Apple Newton-Smith

The appellant was convicted of first-degree murder in the shooting death of Glen Davis in a Toronto parking garage.

The appellant's nephew orchestrated the murder and recruited the appellant and others to carry it out.

The appellant's defence was that he had a last-minute change of heart and did not shoot Davis, but rather his co-accused did.

The appeal raised three grounds: that the trial judge unjustifiably curtailed cross-examination of key Crown witnesses; that the trial judge erred in giving a Browne v. Dunn instruction; and that the trial judge erred in his charge regarding post-offence conduct.

The appellate court dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding that despite some questionable interventions, the trial was fair and the conviction was supported by compelling evidence.

The appellant appealed both his conviction and sentence for sexual assault against his stepdaughter.

The appellant argued that the trial judge applied a higher level of scrutiny to his evidence than to the Crown's evidence, and failed to adequately address the improbability of the assaults occurring in the family room with the mother potentially nearby.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction and sentence, finding that the trial judge's reliance on the appellant's admissions at the time of arrest was well-founded and that his assessment of the evidence disclosed no error.

The appellant appealed his sentence of two years' imprisonment for criminal negligence causing bodily harm.

The appellant had attempted suicide by driving his vehicle into a hydro pole, causing debris to strike and seriously injure a victim.

The sentencing judge imposed the custodial sentence based primarily on denunciation and deterrence, with minimal consideration of the appellant's serious mental health issues and rehabilitation prospects.

The Court of Appeal found the sentencing judge erred in principle by excluding other relevant sentencing principles and failing to give meaningful consideration to the appellant's mental illness, which played a central role in the offence.

The court allowed the appeal and varied the sentence to time served plus two years' probation.

The appellant appealed his convictions for driving while disqualified and assault, as well as his sentence.

The appellant admitted he was disqualified from driving, and the trial judge found he operated a motor vehicle in a residential driveway.

However, the Court of Appeal found there was no evidence that the driveway constituted a street, road, highway, or other public place within the meaning of the Criminal Code.

The appeal from the driving conviction was allowed and an acquittal entered.

The appeal against the assault conviction was dismissed as it was supported by ample evidence.

The sentence appeal regarding a probation condition was dismissed, with the court noting it should be addressed by application to the trial judge.

The appellant appealed his effective sentence of 16 months following guilty pleas to driving offences and possession of stolen property.

The trial judge had imposed a 9-month sentence (in addition to 7 months of pretrial custody) to allow the appellant to attend the Ontario Correctional Institute, which required a 9-month minimum.

After the appellant was rejected from the program, he appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and reduced the sentence to the 5 months originally requested by the Crown, noting the appellant's genuine remorse.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder for killing his mother.

He raised a defence of not criminally responsible by reason of mental disorder (NCR), which the jury rejected.

On appeal, he argued the jury's verdict was unreasonable because it rejected uncontradicted expert psychiatric evidence, and he sought to introduce a new psychiatric report as fresh evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the jury had a rational basis to reject the expert opinion due to flaws in its factual foundation.

The court also denied the admission of fresh evidence, concluding it lacked cogency and could not reasonably be expected to have affected the verdict.

The appellant appealed his convictions on the sole issue of whether the 2013 self-defence provisions of the Criminal Code have retrospective application.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting that it had previously determined in R. v. Bengy that the provisions do not have retrospective effect.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding the complainant's testimony about the timing of events and whether she blacked out.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge was fully alive to the timing issues and gave thorough reasons for finding the complainant credible.

The sentence appeal was abandoned.

The appellant appealed his global sentence of 14 years' imprisonment for multiple offences arising from a violent home invasion and possession of a prohibited firearm.

He argued the sentence was crushing and demonstrably unfit given his youth, minor prior record, and rehabilitative efforts in custody.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence was within the appropriate range.

The court emphasized the gratuitous physical violence, permanent psychological damage inflicted on the victims, and the terrorization of the family, which included holding a loaded gun to a child's head.

The appellant was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder after shooting his sister and her fiancé.

At trial, the defence conceded the shootings and intent but argued provocation, while the Crown argued the murders were planned and deliberate 'honour killings'.

