Tracy Vogel

The accused was charged with assaulting three of his young children with a belt and a wire/cable, assault causing bodily harm, and forcible confinement.

The charges arose amidst a highly acrimonious custody dispute with the children's mother.

The defence sought to introduce the children's prior statements from an unrelated, unfounded sexual assault investigation to argue they were prone to collusion and influence.

The court admitted the statements but gave them little weight.

Relying on the children's video-recorded police statements, their trial testimony, and corroborating medical evidence of patterned injuries, the court found the accused guilty of the assault charges.

The court acquitted the accused of forcible confinement due to reasonable doubt regarding the reliability of the child's delayed disclosure.

The offender pleaded guilty to possession of a loaded prohibited firearm, breach of a weapons prohibition, and possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

The Crown and defence agreed that the appropriate sentence before pre-sentence custody credit was seven years.

The court considered the exceptionally harsh conditions of the offender's pre-sentence custody, including frequent lockdowns and COVID-19 restrictions at the Toronto South Detention Centre.

Applying the principles from Duncan and Marshall, the court reduced the otherwise appropriate sentence by two years to account for these harsh conditions, resulting in a five-year sentence.

After applying enhanced credit for time served, the offender was sentenced to 98 days going forward.

The applicant, charged with sexual assault, brought a Charter challenge against ss. 278.92, 278.93, and 278.94 of the Criminal Code.

These provisions required the defence to disclose private records to the complainant and permitted the complainant to participate in the admissibility hearing.

The court found that the overbreadth of s. 278.92, the mandated disclosure of the accused's defence to the complainant, and the complainant's participation in the evidentiary process significantly impaired the accused's right to a fair trial and undermined the Crown's constitutional role.

The court declared ss. 278.92, 278.94(2), and 278.94(3) unconstitutional and of no force and effect under ss. 7 and 11(d) of the Charter.

The offender was convicted of robbery with a firearm and related offences, which carried a mandatory minimum sentence of seven years.

He spent over three and a half years in pre-sentence custody at the Toronto South Detention Centre, enduring exceptionally harsh conditions including 491 days of lockdowns.

The court dismissed a request for a Charter stay of proceedings but granted significant enhanced credit for the oppressive pre-sentence custody conditions under the Duncan framework.

The offender was sentenced to 7.5 years plus one day, with 7.5 years of pre-sentence credit applied, leaving one day to serve followed by two years of probation.

The accused, a condominium custodian, lured the complainant into a secluded stairwell, brandished a knife, and pinned her down while hovering his crotch near her face.

The attack was interrupted by a resident.

At trial, the accused conceded identity and the use of a weapon but disputed that the assault was sexual in nature and that he committed forcible confinement.

The court found the accused guilty on all counts, concluding the attack was objectively sexual and that he intentionally restricted the complainant's liberty.

The accused was charged with assault with a weapon, sexual assault, and forcible confinement arising from an incident on October 31, 2017, in a residential condominium building.

The accused, a custodian at the building, lured the complainant to a secluded stairwell by deception, brandished a knife, and positioned his crotch near her face while restraining her with his forearm.

The complainant resisted and screamed until a neighbor intervened.

The trial judge found the accused guilty on all three counts, determining that the conduct constituted an actual sexual assault (not merely attempted), as the accused deliberately violated the complainant's sexual integrity through the positioning of his genitals near her face in a threatening context, combined with physical restraint.

The applicant was convicted of robbery with a firearm and related offences.

Following conviction, the Crown brought an unsuccessful application for a psychiatric assessment for a dangerous offender application, and the defence brought a Charter application regarding pre-trial custody conditions.

The sentencing was delayed for 17 months post-conviction.

The applicant brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, arguing unreasonable delay.

The court applied the Jordan framework to the post-conviction sentencing delay, finding a net delay of 32 months (24 months pre-trial and 8 months post-trial attributable to the system/Crown).

As this exceeded the 30-month presumptive ceiling, the court found a s. 11(b) violation and permanently stayed the proceedings.

The accused was charged with armed robbery, aggravated assault, and possession of a loaded restricted firearm following an incident at a convenience store.

The Crown alleged the accused pistol-whipped the store clerk and struggled with him over a handgun, resulting in two shots being fired.

The accused testified that he was merely a bystander and that his young companion committed the robbery.

Applying the W(D) framework, the court rejected the accused's exculpatory evidence as contrived and accepted the store clerk's testimony, which was corroborated by an independent witness and forensic evidence including gunshot residue.

The accused was found guilty on all charges.

The Crown applied to have the respondent declared a dangerous offender following his convictions for two counts of attempted murder with a firearm, discharging a firearm with intent to wound, and failing to comply with a prohibition order.

The court reviewed the respondent's extensive criminal record, institutional misconduct, gang affiliation, and psychiatric assessments.

Finding that the respondent met the criteria for a dangerous offender due to a pattern of persistent aggressive behaviour and a substantial degree of indifference to the consequences of his actions, the court declared him a dangerous offender and imposed an indeterminate sentence.

