Jennifer Stanton

Following guilty pleas to possessing, accessing, and making available child pornography and breaching probation, the court determined whether the accused met the criteria for designation as a long-term offender under s. 753.1 of the Criminal Code.

The court held that the accused's sexual offending history, including prior hands-on, luring, and child pornography offences, disclosed a pattern of repetitive sexually motivated conduct targeting prepubescent and pubescent girls and established a substantial risk of reoffending under both s. 753.1(2)(b)(i) and (ii).

Relying on the forensic psychiatric evidence, the court also found a reasonable possibility of eventual control in the community through intensive supervision, internet restrictions, treatment, and sex drive reducing medication.

The accused was designated a long-term offender, sentenced to a fixed term of 4 years and 9 months less Summers credit, and made subject to a 10-year long-term supervision order.

L.M. pleaded guilty to child pornography offences.

The Crown sought reconsideration of a previous ruling that these offences did not constitute "serious personal injury offences" (SPIOs), which is a prerequisite for a dangerous offender designation.

The Crown's request for reconsideration was based on the Court of Appeal's decision in R. v. Snowden.

The court, after clarifying its previous reasoning and considering new evidence and the Snowden decision, reaffirmed its original finding that L.M.'s offences, while connected to harm, do not meet the threshold for SPIOs, thus precluding a dangerous offender designation.

The accused brought a Charter application to exclude evidence obtained by police during a murder investigation, alleging breaches of various Charter rights, including those related to search and seizure and rights upon detention.

The court analyzed the validity of production orders for banking records, warrantless review of surveillance video, the lawfulness of detention and seizure of electronic devices, and the validity and execution of a search warrant for cellphones.

The decision outlines specific findings on each alleged breach, determining some police actions were lawful while others violated the accused's Charter rights.

During a dangerous offender sentencing hearing, the Crown tendered a forensic psychiatrist as an expert witness.

The offender and amicus curiae challenged the expert's qualifications, arguing he exhibited professional credibility bias.

A voir dire revealed the expert's reports contained numerous significant errors, including copying large sections from a report about a different offender.

The court found the expert demonstrated professional credibility bias by failing to objectively reconsider his opinions when confronted with these errors.

The court excluded the expert opinion evidence, concluding that the risks of admitting the evidence outweighed its benefits.

Sentencing decision following guilty pleas to numerous internet-based sexual offences against eight child victims, together with possessing and accessing child pornography.

The court held that denunciation, deterrence, proportionality, and the totality principle required a significant penitentiary sentence, emphasizing the degrading, coercive, and dehumanizing nature of the offending and the profound psychological harm to the children.

The court accepted forensic psychiatric evidence that the offender likely suffered from paraphilic disorder or disorders and presented above-average, but not high, risk of sexual recidivism, while finding his insight and rehabilitation prospects uncertain.

A fit global sentence was fixed at 12 years, reduced by Summers credit for pre-sentence custody to 9 years 7 months and 20 days, with harsh remand conditions considered as mitigation under the Duncan framework.

The accused, L.M., pleaded guilty to child pornography offences.

The Crown sought to prove an unproven historical allegation of sexual assault involving M.L., the daughter of L.M.'s then-partner, as an aggravating fact for a potential long-term offender designation.

The court heard testimony from M.L. and her mother, N.L., and considered the challenges of assessing an adult's testimony about childhood events, including inconsistencies over time.

Applying principles from R. v. W.(R.) and R. v. A.M., the court found M.L. to be a credible and reliable witness, concluding that the sexual assault allegation was proven beyond a reasonable doubt, despite minor inconsistencies attributed to the passage of time and the victim's age at the time of the incident.

The Crown brought a dangerous offender application against the offender following his convictions for aggravated assault, assault with a weapon, and breaches of probation.

The offender had a lengthy, violent criminal record spanning two decades and was diagnosed with severe antisocial personality disorder and substance use disorder.

The court found the offender met the criteria for a dangerous offender designation, noting his pattern of persistent aggressive behaviour and high likelihood of harmful recidivism.

