ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE
CITATION: R. v. Paroski, 2026 ONCJ 503
DATE: August 21, 2026
BETWEEN:
HIS MAJESTY THE KING
— AND —
MARKO PAROSKI
Before Justice Angela L. McLeod
Trial January 21, 27; April 13, 17; June 18; August 10, 2026.
Indy Kandola....................................................................................... counsel for the Crown
Anik Morrow.................................................................................... counsel for the Accused
OVERVIEW
[1] Mr. Paroski was declared a dangerous offender on October 14, 2022, and sentenced to an Order of Long-Term Supervision for 10 years. The order completes on October 14, 2033.
[2] It is alleged that on the 19th of February 2025, he breached one of his conditions which required him to report to his supervisor about relationships. Specifically, the condition reads:
REPORT RELATIONSHIPS
Immediately report all sexual and non-sexual relationship and friendship with females and any changes to the status of the relationships/friendships to your parole supervisor.
NON-CONTESTED FACTS
[3] Mr. Paroski’s conditions were reviewed with him dozens of times, by at least 2 different parole officers. Indeed, he signed a copy of his conditions, acknowledging his understanding of those conditions, days before this allegation on January 20, 2025
[4] Mr. Paroski was assigned a new parole supervisor and met with her for the first time on December 10, 2024. At this meeting his conditions were reviewed and expectations were outlined.
[5] Mr. Paroski was involved in a romantic relationship with a woman named Jessica, at the time of the alleged breach. Concerns about that relationship, specifically constant changes to the status of that relationship were discussed by the parole officer and Mr. Paroski from the start of February 2025.
[6] He had been issued a suspension on February 5th, 2025, as a result of information shared by his halfway house regarding the instability of the relationship. The parole officer visited him in custody and discussed with him the reporting condition and the need to monitor the relationship. Mr. Paroski agreed that he would follow the expectation and the suspension was cancelled.
[7] Further concerns arose on February 10, 2025, and another conversation was had with Mr. Paroski about his conditions, the need for immediate reporting of changes, in real time. The officer was satisfied that he understood the concerns and the expectations.
[8] The officer and Mr. Paroski next met on February 19, 2025. Concerns about the relationship with Jessica were raised and were reported to the Parole Board. A suspension was not issued; however, Mr. Paroski was instructed not to associate with her thereafter. The LTSO conditions were reviewed again.
[9] The following date, on February 20, 2026, Mr. Paroski text messaged his parole supervisor as follows:
[10] The redacted portion reads Ashley Flint.
[11] Ashley Flint was the 4-year domestic partner of Mr. Paroski and was one of his victims. The conviction arising from this victimization underlies, in part, the dangerous offender designation.
[12] Ms. Flint and Mr. Paroski last had contact 7 years prior to 2025.
EVIDENCE OF THE PAROLE SUPERVISOR
[13] Ms. Pestikova testified that she reviewed the conditions with Mr. Paroski at least three times, including underscoring the need for immediate reporting, which could be by phone, text or in person. She identified that the parole officer needed to be aware of changes at the actual time they took place. She reminded him of the potential consequences of breaching, which could include a criminal charge.
[14] She was aware that Mr. Paroski was taking medication for ADHD and was dealing with trauma as a result of having been abused as a child.
[15] Mr. Paroski, while in the community, was working and going to school.
[16] The officer did not review the text exchange between Ashley Flint and Mr. Paroski, and relied upon his text message to her, as noted above. She determined that he had self reported a breach of the condition.
[17] The concern of the officer was that the Mr. Paroski did not immediately report the change to the relationship between himself and Ashley Flint; from non-contact/communication to contact/communication.
EVIDENCE OF MARKO PAROSKI
[18] I highlight the importance of the following evidence:
(1) He received a text, “Hey it’s Ashley call me”, and a phone number was included. He testified that he was confused and didn’t know which Ashley was texting him. Later, he came to the conclusion that it was Ashley Flint.
(2) He was surprised that she was texting and confused as to how she got his number.
(3) He ignored her text for awhile and didn’t want to reply. He then text back and told her he needed to ask his parole officer if they could communicate.
(4) He text messaged the parole officer on February 20th, 2025, before he went to class. This was the day after he had replied to Ashley.
(5) He knew that he had to report immediately all non sexual and sexual relationships and any changes in the status of those relationships. He knew that this was a very important condition.