The applicant, who was convicted of attempted murder and other firearm offences, challenged the constitutionality of the dangerous offender provisions in sections 753(1) and 753.01 of the Criminal Code.

The applicant argued that the 2008 amendments impermissibly curtailed judicial discretion and were overbroad, violating section 7 of the Charter.

The court reviewed the legislative history and jurisprudence, concluding that the provisions operate as part of a carefully calibrated scheme to protect the public while maintaining judicial discretion at the penalty phase.

The court found that the provisions are not overbroad and do not violate the principles of fundamental justice.

The application was dismissed.

The accused was charged with five criminal offences including failing to comply with bail conditions, robbery, and assault.

The Crown sought to revoke his previous bail and sought detention on the secondary ground (public safety).

The accused sought judicial interim release with his father as proposed surety.

The court found that the accused had not met his burden of demonstrating that release conditions could adequately address public safety concerns, particularly given his extensive criminal history including multiple breaches of court orders, violent offences, and the pattern of non-compliance with bail conditions.

The court was not satisfied that the proposed surety could provide adequate supervision given the lack of a meaningful relationship between father and son.

The court ordered detention.

The offender was convicted of sexual interference and sexual assault against his six-year-old biological son.

The offences involved oral and anal sex over a two-week period.

The court considered the devastating impact on the victim, the offender's lack of remorse, and the profound breach of trust.

Balancing the aggravating and mitigating factors, the court sentenced the offender to 5 years' incarceration, along with weapons prohibitions, a DNA order, and a section 161 prohibition order.

The accused was tried before a judge alone on multiple counts of sexual interference and sexual assault involving his young biological son.

The court addressed delayed disclosure, possible taint from family conflict, and inconsistencies in the complainant’s written and oral accounts, but found the complainant truthful and his explanation for non-disclosure credible.

The court also admitted prior discreditable conduct evidence concerning the accused’s prior conviction involving another child, finding the probative value sufficiently high to outweigh prejudice.

Applying the criminal burden of proof and the W(D.) framework, the court rejected the defence theory as speculative and entered convictions on all counts.

In a judge-alone criminal trial involving historical allegations of sexual interference and sexual assault against a child, the Crown sought admission of the accused's prior conviction for sexual offences against another young child as similar fact evidence.

The court applied the governing similar fact evidence framework and found substantial similarities in age, vulnerability, setting, relationship of trust, and pattern of conduct.

Although there was some concern about possible contamination of the complainant's account through exposure to the other case, that concern did not outweigh the probative value of the evidence, particularly given that the prior conduct arose from admitted facts supporting a guilty plea and could also bear on the defence theory.

The prior discreditable conduct evidence was admitted.

Mary Wagner was charged with breach of probation and mischief interfering with private property arising from her attendance at an abortion clinic where she allegedly offered roses and pamphlets to patients to discourage them from having abortions.

Wagner brought an application seeking production of all medical records, counselling records, identities, and contact information for the fifteen clinic patients and staff.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the requested information failed both branches of the O'Connor test: the information was not likely relevant to any material issue at trial, and even if it were, the privacy and dignity interests of the patients and employees outweighed any benefit to the defence.

Mary Wagner was charged with breach of probation and mischief interfering with private property arising from her attendance at a Toronto abortion clinic, where she attempted to intercede with patients by offering roses and pamphlets.

The trial focused not on whether the Crown could prove the acts alleged, but on whether Wagner was justified in her conduct based on defences of self-defence of others and necessity.

Wagner argued that a foetus has the status of a human being and that she was duty-bound to intervene to protect unborn lives.

The court rejected all of Wagner's constitutional and legal defences, finding her guilty on all counts.

The judgment provides extensive analysis of the legal status of the foetus under Canadian law, the scope of self-defence provisions, the doctrine of necessity, and the rule of law.

The offender was convicted by a jury of manslaughter after being charged with second degree murder in the fatal stabbing of an intimate partner during a domestic argument.

The sentencing judge rejected the offender’s claim that the victim accidentally stabbed himself during a struggle and found that the offender intentionally stabbed the victim in anger during an argument.

Aggravating factors included the domestic relationship, the use of a knife, and the offender’s failure to seek medical assistance for the victim after the stabbing.

Mitigating factors included the offender’s youth, lack of criminal record, remorse, positive rehabilitative efforts while in custody, and difficult personal background.

The court concluded that the moral blameworthiness placed the offence in the upper range of manslaughter cases and imposed a penitentiary sentence of eight years, with credit for pre‑trial custody.

The Crown applied under s. 752.1(1) of the Criminal Code for an order remanding the offender for a psychiatric assessment to determine whether a dangerous offender or long‑term offender application should proceed.

The offender had been convicted by a jury of two counts of attempted murder with a firearm and two counts of discharging a firearm with intent.

The court reviewed the offender’s extensive criminal record, including numerous firearm, drug trafficking, and breach offences, and considered the low threshold for ordering an assessment.

Finding reasonable grounds to believe the offender might be designated a dangerous offender due to a pattern of repetitive and aggressive behaviour involving firearms and drug trafficking, the court ordered the assessment.