However, at the penalty stage, the court found a reasonable expectation that the offender's risk could be managed in the community given his recent commitment to treatment and the availability of intensive cognitive behavioural therapy.

The court imposed a determinate sentence of 8 years (with 18 months remaining after pre-sentence custody credit) followed by a 10-year long-term supervision order.

L.M. pleaded guilty to possessing, accessing, and distributing child pornography.

The Crown applied for an assessment to determine if L.M. should be declared a dangerous offender or a long-term offender.

The court dismissed the application for a dangerous offender assessment, finding no sufficient causal link between L.M.'s conduct and severe psychological damage to victims to classify the offences as "serious personal injury offences" (SPIO) under s.752 of the Criminal Code.

However, the court granted the application for an assessment to determine if L.M. might be a long-term offender under s.753.1, given his criminal history and risk of reoffending.

The Crown applied for a preventative order under s. 810.2 of the Criminal Code against the respondent, who had recently completed a sentence for aggravated assault against an intimate partner.

The court first ruled on the admissibility of various documents in the Crown's application record, applying the 'credible and trustworthy' standard to exclude unproven allegations and an unsupported psychological assessment.

Based on the admissible evidence, including the respondent's extensive criminal record of domestic violence, the court found reasonable grounds to fear he would commit a serious personal injury offence and ordered him to enter into a recognizance.

The defendant, Aleksandr Shaporov, was found guilty of possessing and accessing child pornography following an international investigation into the "Welcome to Video" (W2V) website, a child pornography platform on the Dark Web.

The prosecution presented extensive electronic evidence, including Bitcoin transactions from the defendant's Coinbase account to W2V, and downloaded child pornography files found on his computer.

The defence argued that a third party, a roommate named Roman, was responsible and that the police investigation was deficient.

The court rejected the defendant's testimony as incredible and unreliable, finding that the electronic evidence overwhelmingly established his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Crown applied to have Thomas Snowden declared a dangerous offender or, alternatively, a long-term offender, following his guilty pleas to multiple child pornography and breach of recognizance charges.

The court denied both dangerous offender and long-term offender designations, finding that the predicate offences did not meet the definition of a serious personal injury offence (SPIO) as there was no direct causal connection between Snowden's actions (possession/distribution of child pornography) and the severe psychological damage suffered by the victims, which largely stemmed from the original abuse.

The court also found no substantial risk of violent re-offending, which is required for a long-term offender designation.

Snowden was sentenced to a determinate sentence of 5 years, with 3 years credit for pre-sentence custody, resulting in 2 years in penitentiary.

The Crown applied for a bail review to vacate a Justice of the Peace's order granting judicial interim release to the accused, who was charged with child pornography offences and breach of probation.

The reviewing judge found that the Justice of the Peace erred in law by minimizing the severity of the offences, failing to consider the potential for a lengthy sentence, and improperly limiting the Crown's cross-examination of the proposed surety.

Conducting a de novo hearing, the reviewing judge found the release plan strong enough to satisfy the secondary ground, but ordered the accused's detention on the tertiary ground due to the overwhelming evidence, the serious and inherently violent nature of the offences, and the risk of the accused accessing the internet in the proposed residence.

The Crown applied for an assessment under s.752.1 of the Criminal Code to determine if the accused, who pleaded guilty to possessing and accessing child pornography, should be declared a dangerous or long-term offender.

The central issue was whether these offences qualified as "serious personal injury offences" under s.752, a prerequisite for such an assessment.

The court, distinguishing from previous cases like Patterson based on the quantity and nature of the child pornography, the accused's repeat offender status, and compelling victim impact evidence, found that the offences did meet the definition of serious personal injury offences.

Consequently, the court ordered the assessment.

The Crown appealed a decision granting the accused a preliminary inquiry.

The accused was charged with offences carrying a maximum 10-year sentence, but the Crown indicated intent to seek a dangerous offender designation, which could lead to indefinite detention.

