orders including a lifetime weapons prohibition, DNA order, and forfeiture.

This ruling addresses the voluntariness of statements made by Malik Essue, who is charged with first-degree murder, to police.

The central issue was the police's failure to provide a proper primary caution and their use of trickery during the interview.

The court found that Essue was a suspect in law, despite police assertions to the contrary, and that the partial caution given was inadequate.

The police also failed to inform Essue that the interview was being recorded and falsely told him he was not a suspect.

The court concluded that the police's deliberate omissions and deception undermined the fairness of the statement-taking process and Essue's ability to make a meaningful choice.

Consequently, the Crown failed to prove voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt, and Essue's statement was ruled inadmissible at trial.

The Crown sought to admit ante-mortem statements made by the deceased, Sangita Sharma, in a murder trial against three defendants.

The statements concerned Ms. Sharma's business dealings and disputes with an alleged orchestrator of her contract killing, Mian Afzalaqif.

The court ruled on the admissibility of these statements under traditional hearsay exceptions (state of mind, statement of intention) and the principled approach to hearsay (necessity and threshold reliability).

The court found the statements admissible, deeming them relevant to motive and identity, and satisfying the reliability criteria despite defence concerns regarding the witness's credibility.

The applicant, charged with first-degree murder, sought to exclude cellphone evidence seized during a traffic stop, alleging breaches of sections 8, 9, and 10 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and a delay in filing a Report to Justice.

The court found that while the traffic stop was legitimate, the seizure of the cellphones by the London police officer was unlawful as he lacked independent reasonable grounds, acting solely on direction from another officer.

However, the court determined that the Charter breach was not serious, the impact on the accused was minimal, and the administration of justice would not be brought into disrepute by admitting the evidence, especially given the seriousness of the murder charge and the subsequent judicial authorization for the search.

The accused, Mr. David Morias, brought an application to exclude evidence obtained during a search and seizure, alleging violations of his rights under sections 7, 8, and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Crown conceded a violation of s. 10(b) rights (right to counsel) due to an 8-hour delay in facilitating a call to counsel, but argued against exclusion under s. 24(2).

The court found no violation of s. 8 (unreasonable search/seizure) as the search warrant was validly issued and executed, and no violation of s. 7 (excessive force) as the police's use of force was deemed reasonable given the circumstances.

Despite the serious s. 10(b) breach, the court dismissed the application to exclude evidence under s. 24(2), finding that its admission would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute, primarily because the evidence was not causally connected to the breach and was reliably obtained via a valid warrant.

Andre Martin was convicted of attempted murder with a firearm and unauthorized firearm possession.

The Crown sought an 18-year sentence, while the defence proposed 6-10 years.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the use of a firearm, the victim's permanent paralysis, and the offender's criminal record.

Mitigating factors included provocation, a dysfunctional upbringing, and systemic anti-Black racism.

The court emphasized general deterrence, denunciation, and the importance of rehabilitation, imposing a total sentence of 12 years, accounting for pre-trial custody and future COVID-related restrictions.

The applicant, Jahvar Green, charged with multiple firearms offences, brought a pre-trial application under s. 24(2) of the Charter to exclude a firearm found in a car he was driving.

He argued arbitrary detention (s. 9) due to racial profiling and unreasonable search/use of force (ss. 7, 8).

The court found no racial profiling, as the officer did not see the applicant's race before the initial interaction.

The court also ruled that no detention occurred when the applicant fled from the officer's initial signal to stop, as there was no submission or acquiescence.

Detention began lawfully when the applicant was directed to stop in a Starbucks drive-thru.

The court further found the officer's belief that a firearm was in a satchel was objectively reasonable, justifying the search and use of force.

The application to exclude the firearm was dismissed.

The applicant, who was found guilty of child pornography offences, applied for a stay of sentencing under s. 11(b) of the Charter, arguing unreasonable delay between the verdict and the sentencing hearing.

The court applied the Jordan framework and found that the presumptive ceiling of five months for sentencing delay was exceeded.

However, the court dismissed the application, concluding that the delay was reasonable due to the exceptional circumstances of the COVID-19 pandemic, which caused a suspension of regular court operations and a significant backlog.

The accused, Richard Walker, brought a motion to qualify Mr. David Pellerin as an expert witness in computer forensics and viruses to support his defence against charges of possessing, accessing, and making available child pornography.

The motion was dismissed.

The court found that Mr. Pellerin did not meet the threshold requirements for expert qualification, specifically lacking clear impartiality, independence, and unbiasedness due to a prior working relationship with the accused.

Furthermore, his proposed evidence was based on incomplete information and general knowledge, making its relevance and necessity tenuous.

The court concluded that the probative value of the evidence was outweighed by the risk of unduly delaying the trial, confusing the jury, and leading to an unhelpful line of inquiry.

The offender was convicted of two counts of making written child pornography and two counts of making an arrangement to commit sexual offences under sections 151 and 271 of the Criminal Code.

The offences involved online communications with undercover police officers posing as mothers with young children.

The offender was sentenced to a total of 30 months imprisonment, comprising 18 months concurrent on counts 1 and 2, and 12 months consecutive on count 4.

The court rejected the offender's constitutional challenge to the mandatory minimum sentence and declined to apply section 718.3(7) requiring consecutive sentences, finding that provision applies only to offences against real children.

Ancillary orders including DNA, SOIRA, and section 161 prohibition orders were imposed for life.

The accused was charged with two counts of making written child pornography and two counts of making arrangements with another person to commit sexual offences against a four-year-old child.

The Crown's case involved an undercover police operation where the accused engaged in sexually explicit online communications with an undercover officer posing as a mother willing to facilitate child sexual abuse.

The accused discussed meeting the officer at a specific address and time to commit sexual offences against the child.

The sole issue at trial was whether the Crown proved the requisite mens rea for the arrangement offence.

The court found that the accused intended to make an arrangement to commit sexual assault and sexual interference, and convicted on all counts.

Z.K. appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel based on his lawyer's alleged refusal to let him testify and general incompetence.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that Z.K. ultimately made his own decision not to testify after receiving advice from counsel.

The court also concluded that, despite some identified shortcomings in counsel's performance, there was no reasonable possibility that the trial verdict would have been different, and therefore no miscarriage of justice occurred.

The accused was charged with impaired driving, driving with excess alcohol, and possession of marijuana following a traffic stop in Brampton.

The marijuana charge was dismissed on consent.

The central issue was whether the arresting officer had reasonable grounds to believe the accused's ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired by alcohol, thereby justifying a breath demand under section 254(3) of the Criminal Code.

The defence challenged the lawfulness of the breath demand and sought exclusion of the evidence.

The court found the officer had reasonable and probable grounds based on the totality of circumstances, including observations of driving conduct and physical signs of intoxication.

The court rejected the defence argument that the officer's observations were exaggerated or careless.

Convictions were entered on both driving-related counts.