(6) He testified that he felt that 24 hours was immediate. He agreed that the condition does not say within 24 hours.
(7) He testified that the delay in reporting to the parole officer was because he did not know which Ashley had contacted him and when he realized that it was Ashley Flint he then reported the contact.
(8) He testified that the contact from Ashley Flint was not a change to the status of their relationship. From his perspective, it was contact, put on hold, seeking permission from the parole officer to continue communication.
(9) While his conditions were reviewed with him at least 50 times, at no point did anyone explain to him what a relationship was.
POSITION OF THE PARTIES
A. CROWN
[19] The Crown submits that the matter is rather straightforward. Mr. Paroski had a condition to immediately report changes to his relationships. His relationship with Ashley Flint was non-contact/communicate for 7 years. When she text him, and he text her back, the status of that relationship changed. The onus was on Mr. Paroski to immediately advise his parole officer that he had received a text message from someone he believed to be Ashley Flint.
[20] Mr. Paroski knew about his condition and understood the expectation.
B. DEFENCE
[21] Ms. Morrow submits that Mr. Paroski did not know, for sure, that it was Ashley Flint and was doing the right thing by seeking permission to continue in the text exchange to confirm same. Ms. Morrow submits that the officer should have sought to see the actual text message(s) and, in the absence, the Crown has failed to establish the actus reus.
[22] Furthermore, Ms. Morrow submits that there was no change to the status of the relationship with Ashley Flint, if this court finds that it was in fact Ashley Flint who text Mr. Paroski. In this regard, she relies upon R. v. Tremblay, 2008 ONCA 24, specifically paragraph 17:
17 Karakatsanis J. cited the Concise Oxford English Dictionary meaning of "relationship":
(1) the way in which two or more people or things are connected, of the state of being connected, the way in which two or more people or groups regard and behave towards each other, and (2) as an emotional and sexual association between two people.
She ruled:
[T]here needs to be some mutual level of involvement, or connectedness, between two people for them to have a 'relationship.' In essence, it takes at least two of them to make a relationship. It seems to me that in applying this definition to the phrase 'any relationship entered into with females' in the context of the condition of this long-term supervision order, the second more restricted definition in the dictionary is most appropriate. The Parole Board fashioned the condition to ensure notice where there was a relationship that could develop into cohabitation with a woman. The word 'relationship' in this context refers to any mutual connection with a woman that engages on an emotional or sexual level. While the relationship need not necessarily be romantic and could be, for example, one of friendship, it does not in my view include an unsuccessful attempt to enter into a relationship with another person or an interest by one person to enter into a relationship.
[23] Ms. Morrow submits that contact is not connection and connection is the basis for a relationship. In Tremblay, supra, the court noted that Mr. Tremblay was not prohibited from having any casual contact with women nor was he required to report such contact. The same can be said for Mr. Paroski.
[24] Regarding the mens rea component, Ms. Morrow submits that the case of R. v. Ali, 2022 ONCJ 142 is instructive. Ali dealt with an allegation of a breach of a condition of probation. The case is submitted to underscore the subjective men rea requirement for a conviction in the case at bar. In Ali, the court identified the mens rea for a breach under s. 145(3) as:
(1) The accused had knowledge of the conditions of their bail order, or they were wilfully blind to those conditions; and,
(2) The accused knowingly failed to act according to their bail conditions, meaning that they knew of the circumstances requiring them to comply with the conditions of their order, or they were wilfully blind to those circumstances, and failed to comply with the conditions despite that knowledge; or
(3) The accused recklessly failed to act according to their bail conditions, meaning that the accused received a substantial and unjustified risk that their conduct would likely fail to comply with the bail conditions and persisted in this conduct.
[25] The Court in Ali held that the subjective standard for mens rea in that matter was whether or not the accused knew, not whether or not the accused ought to have known, which would erroneously bring the standard to an objective basis.
[26] The Crown in the case at bar made no submission nor reference to the mens rea component.
