Scott C. Hutchison

The appellant, convicted of second-degree murder, brought a motion under s. 683(1)(a) of the Criminal Code for the production of police records relating to the officer in charge of his homicide investigation.

The officer had a history of misconduct, including stealing opiate drugs from evidence lockers and crime scenes.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion in part, ordering the Toronto Police Service and Ontario Provincial Police to produce records relating to the officer's conduct in the appellant's specific investigation to the court for review.

The court dismissed the request for records relating to unrelated investigations, finding it speculative.

The officer was granted limited intervener status to assert privacy interests in the records.

The applicant, Canadian Air Transport Security Authority (CATSA), brought an application to quash a General Warrant and Assistance Order that authorized the Ontario Provincial Police to randomly search passenger baggage at the Thunder Bay International Airport for evidence of drug trafficking and money laundering over a 30-day period.

The Assistance Order compelled CATSA employees to notify police if they discovered controlled substances or large sums of currency during routine security screening.

The Superior Court of Justice granted the application and struck out the orders.

The court held that while CATSA lacked standing to raise a section 8 Charter challenge, the General Warrant was invalid under section 487.01 of the Criminal Code because it lacked specificity and reasonable grounds, amounting to an unauthorized fishing expedition.

Consequently, the Assistance Order issued under section 487.02 could not stand.

The appellant, a medical doctor, appealed his convictions for 16 counts of sexual assault and 1 count of sexual exploitation against 13 patients.

The appeal centered on the trial judge's universal ruling permitting the cross-count use of similar fact evidence.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in assessing the risk of prejudice, using acquitted counts as similar fact evidence, finding sufficient similarity, and discounting the risk of inadvertent tainting from media and the CPSO website.

The majority of the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's treatment of the similar fact evidence or the risk of tainting.

The dissenting judge would have allowed the appeal in part, finding the trial judge erred in her assessment of inadvertent tainting for two counts.

The appellant, convicted of 12 counts of fraud, brought a motion seeking directions and assistance in cross-examining police and civilian witnesses regarding the late disclosure of police emails.

The appellant sought production of redacted portions of emails generated between 2021 and 2024 concerning the disclosure process.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding it was a request for production governed by the Trotta test.

The court concluded there was no reasonable possibility that ordering production would result in admissible fresh evidence or assist in developing a successful ground of appeal, as there was no air of reality to the underlying abuse of process claim.

A reference to the Court of Appeal for Ontario concerning whether legal online gaming and sports betting would remain lawful under the Criminal Code if users were permitted to participate in games and betting involving individuals outside of Canada.

The majority (Tulloch C.J.O., Gillese, Hourigan and Dawe JJ.A.) answered affirmatively, finding that section 207(1)(a) of the Criminal Code permits Ontario to conduct and manage a lottery scheme with international pooled liquidity, provided Ontario continues to conduct and manage the Ontario-based aspects of the scheme in accordance with provincial law.

The majority rejected the application of the real and substantial connection test and distinguished the Earth Future decisions.

Van Rensburg J.A. dissented, arguing that the Proposed Model would contravene the Criminal Code because it would require Ontario to conduct and manage aspects of the lottery scheme outside Ontario's territorial boundaries, contrary to the plain meaning of "in that province" in section 207(1)(a).

The appellants sought to advance a new theory regarding a 15-degree bend in the property boundary line between their lot and the respondent's lot on Jack Lake.

This theory was based on new expert evidence obtained after the Court of Appeal's 2020 decision, which had remitted the matter back to the Superior Court to determine the location of the water's edge in 1902 and related issues.

The motion judge dismissed the appellants' second application as a collateral attack on the 2020 order.

The Court of Appeal upheld this dismissal, finding the second application constituted an abuse of process because the bend theory could and should have been raised in the original application.

The court also rejected the appellants' alternative motion to vary the 2020 order.

The appellant sought a stay pending appeal of an application judge's decision dismissing its application for a declaration that the modified version of its GotSkill? game was not a game of mixed chance and skill under the Criminal Code.

The appellant also sought injunctive orders preventing enforcement of a bulletin issued by the respondent requiring liquor licensees to cease operating the game.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, finding that while there was a serious issue to be tried and the appellant would suffer irreparable harm, the balance of convenience favoured the respondent due to the public interest in enforcing gambling and alcohol regulations designed to protect minors and vulnerable individuals.

The plaintiffs, a law firm, brought a motion for further and better affidavits of documents from two defendants (spouses) and for their further examination for discovery.

The defendants refused to answer certain discovery questions based on spousal privilege.

The court determined that under section 11 of the Ontario Evidence Act, spousal privilege applies only to communications received from a spouse, not communications made to a spouse.

Therefore, each defendant must disclose their communications sent to their spouse but may claim privilege over communications received from their spouse.

The plaintiffs were successful and awarded costs.

The appellant, J. Michael Evans, appealed the refusal of building and septic permits for Harry Island in the Township of Muskoka Lakes.

The court found that Evans failed to establish a legal nonconforming residential use of the boathouse on Harry Island, as there was no evidence of actual residential use or intention to continue such use since the 1920s or 1930s.

The court also held that the chief building official did not have discretion under the zoning bylaw to deem the undersized island to conform.

However, the court allowed the appeal regarding the septic permit, finding that compliance with the Building Code superseded the municipal bylaw’s setback requirement.

Kevin Carmichael pleaded guilty to fraud and other offences under the Ontario Securities Act for operating a multi-million dollar Ponzi scheme.

