Adam R. Newman

In a criminal Charter motion, the accused sought a stay of proceedings after being arrested on an outstanding warrant and not being brought before the issuing jurisdiction for approximately three months.

Interpreting Criminal Code ss. 514, 511(4), 511(1)(c), and 503(1), the court held that the warrant was executed upon arrest and that police were required to bring the accused before a justice without unreasonable delay.

The court rejected the Crown’s position that execution occurred only at the later Hamilton bail appearance and found breaches of ss. 7 and 9 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

Applying the stay framework in Regan and Babos, the court found no demonstrated prejudice to trial fairness or to the integrity of the justice system in the specific circumstances, including parallel lawful detention on other charges.

The application for a stay was therefore dismissed.

The court sentenced David Morias for offences including possession of a loaded restricted firearm, possession of a prohibited device, and possession of fentanyl and cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

The decision reviews the aggravating and mitigating factors, the impact of systemic anti-Black racism, and the appropriate sentencing range for mid-level fentanyl traffickers.

The court imposed a global sentence of 90 ⅔ months after credits for pre-trial custody and restrictive bail conditions, with ancillary orders including a lifetime weapons prohibition, DNA order, and forfeiture.

The three accused, Anand Nath, Suliman Raza, and Naqash Abbasi, were found guilty of first-degree murder and five counts of attempted murder with a firearm following a shooting at a restaurant.

The court considered whether the offense constituted a terrorism offense, finding that while the motive clause (political, religious, or ideological purpose) was met, the intention clause (to intimidate the public) was not.

The court emphasized the aggravating factors, including the planned and deliberate nature of the crimes, the group plan, the gratuitous violence against bystanders, and the profound impact on victims.

The judge imposed concurrent life sentences for all counts for each offender, along with ancillary orders.

The accused, Mr. David Morias, brought an application to exclude evidence obtained during a search and seizure, alleging violations of his rights under sections 7, 8, and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Crown conceded a violation of s. 10(b) rights (right to counsel) due to an 8-hour delay in facilitating a call to counsel, but argued against exclusion under s. 24(2).

The court found no violation of s. 8 (unreasonable search/seizure) as the search warrant was validly issued and executed, and no violation of s. 7 (excessive force) as the police's use of force was deemed reasonable given the circumstances.

Despite the serious s. 10(b) breach, the court dismissed the application to exclude evidence under s. 24(2), finding that its admission would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute, primarily because the evidence was not causally connected to the breach and was reliably obtained via a valid warrant.

The applicant, charged with sexual offences involving two complainants, brought a pre-trial motion to sever the counts relating to each complainant.

The court found a factual and legal nexus between the complaints, noting similarities in the alleged conduct, the vulnerability of the complainants, and the relationship between the parties.

The court held that the potential for similar fact evidence and the efficiency of a joint trial outweighed the risk of prejudice, which could be mitigated by appropriate jury instructions.

The application for severance was dismissed.

The Crown applied for a bail review to vacate a Justice of the Peace's order granting judicial interim release to the accused, who was charged with child pornography offences and breach of probation.

The reviewing judge found that the Justice of the Peace erred in law by minimizing the severity of the offences, failing to consider the potential for a lengthy sentence, and improperly limiting the Crown's cross-examination of the proposed surety.

Conducting a de novo hearing, the reviewing judge found the release plan strong enough to satisfy the secondary ground, but ordered the accused's detention on the tertiary ground due to the overwhelming evidence, the serious and inherently violent nature of the offences, and the risk of the accused accessing the internet in the proposed residence.

During a Zoom preliminary inquiry for two accused charged with first-degree murder, a screen capture of one accused was taken and uploaded to social media, violating section 136 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court suspended the observer portion of the Zoom proceedings to prevent further violations, emphasizing the seriousness of such acts and the potential for witness intimidation.

To uphold the open court principle, arrangements were made for public observation in a physical courtroom with limited capacity due to COVID-19 protocols and police supervision, while the main proceedings continued virtually.

The applicant, facing 22 charges including robbery, dangerous driving, and firearm offences, sought a bail review after being detained by a justice of the peace.

He argued that his recovery from COVID-19 and delays in setting a preliminary inquiry constituted a material change in circumstances, and that the justice of the peace erred in law.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, finding no material change in circumstances and no errors of law.

The court further held that even with a foolproof release plan, the applicant's detention was necessary on the tertiary ground to maintain confidence in the administration of justice given the gravity of the offences and his extensive criminal record.

The mother appealed a trial decision placing her two children in extended society care and ordering that access for the mother, older sister, and grandmother be at the discretion of the Children's Aid Society.

The Divisional Court upheld the extended society care order, dismissing the mother's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and other errors.