MENS REA FOR BREACH OF A LTSO CONDITION
[27] The New Brunswick Court of Appeal reviewed the requisite mens rea for LTSO breach allegations in R. v. Watts, 2022 NBCA and held that the mens rea is specific intent, as it is for a breach of release conditions. The Court highlighted two considerations; 1. knowledge of the risk of the breach by the accused, and, 2. recklessness:
A. The mens rea for breach of conditions
28 The applicable legal principles are not disputed. The Supreme Court recently addressed the requisite intent for offences arising from the breach of a condition, including the issues of risk of breach and recklessness. In R. v. Zora 2020 SCC 14, [2020] S.C.J. No. 14 (QL), Martin J. stated, in relation to a breach contrary to s. 145(3):
This second component [of the mens rea] can also be met by showing that the accused was reckless. Where, as here, a higher requirement of "wilfulness" or "intent" is not indicated by the text or nature of an offence, recklessness is generally included in subjective mens rea (see Sault Ste. Marie, at pp. 1309-10; R. v. Buzzanga(1979), 1979 CanLII 1927 (ON CA), 25 O.R. (2d) 705 (C.A.), at p. 71). Recklessness requires that accused persons be aware of the risk of not complying with their condition and proceed in the face of that risk (Josephie, at para. 30; Sansregret v. The Queen, 1985 CanLII 79 (SCC), [1985] 1 S.C.R. 570, at p. 584). Knowledge of risk is key to recklessness. Therefore, the accused must still know of their bail conditions in order to be aware of any risk of non-compliance. The accused must also be aware of the risk that the factual circumstances requiring them to act (or refrain from acting) to comply with their bail conditions could arise and continue with their course of conduct despite the risk. Recklessness is not, and should not through misapplication, become the same as negligence. Recklessness has nothing to do with whether the accused ought to have seen the risk in question, but whether they subjectively saw the risk and continued to act with disregard to the risk.
Given that s. 145(3) can operate to criminalize otherwise lawful day-to-day behaviour, I would conclude that knowledge of any risk of non-compliance is not sufficient to establish that an accused was reckless. Instead, the accused must be aware that their continued conduct creates a substantial and unjustified risk of noncompliance with their bail conditions. This Court has previously adopted this standard of risk in describing recklessness for certain offences (see R. v. Hamilton, 2005 SCC 47, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 432, at paras. 27-29; Leary v. The Queen, 1977 CanLII 2 (SCC), [1978] 1 S.C.R. 29, at p. 35 (per Dickson J. dissenting, but not on this point)). The risk cannot be farfetched, trivial, or de minimis. The extent of the risk, as well as the nature of harm, the social value in the risk, and the ease with which the risk could be avoided, are all relevant considerations (Manning and Sankoff, at p. 229). Although the trial judge will assess whether a risk is unjustified based on the above considerations, because recklessness is a subjective standard, the focus must be on whether the accused was aware of the substantial risk they took and any of the factors that contribute to the risk being unjustified.
Requiring this standard of risk for recklessness is warranted because the offence may criminalize everyday activities and have unforeseen consequences on people's everyday lives. For example, in the context of a condition requiring an accused to answer the door to police during their curfew, an accused would not be reckless if they took the minimal and justified risk of taking a short shower during their curfew whereas they could be reckless if they disconnected their doorbell or wore earplugs around their house. As with this Court's decision in Hamilton, at paras. 32-33, these reasons should not be interpreted as changing the general principles of recklessness as a fault element set out in Sansregret, as my description of recklessness is specific to the offence under s. 145(3).
Finally, I do not accept that a subjective fault requirement would make it too difficult for the Crown to prove an accused's knowing or reckless failure to comply with bail conditions. If the Crown chooses to lay a criminal charge under s. 145(3), when the possibility of a bail variation and bail revocation also exist, it will do so only when it has a reasonable prospect of conviction based on a full appreciation of all constituent elements of the offence. Many crimes have a subjective fault standard and there are recognized ways to marshal sufficient evidence to convince a judge beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused acted knowingly or recklessly. Courts may infer subjective fault for failure to comply charges, whether or not the accused decides to testify. After considering all the evidence, the trier of fact may be able to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused had the state of mind required for conviction based on the common sense inference that individuals "intend the natural and probable consequences of their actions" (R. v. Seymour, 1996 CanLII 201 (SCC), [1996] 2 S.C.R. 252, at paras. 19 and 23; Docherty, at p. 958; Loutitt, at para. 18). As noted by the intervener Attorney General of Ontario a subjective fault requirement has not prevented convictions on s. 145(3) charges in Ontario.