The lower courts held that this potential indefinite detention entitled the accused to a preliminary inquiry under s. 535 of the Criminal Code, interpreting "punishable by 14 years or more of imprisonment" to include the overall penal jeopardy.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that s. 535 unambiguously refers to the maximum sentence of the *offence charged*, not the potential outcome of a subsequent dangerous offender proceeding.

The court emphasized that dangerous offender proceedings are separate and relate to the offender, not the offence, and that the lower courts' interpretation contradicted Parliament's intent to restrict preliminary inquiries and would lead to absurd results contingent on prosecutorial discretion.

This is a decision on an application for leave to intervene by the Criminal Lawyers’ Association of Ontario (CLA) in a Crown appeal.

The underlying appeal concerns the interpretation of section 535 of the Criminal Code regarding an accused's entitlement to a preliminary inquiry when facing potential dangerous offender proceedings or increased penalties under section 718.3(8)(c).

The court granted the CLA leave to intervene on the argument that a preliminary inquiry should be granted if an accused faces a potential total sentence of 14 years or more, approaching the calculation from a totality perspective.

However, the court denied intervention on arguments related to the direct applicability of section 718.3(8)(c) as a gateway to a preliminary inquiry and the requirement for pre-election Crown notice, deeming these new issues outside the scope of the appeal and lacking a proper factual record.

The Crown applied for judicial review to quash a pre-trial judge's decision that the accused was entitled to a preliminary inquiry.

The accused was charged with assault offences carrying maximum sentences of 10 years, but the Crown gave notice of its intent to seek a dangerous offender assessment upon conviction.

The pre-trial judge found that the potential for an indeterminate sentence meant the offences were 'punishable by 14 years or more of imprisonment' under s. 535 of the Criminal Code.

The Superior Court dismissed the Crown's application, holding that the pre-trial judge had jurisdiction to make the finding and correctly interpreted the provision by considering the accused's actual penal jeopardy.

The defendant sought a preliminary inquiry under section 535 of the Criminal Code despite being charged with offences carrying a maximum sentence of ten years imprisonment, which falls below the fourteen-year threshold established by 2019 amendments.

The Crown provided notice of its intention to seek a Dangerous Offender designation, which could result in an indeterminate sentence.

The court held that the defendant was entitled to a preliminary inquiry, finding that the Crown's notice of intent to pursue a Dangerous Offender application fundamentally altered the defendant's potential penal jeopardy, bringing it within the scope of section 535 when interpreted purposively.

During a first-degree murder trial, the accused brought an application for a mistrial and other relief following the late disclosure that undercover officers placed in his cell had audio-monitored their communications.

The accused sought further disclosure, challenged the Crown's claim of investigative privilege over the monitoring device, and argued the monitoring violated section 8 of the Charter.

The court dismissed the applications, finding that the Crown properly asserted public interest privilege over the device's specifics.

The court also held that the audio monitoring was lawfully conducted for officer safety under section 184.1 of the Criminal Code and did not constitute an unreasonable search or seizure.

The application for a mistrial was dismissed.

This ruling addresses the admissibility of text messages extracted from the accused's cell phone during a first-degree murder trial.

The defence argued the texts were irrelevant and constituted impermissible disposition evidence.

The Crown sought to admit them to corroborate the credibility and reliability of statements made by the accused to undercover officers, particularly regarding his lifestyle and interests.

The court found the majority of the texts relevant for supporting the officers' testimony, concluding their probative value outweighed their prejudicial effect.

However, the court excluded texts referring to violent consensual sex, masturbation, and a nude photograph, deeming them either too prejudicial or irrelevant.

The accused, Kalen Schlatter, applied for an order declaring his right to silence under s. 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms was infringed by statements made to Toronto Police Services undercover officers placed in cells adjacent to his upon arrest, and to exclude these statements under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The court reviewed the police conduct, including the decision not to record the interaction surreptitiously without judicial authorization, and the nature of the conversation between the accused and the undercover officers.

The court found that the police did not actively elicit the statement in a manner akin to interrogation and that the accused had not met the onus of establishing a Charter violation.

The application was dismissed.