Anik Morrow

The accused was charged with breaching a condition of his Long-Term Supervision Order that required him to immediately report any changes in his relationships.

He received a text message from a previous victim and replied that he needed to ask his parole officer if they could communicate, which he did the next day.

The Crown alleged this constituted a failure to report "immediately." The Court found the actus reus was met as the status of the relationship had changed and reporting was not immediate.

However, the Court held the Crown failed to prove the requisite mens rea beyond a reasonable doubt, as the accused believed he had put any change on hold awaiting permission.

The accused was found not guilty.

The offender pleaded guilty to two counts of possession of a loaded firearm and one count of breaching a weapons prohibition order.

The offences occurred three years apart, with the second occurring while the offender was on release for the first.

The court considered the offender's youth, first-offender status, and the impact of anti-Black racism as mitigating factors, but found the aggravating factors, including brandishing a firearm in public and possessing a firearm with an obliterated serial number, required a significant penitentiary sentence.

A global sentence of 6.5 years was imposed.

The offender was sentenced after pleading guilty to sexual interference against a minor child contrary to section 151 of the Criminal Code.

The court treated denunciation and deterrence as paramount, while also considering rehabilitation and restraint in light of significant mental health history, remorse, and very low assessed risk of sexual reoffending.

Aggravating factors included repeated abuse over several months, gross breach of parental trust, the child’s vulnerability, and severe family harm.

The defence sought a reformatory term of two years less a day with probation, while the Crown sought four years.

The court imposed a penitentiary sentence of 42 months with consent ancillary orders.

The Crown brought a dangerous offender application against the offender following his convictions for aggravated assault, assault with a weapon, and breaches of probation.

The offender had a lengthy, violent criminal record spanning two decades and was diagnosed with severe antisocial personality disorder and substance use disorder.

The court found the offender met the criteria for a dangerous offender designation, noting his pattern of persistent aggressive behaviour and high likelihood of harmful recidivism.

However, at the penalty stage, the court found a reasonable expectation that the offender's risk could be managed in the community given his recent commitment to treatment and the availability of intensive cognitive behavioural therapy.

The court imposed a determinate sentence of 8 years (with 18 months remaining after pre-sentence custody credit) followed by a 10-year long-term supervision order.

The Crown brought a dangerous offender application against the offender following his convictions for aggravated assault and related offences.

The offender had a lengthy criminal record and a severe substance use disorder.

The court reviewed extensive psychiatric and psychological evidence, including risk assessments using the PCL-R, VRAG, and HCR-20.

The court found that the predicate offence was reactive rather than instrumental, and therefore did not form part of a pattern of persistent aggressive behaviour required for a dangerous offender designation.

However, the court found the offender met the criteria for a long-term offender designation.

The offender was sentenced to a further 12 months in custody followed by a 6.5-year long-term supervision order.

The Crown sought to qualify Dr. Mark Pearce as an expert forensic psychiatrist to provide opinion evidence on the respondent's risk of offending or reoffending in a dangerous offender proceeding.

The court conducted a voir dire, examining Dr. Pearce's extensive qualifications, training, and experience, including his specialization in forensic psychiatry and use of actuarial instruments for recidivism risk assessment.

The respondent challenged the scope of expertise.

The court found Dr. Pearce highly qualified and accepted him as an expert in the assessment, diagnosis, and treatment of psychiatric disorders in both clinical and forensic contexts, specifically qualified to opine on the respondent's risk of offending or reoffending.

The Crown sought a s. 752.1 assessment order following convictions for aggravated assault, assault with a weapon, possession of a weapon dangerous to the public peace, and breach of probation.

The court held that the assessment stage is a summary proceeding within the sentencing process and that the statutory threshold is low: whether there are reasonable grounds to believe the offender might be found to be a dangerous offender or long-term offender.

The court rejected the respondent’s submissions that the 2008 amendments enhanced the judicial gatekeeper role or required a higher evidentiary standard, and further held that the offender’s lengthy violent record could support a qualifying pattern under s. 753(1)(a)(i) or (ii).

Leave to file additional Crown materials was granted, and the assessment order was issued.

The Crown applied to have the offender designated a dangerous offender following a conviction for assault with a weapon.

The court reviewed extensive evidence of the offender’s criminal history, including 89 prior convictions and numerous violent offences demonstrating a persistent pattern of aggressive and repetitive violent behaviour.

Psychological assessments placed the offender in high‑risk categories for violent recidivism but indicated potential manageability through intensive supervision and treatment in the community.

The court concluded the statutory criteria for dangerous offender designation under ss. 752 and 753 of the Criminal Code were met.