The Crown's concern that accused persons may simply say they forgot about their bail conditions to escape criminal liability for breaching their bail is addressed because judges "will no doubt act sensibly in assessing the authenticity of claims of forgotten court dates and overlooked bail conditions. Effect need not be given to forgetfulness merely because it has been asserted" (Withworth, at para. 14).
[Underlining and bold are mine; paras. 117-121]
29 Additionally, as referenced in Zora, the Supreme Court previously addressed the issue of recklessness in relation to an accused's awareness of the risk of violating a condition and the decision to proceed despite that risk, in Sansregret v. The Queen1985 CanLII 79 (SCC), [1985] 1 S.C.R. 570, [1985] S.C.J. No. 23 (QL):
The concept of recklessness as a basis for criminal liability has been the subject of much discussion. Negligence, the failure to take reasonable care, is a creature of the civil law and is not generally a concept having a place in determining criminal liability. Nevertheless, it is frequently confused with recklessness in the criminal sense and care should be taken to separate the two concepts. Negligence is tested by the objective standard of the reasonable man. A departure from his accustomed sober behaviour by an act or omission which reveals less than reasonable care will involve liability at civil law but forms no basis for the imposition of criminal penalties. In accordance with well-established principles for the determination of criminal liability, recklessness, to form a part of the criminal mens rea, must have an element of the subjective. It is found in the attitude of one who, aware that there is danger that his conduct could bring about the result prohibited by the criminal law, nevertheless persists, despite the risk. It is, in other words, the conduct of one who sees the risk and who takes the chance. It is in this sense that the term 'recklessness' is used in the criminal law and it is clearly distinct from the concept of civil negligence. [para. 16]
30 Commenting on how the apparent age of another person may factor into whether an accused "subjectively saw the risk and continued to act with disregard to the risk," Watt J.A. stated, in R. v. Alekozai 2021 ONCA 633, [2021] O.J. No. 4755 (QL):
Recklessness is a state of mind. It is the state of mind of a person who is aware that their conduct might bring about the result prohibited by the criminal law, but persists in the conduct despite the risk. Recklessness is subjective. It entails an appreciation of some level of risk and the decision to take that risk. In most cases, an accused who never turns their mind to the age of the other person is properly characterized as reckless. Reckless indifference also describes a subjective state of mind, a choice to treat age as irrelevant and to assume the risk associated with that choice [references omitted].
[Emphasis added; para. 42]
ANALYSIS
A. ACTUS REUS
[28] Mr. Paroski and Ashley Flint were known to one another, they had a long and intimate relationship. He victimized her. The relationship ended. Contact and communication ceased.
[29] When Ashley Flint (or at least the person that Mr. Paroski believed was Ashley Flint) messaged him, contact and communication resumed. When Mr. Paroski messaged her back advising that he would need to seek permission of his parole officer to continue contact or communication, contact and communication resumed.
[30] I find that the status of the relationship changed when the text messages were exchanged.
[31] Mr. Paroski did not report the change in the status of the relationship to his parole officer for at least 24 hours (his text to her said “a few days ago”).
[32] I find that his reporting of the change in the status of the relationship was not immediate.
B. MENS REA
[33] I find that Mr. Paroski well and truly knew about the conditions of his LTSO.
[34] I find that Mr. Paroski had been advised and well and truly understood the potential consequences of breaching those conditions. Indeed, he had his release suspended in the days preceding this allegation for the same reason. He had been incarcerated, met with his supervisor, had the conditions and consequences reviewed again, and was then released back into the community.
[35] I found Mr. Paroski to be uneducated, unsophisticated and institutionalized. He testified that at no time had anyone, either parole officer in particular, explained to him what constituted a relationship. The corollary to this is that it is unlikely that that anyone thereafter explained what constituted a change.
[36] I cannot find, beyond a reasonable doubt, find that Mr. Paroski knew that Ashley Flint sending him a text message, asking him to call her, and he replying that he needed to seek permission of his parole officer before doing so, as understanding that this constituted a change in their relationship. As he testified, he believed that he had put any change on hold, awaiting permission to communicate.
CONCLUSION
[37] The Crown has failed to establish each element of the offence beyond a reasonable doubt. Mr. Paroski is found not guilty.
Released: August 21, 2026.
Signed: Justice Angela L. McLeod