The scheme defrauded over 40 investors of an estimated $18 million to $23 million, causing devastating financial and personal impacts.

The Ontario Court of Justice sentenced Carmichael to four years of imprisonment, emphasizing general deterrence as the primary sentencing principle for regulatory fraud of this magnitude.

The court also noted that the current maximum penalty under the Securities Act is too low compared to similar offences under the Criminal Code and called for legislative reform.

The appellants, Charles McVety and Canada Christian College, appealed a motion judge's decision to dismiss their anti-SLAPP motion against a defamation action brought by Kory Teneycke and Rubicon Strategy Inc. The defamation claim alleged that McVety publicly stated Teneycke acted in a conflict of interest regarding Ontario's vaccine passport policy and profited from it, and that Teneycke was prejudiced against Christians.

The motion judge found substantial merit to the defamation action and that the appellants had no viable defences, partly due to potential malice, and that the public interest favored allowing the action.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's analysis of the claim's merits and defences, and while agreeing the balancing analysis was flawed, a fresh analysis led to the same conclusion that the public interest in allowing the action outweighed the public interest in protecting the appellants' expression, given the low quality and malicious motivation of the speech.

The request for leave to appeal costs was also dismissed.

The appellant, C.D., appealed his conviction for sexual interference, sexual exploitation, and sexual assault, and his sentence.

The sentence appeal was abandoned during oral submissions.

The conviction appeal raised three issues: the admissibility of prior discreditable conduct (the "shower incident"), the lack of a caution regarding the complainant's prior consistent statement, and the absence of an instruction against cross-count reasoning.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible errors by the trial judge.

The court held that the shower incident evidence was admissible for motive and to rebut defence theories, and that the lack of specific jury instructions was a legitimate tactical decision by defence counsel.

This ruling addresses a defence application under section 276 of the Criminal Code to admit evidence of prior consensual sexual activity between the accused and the complainant in a historical sexual assault case.

The accused sought to introduce the evidence to contextualize his actions and challenge the complainant's credibility regarding the nature of their prior relationship, arguing that without it, his conduct would appear unexplained.

The Crown and complainant opposed, asserting it would invite "twin myths." The court granted the application, finding the evidence admissible as it was fundamental to the coherence of the defence narrative and not being adduced for prohibited purposes, drawing parallels to R. v. Temertzoglou.

The decision emphasizes the accused's right to make full answer and defence.

The moving party sought to stay an upcoming Law Society Tribunal hearing pending her application for judicial review.

She argued the Law Society committed an abuse of process by improperly obtaining documents from her bank.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for a stay, finding that the judicial review application was premature as the administrative process had not yet run its course.

The court also held that the balance of convenience favoured proceeding with the scheduled hearing to avoid further delay and fragmentation of the proceedings.

The moving party brought a motion before the Divisional Court.

The motion was dismissed for oral reasons dictated in court, with costs reserved to the panel hearing the application by agreement of the parties.

The appellant, a former police officer, appealed his convictions for bribery, attempting to obstruct justice, breach of trust, and trafficking cocaine, as well as his 13-year sentence and a $250,000 fine in lieu of forfeiture.

The convictions arose from a corrupt relationship with a drug trafficker, from whom the appellant accepted bribes for protection.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's jury instructions on reasonable doubt and credibility, admission of evidence, or handling of late disclosure.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, with the court finding the 13-year sentence fit given the gravity of the police corruption.

The fine in lieu of forfeiture was upheld, but the time to pay was varied to one year from the date of the appellant's release from custody.

The Mohawk Council of Kahnawà:ke sought a declaration that Ontario's iGaming scheme, enabled by specific provincial legislative provisions, was inoperative.

The Council argued that these provisions impermissibly allowed private operators to "conduct and manage" lottery schemes, which, under the Criminal Code, is reserved for provincial governments, thus violating the division of powers and triggering the doctrine of paramountcy.

The respondents, iGaming Ontario and the Attorney General of Ontario, challenged the Council's standing and argued that Ontario, through iGO, properly conducts and manages the scheme.

The court granted the Council public interest standing but ultimately dismissed the application, finding that Ontario, through iGO, maintains sufficient control to be considered the "operating mind" of the iGaming scheme, thereby complying with the Criminal Code and avoiding paramountcy.

The applicants, senior secured lenders, sought the appointment of a receiver over the assets of "The One" mixed-use construction project due to financial and covenant defaults by the borrower.

The project, significantly delayed and over budget, had outstanding debt of approximately $1.235 billion.

The appointment of Alvarez & Marsal Canada Inc. as receiver was unopposed by any key stakeholder.

The court granted the application, appointed the receiver, approved a super-priority receivership funding credit agreement of up to $315 million, and issued a stay of proceedings, finding it just and convenient to stabilize the situation and maximize recovery for all stakeholders.

The applicants, families of adults with severe autism, sought judicial review of the Ministry's decision to discontinue special, non-statutory funding for Applied Behavioural Analysis (ABA) therapy and transition them to mainstream adult developmental services.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that the allocation of public funds is a political decision not subject to judicial review absent bad faith.

The court also dismissed the applicants' Charter claims, reaffirming that section 7 does not impose a positive obligation on the state to fund specific health or social services, and finding no breach of sections 7, 9, or 12 regarding one applicant's involuntary hospitalization under the Mental Health Act.

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal the order of Varpio J. dated April 11, 2023.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and ordered the moving parties to pay costs of $5,000 to the responding party.