The appellant appealed his convictions, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting expert evidence on the cultural context of honour killings and in failing to give a W.D. instruction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the expert evidence was relevant, balanced, and properly admitted, and that the jury instructions as a whole correctly conveyed the burden of proof without setting up a credibility contest.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence.

He provided satisfactory proof that he is a full status Métis.

The Court of Appeal varied his probation order by deleting the condition requiring him to abstain from owning, possessing, or carrying weapons as defined in the Criminal Code.

The appeal was otherwise dismissed.

The appellants appealed convictions arising from a vicious, pre-meditated group assault intended to intimidate a victim from testifying at an upcoming murder trial, arguing that the trial judge failed to provide an adequate Vetrovec warning regarding an unsavoury key witness and misdirected the jury on confirmatory evidence.

The Court of Appeal held that the caution, framed consistently with standard jury instructions and reinforced by repeated references to the witness's frailties, was more than adequate in the context of the case as a whole.

It further held that the cited confirmatory evidence was capable of bolstering material aspects of the witness's account and was not misleading.

On sentence, the court found an error in the trial judge's statement that there were no mitigating factors, but concluded that denunciation and deterrence properly predominated and that the four-year global sentence remained fit.

The young person appealed their conviction and sentence for robbery.

The appellant argued the trial judge misapprehended circumstantial evidence regarding identification and erred in principle during sentencing by departing from a probation officer's recommendation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge correctly assessed the circumstantial evidence matching the appellant's clothing and appearance to the perpetrators.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge made no error in principle and was entitled to weigh the appellant's poor behaviour in pre-trial custody.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault and assault with a weapon, as well as his designation as a dangerous offender and indeterminate sentence.

He argued the trial judge failed to address inconsistencies in the complainants' evidence and that the predicate offences did not form a pattern with his prior sexual assault convictions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons adequate.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the court found a clear pattern of the appellant using violence to achieve sexual objectives and an inability to control his impulses.

The appellants were convicted of first degree murder after the Crown alleged the wife hired her co-accused to kill her husband.

On appeal, the wife argued the trial judge erred by permitting the Crown to cross-examine its own witness at large after declaring her adverse under s. 9(1) of the Canada Evidence Act, without instructing the jury that the witness's lack of credibility could not be used to infer the accused were not credible or guilty.

The co-accused argued the trial judge erred in refusing to sever his trial, exposing him to highly prejudicial hearsay evidence admissible only against the wife.

The Court of Appeal allowed both appeals, finding the lack of a limiting instruction regarding the adverse witness amounted to misdirection, and the refusal to sever the trial resulted in an injustice.

Separate new trials were ordered.

The appellants, two brothers, appealed their convictions for second degree murder following the stabbing death of the victim during an altercation in an apartment.

The appellants argued the trial judge erred in his instructions to the jury regarding self-defence, provocation, intent, causation, and in responding to jury questions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding no errors in the trial judge's instructions or responses to the jury, and concluding there was no air of reality to the defences of provocation or self-defence.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for a firearms offence.

He argued the trial judge erred by reversing the burden of proof in his jury instructions and by failing to discharge a juror who conducted an independent investigation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the jury charge was proper when read as a whole and the trial judge reasonably exercised his discretion regarding the juror.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the sentence of six months above the statutory minimum was not manifestly excessive.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred by failing to read portions of cross-examination to the jury after reading the examination-in-chief they requested.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting that defence counsel had not identified any specific portions to be read and that the trial judge had reminded the jury of the extensive cross-examination and the defence's theory of collusion.

The court found no prejudice or unfairness to the appellant.

The appellant was convicted of first-degree murder based in part on DNA evidence and a statement he made to police.

On appeal, he argued his s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel was breached when police questioned him before he had a reasonable opportunity to consult his counsel of choice.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the police failed to hold off questioning after the appellant indicated he was still trying to reach his lawyer.

The court concluded the statement was conscriptive evidence that should have been excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittal on drug charges.

The trial judge had excluded evidence of cocaine found in a knapsack the accused threw away while fleeing police, finding violations of ss. 8 and 9 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the accused was not detained when the police chase began, and by the time he was tackled, police had reasonable grounds for investigative detention.

Furthermore, the accused abandoned any reasonable expectation of privacy in the knapsack when he threw it away.

A new trial was ordered.