However, the court allowed the appeal regarding access, finding that the trial judge erred in law by delegating the determination of the type, frequency, and duration of access entirely to the Society.

The matter of access was remitted to the trial judge.

The accused, charged with firearm possession offences, brought a Charter application challenging an investigative detention and search based on a confidential-source tip describing a group of Black males at a large apartment building, one allegedly armed.

The court held that the accused was detained from the moment an officer physically stopped him and told him to stop, and that the available tip information was too generalized and insufficiently particularized to amount to reasonable suspicion.

Because the detention was arbitrary, the incidental search was unreasonable, and the police also breached the accused’s right to counsel both by failing to advise immediately and by eliciting a statement after he requested duty counsel.

Applying the Grant s. 24(2) framework, the court found the first two factors strongly favoured exclusion and ordered the firearm, ammunition, and statement excluded.

The offender, a 19-year-old first-time offender, pled guilty to aggravated assault, assault with a weapon, and breaching bail after a violent, unprovoked attack on his intimate partner.

The court sentenced him to 12 months in custody for the aggravated assault, focusing on denunciation and deterrence while acknowledging his rehabilitative prospects.

The court granted 1.5 days credit for pre-sentence custody, plus enhanced credit for strict house arrest bail and harsh pre-sentence detention conditions, including frequent lockdowns and isolation from family.

After applying 375 days of total credit, the offender was sentenced to 1 day in jail followed by 24 months of probation.

The accused was charged with sexual assault following an encounter with the complainant.

The complainant, who was highly intoxicated, initially had no memory of the events but later claimed to remember non-consensual anal penetration.

The accused testified that the sexual activity was consensual and denied any anal penetration, stating that the encounter ended when the bed tipped and the complainant hit her head.

The court found the accused's evidence credible and corroborated by forensic evidence and witness testimony.

The court raised serious concerns about the reliability of the complainant's recovered memories, suggesting they may have been tainted by suggestions from a sexual assault nurse and police.

The accused was acquitted.

The accused was charged with multiple counts of uttering forged documents, possession of property obtained by crime, and attempted fraud.

The Crown's case relied heavily on the testimony of an accomplice who had already pleaded guilty to related frauds.

The court found the accomplice's testimony lacked credibility and reliability, and the circumstantial evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was the mastermind or the driver who assisted in the frauds.

The accused was found not guilty on all counts.

The offender was convicted by a jury of manslaughter after being charged with second degree murder in the fatal stabbing of an intimate partner during a domestic argument.

The sentencing judge rejected the offender’s claim that the victim accidentally stabbed himself during a struggle and found that the offender intentionally stabbed the victim in anger during an argument.

Aggravating factors included the domestic relationship, the use of a knife, and the offender’s failure to seek medical assistance for the victim after the stabbing.

Mitigating factors included the offender’s youth, lack of criminal record, remorse, positive rehabilitative efforts while in custody, and difficult personal background.

The court concluded that the moral blameworthiness placed the offence in the upper range of manslaughter cases and imposed a penitentiary sentence of eight years, with credit for pre‑trial custody.

In a trial for second degree murder, the Crown and defence brought pre-trial applications regarding the admissibility of evidence.

The defence sought to introduce evidence of prior violent acts by the deceased to support a claim of self-defence.

The Crown sought to introduce evidence of the deceased's good character, the accused's bad character, and ante-mortem statements made by the deceased.

The court ruled that evidence of the deceased's prior violent acts was admissible.

The Crown's application to introduce the deceased's good character was largely dismissed, except for evidence of his non-violent disposition at work.

The Crown's application to introduce the accused's bad character was dismissed due to its prejudicial effect outweighing its probative value.

Most of the ante-mortem statements were ruled inadmissible hearsay, save for a statement of intention and lay opinion regarding the accused's tone of voice.

The applicants sought exclusion of cash and cocaine seized during execution of a search warrant, alleging breaches of s. 8 of the Charter and arguing that the warrant was invalid because the redacted Information to Obtain relied heavily on confidential informer information.

The Crown invoked the Garofoli “Step Six” procedure, providing a judicial summary of redacted material so the reviewing judge could consider the unredacted ITO while preserving informer privilege.

The court held that the Step Six procedure was appropriate because the defence was sufficiently aware of the nature of the excised material to challenge it.

After excising minor inaccuracies and amplifying certain information, the court concluded that the authorizing justice could reasonably have issued the warrant under the Debot framework based on a compelling tip and corroborative police investigation.

Even if the warrant had been invalid, the evidence would have been admitted under s. 24(2) of the Charter given the absence of police misconduct and the importance of the real evidence seized.