However, satisfied that long‑term supervision could adequately protect the public, the court imposed a two‑year sentence (time served) together with a ten‑year long‑term supervision order rather than an indeterminate sentence.

The Crown applied under s. 752.1(1) of the Criminal Code for an order remanding the offender for a psychiatric assessment to determine whether a dangerous offender or long‑term offender application should proceed.

The offender had been convicted by a jury of two counts of attempted murder with a firearm and two counts of discharging a firearm with intent.

The court reviewed the offender’s extensive criminal record, including numerous firearm, drug trafficking, and breach offences, and considered the low threshold for ordering an assessment.

Finding reasonable grounds to believe the offender might be designated a dangerous offender due to a pattern of repetitive and aggressive behaviour involving firearms and drug trafficking, the court ordered the assessment.

The defendant, a long-term offender subject to a long-term supervision order (LTSO) requiring him to remain within the City of Toronto, was charged with breaching the conditions of his release by being found outside Toronto in Pickering.

The Crown alleged the defendant knowingly violated the territorial restriction.

The defendant testified that he was a passenger in a vehicle driven by his common-law spouse, who became lost while searching for a significant home and inadvertently crossed the Toronto boundary.

The court found the defendant not guilty, holding that being a passenger who took no action to place himself outside the city, and ending up in Pickering as an accident, constituted a reasonable excuse under section 753.3(1) of the Criminal Code.

The appellants were convicted of first degree murder.

During the investigation, an undercover police officer posed as an Obeah spiritual advisor and obtained incriminating statements from two of the appellants.

The appellants appealed, arguing that the undercover operation violated their Charter rights to freedom of religion and equality, constituted a 'dirty trick', and that the statements were protected by common law religious privilege.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding that the appellants' participation was motivated by a desire to obstruct the justice system rather than sincere religious belief, and that the police conduct did not shock the conscience of the community.

The court also upheld the trial judge's decisions regarding an in camera hearing and the refusal to sever the trial of the third co-accused.

The Registrar issued a proposal to revoke the motor vehicle dealer registration of the applicant due to his criminal convictions for possession of stolen property and Highway Traffic Act offences.

The applicant appealed to the Licence Appeal Tribunal.

The Tribunal found that the applicant's serious industry-related criminal convictions afforded reasonable grounds for belief that he would not carry on business in accordance with law and with integrity and honesty.

The Tribunal ordered the Registrar to proceed with the revocation, but stayed the order briefly to allow the applicant's son to apply for his own dealer's licence.

The appellant was convicted in two separate trials of assault causing bodily harm, criminal harassment, and drug trafficking offences.

He received a 5-year sentence for the assault and an 8-year sentence for the drug offences, resulting in a global sentence of 13 years.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the second sentencing judge failed to adequately consider the totality principle.

The appeal was allowed, and the sentence for the drug offences was reduced to 5 years consecutive, resulting in a global sentence of 10 years.

The appellant hospital appealed a decision of the Ontario Review Board granting an absolute discharge to an individual found not criminally responsible for first degree murder.

The Board had previously adjourned the hearing to obtain an independent psychiatric assessment regarding the individual's past criminal involvement.

Despite the assessment failing to resolve these concerns, the Board's majority granted the absolute discharge.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the Board's decision unreasonable due to an unexplained gap in its reasoning regarding the relevance of the past criminal conduct and its failure to address inadequacies in the proposed treatment plan for monitoring medication compliance.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their application to quash their committal for trial.

They argued a denial of natural justice regarding the preliminary inquiry judge's use of hearsay evidence.

The Court of Appeal found no denial of natural justice, noting that counsel had the opportunity to make submissions on the issue and that the absence of a voir dire did not constitute jurisdictional error.

The court also found sufficient evidence of knowledge and control of a gun to warrant committal, based on the location of the child, the car seat, and the visibility of the gun.

The appeals were dismissed.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed by the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting that the sentence fell within the parameters of the joint submission put forward by counsel.

The court found the joint submission to be a fair reflection of the seriousness of the offence and the appellant's serious, related, and lengthy criminal record.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed by the trial judge.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge was justified in noting the difference between the two accused persons, specifically the use of a weapon while prohibited, and increasing the sentence on that account.

The appeal was dismissed.

The complainant union filed unfair labour practice complaints alleging that the respondent employers violated section 64 of the Labour Relations Act by permitting an incumbent union to post disparaging notices on company bulletin boards during an organizing campaign.

The respondents brought a motion to dismiss the complaints for failing to disclose a prima facie case.

The Board granted the motion, finding that the posting of notices was permitted under the collective agreements and section 46(1)(c) of the Act, and therefore could not constitute a violation of section 64.